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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Vol. 52

SUMMER, 1968

No. 1

WHAT IS A PLACE OF "PUBLIC"
ACCOMMODATION?
ALFRED AVINS*

Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on the federal level, and
the laws of 35 states and the District of Columbia,2 prohibit discrimination in places of public accommodation. In spite of the widespread coverage of this type of legislation, there is surprisingly little in the recent
periodical literature which attempts to analyze what types of businesses
are and ought to be considered as "public" accommodations. 3 The purpose of this article is to analyze and attempt to rationalize the considerations which ought to govern in determining what a place of "public"
accommodation means, and how it should differ from a place of "private" accommodation.

1.

THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASES AND THEIR COMMON LAW BACKGROUND.

A. The Common Law of Public Utilities.
Because almost all "public accommodation" statutes were passed after the Civil Rights Cases,4 and, as will be noted later on, the earliest

northern state laws were mostly a response to this decision, it is desirable to start by analyzing this decision in light of its common-law back*B.A. 1954, Hunter College; LL.B. 1956, Columbia Univ.; LL.M. 1957, New
York Univ.; M.L. 1961, J.S.D. 1962, University of Chicago; Ph.D. 1965, University of Cambridge (England); Member of the New York, Florida, District
of Columbia, Illinois, and United States Supreme Court Bars. Formerly Assistant District Attorney, New York County; former Professor of Law, Memphis State University; former Special Counsel to the Attorney-General of
Louisiana; former Special Deputy Attorney-General of New York.
178 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. §§2000 a-2000 a-6 (1964).
2 For an up-to-date list of such laws, see Note, Public Accommodation Laws
and the Private Club, 54 GEo. L. J. 915, 916, n. 8-10 (1966). A list of such laws
in existence at the time of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, supra,
is contained in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
259, n. 8 (1964), and in Avins, Freedom of Choice in Personal Service Occupations: Thirteenth Amendment Limitations on Antidiscrimination Legisla-

tion, 49 CORN. L. Q. 228, n. 1 (1964).
3

Caldwell, State Public Accommodation Laws, FundamentalLiberties and Enforceinent Programs,40 WASH. L. REv. 841 (1965) gives a good general survey

of a descriptive kind. For earlier surveys, see Comment, Race Equality by
Statute, 84 U. PA. L. Rnv. 75, 81 (1935) and Stephenson, Separation of the

Races in Public Conveyances, 3 Am. POT. ScI. REv. 180 (1909). There are a

large number of bland and quite superficial reviews. See, e.g., Comment, 19
U.

MiAMI

L. Rm. 456 (1965). There are also a considerable number of sur-

veys of the law of one state only. See, e.g., Note, 34 U. ClN. L. REV. 368
(1965).

4 109 U.S.3 (1883).
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ground. To do so, the statuq of certain public utilities must first be
examined.
Under English common law, it was the duty of-a common carrier to
serve all persons5 without imposing unreasonable conditions.6 The
English courts considered that "a person [who] holds himself out to
carry goods for everyone as a business .

..

is a common carrier,"' and

that any member of the public may create a,contract with the carrier
by accepting its general offer. 8 The rule remains the same today.9
Wherever English common law was exported, the rule that carriers
had to serve the public without unreasonable discrimination went with
it. The rule is therefore found in cases from Australia," Burma, 1
Canada, 12 India, 13 Ireland,' 4 and New Zealand. 15 An early South African case held that since a public utility must serve the whole public,
an electric tramway could not refuse to carry non-Europeans,"8 although a later case held that race was a reasonable ground for refusal
to carry passengers.7
From its earliest days, American law followed the English ruleI'8
that railroads and ,other common carriers were legally bound to carry
all persons and could not unreasonably exclude anybody, but they had
power to make reasonable regulations and discriminations, and exclude
5Jackson v. Rogers, 2 Show, 327, 89 Eng. Rep. 968 1683).
6 Garton v. Bristol & Exeter Ry. Co., 1 B. & S.112, 121 Eng. Rep. 656 (1861).
See generally, Kline, Origin of the Rule Against. Unjust Discrimination, 66
U. PA. L. REv. 123 (1918) ; Kline, Scope of the Rule Against Unjust Discrimination by Public Servants, 67 U. PA. L. Ray. 109 (1919).
7 Ingate v. Christie, 3 Car. & K. 61, 175 Eng. Rep. 463, 464 (1850).
s Denton v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 5 El. & Bl. 860, 119 Eng. Rep. 701 (1856).
9 See Belfast Ropework Co. v. Bushell, [1918] 1 K.B. 210.
10 James v. Commonwealth, 62 Commw. L. R. 339, 368, 13 Aust. L. J. 34, [1939]
A.L.R. 141 (H.C.)1; cf. Hyland v. Mullaly & Byrne Pty, Ltd., [1923] V.L.R.
193, 44 Aust. L.T. 147, 29 A.L.R. 124 (Vict. Sup. Ct.).
11 Maung Po Taw v. Haramdi Missay, A.I.R. 1.919 Upper Burma 17, 3 Upper
Burma Rul. 120 (U.B. Judicial Commr.'s Ct.).
12 Ludditt v. Ginger Coote Airways Ltd., [1947] A.C. 233, [1947] 2 D.L.R. 241,
243 (P.C.); Thibault v. Garneau, [1959] Que. P.R. 377; Graham & Strang v.
Dominion Express Co., 48 Ont. L.R. 83, 35 Can. C.C. 145, 55 D.L.R. 39, 50
(1920); Fraser v. Mc Gibbon, 10 Ont. W.R. 54, '56 (1907); Jones v. Grand
Trunk Ry. Co., 9 Ont. L.R. 723, 5 Ont. W.R. 611 (1905); Leonard v. American Express Co., 26 U. Can. Q.B.R. 533 '(1867).
13 Hussainbhai v. Motilal, I.L:R. 1963 Bombay 823, A.I.R. 1963 Bombay 208, 65
Bom. L.R. 152, 1963 Mah. L.J. 312; River Steam Navigation Co. n. Shyam
Sundar Tea Co. Ltd., A.I:R. 1955 Assam 65, I.L.R. [1954] 6 Assam 433,
aff'd [1961] 2 S.C.J. 595 [1962] 2 S.C.R. 802, A.I.R. 1962, S.C. 1276.; Dhar v.
Ahmad Bux, A.I.R. 1933 Cal. 735, 60 Cal. 879; India General Navigation &
Rail Co. v. Dekhari Tea Co. Ltd., I.L.R. 51 Cal. 304, A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 40, 51
Ind. App. 28 (1923) ; Indian Carriers Act of 1865, § 2.
14.Scott v. Midland Great Western Ry. Co., 3 Irish Common Law Rep. 59 (C.P.
1852).
'5 Pitcaithly v. Thacker,'23 N.Z.L.R. 783, 6 Gaz. L.R. 157 (1903).
16 Williams & Odendorff v. Johannesburg Municipality, So. Afr. L.R. 1915 T.P.D.
106, 115.
17 Marks v. Port Elizabeth Tramway Co., So. Afr. L.R. 1939 E.D.L. 35, 40.
18 Hamilton, Unjust Discrimination in Railways, 22 Am. L. REG. (n.s.)
733
(1883).
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passengers on reasonable grounds. 9 Even before the Civil War the
Illinois Supreme Court had pointed out that ferrymen were common
carriers because '!he enjoys'a franchise-a special privilege, which is
granted to 'him in 'conseqfience of his superior qualifications to fill a
public trust. 2 0° That court also pointed'out that "railroads are .'. common highways ... in the sense of being compelled to accept of each and
21
all, and take'and catry to the extent of their ability." '
The rule remains unchanged to the present time. Thus it has been
held that because of the special privilege of a monopoly franchise given
to a common carrier to peiform a service for the public,22 the carrier,
like other public utilities, cannot abandon its service without permission
of the authorized governmental commission.2 3 Thus, a recent case has
noted- "This duty of a common carrier to meet the needs of the public
arises from its acceptance and enjoyment of the' powers and privileges
granted by'the State and endures 'so long as they' are retained." 24 A
distinguishing hallmark of common ;carriers is the obligation to carry
all persons without unreasonable discrimination.2 5 Conversely, a carrier
'9

Commonwealth v. Power, 48 Mass. (7 Ivetc.) 596 (1844). See also Indianapolis,

P. & C. Ry. Co. v. Rinard, 46 Ind. 293 (1874); Atwater v. Delaware, L. &
W. R. Co., 48 N.J.L. '55, 2 A. 803 (1886); Choate, The Right of Railway
Passengers to Suitable Acommodations, 1 Southern L. Rev. (n:s.) 445
(1875).
20 Fisher v. Clisbee, 12 II1.'344, 349-350 (1851).
21 Central Military Tract. R.R. Co. v. Rockafellow, 17 Ill. 541, 551 (1856).
221n Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280'F.2d 531 (5th Cir. "1960), the court

said:

"It is, of course, fundamental that the justification for the grant by a state to
a private corporation 6f a right or franchise to perform such a public utility
service as furnishing transportation, gas, electricity, or the like, on the public

streets of the city, is that the grantee is about the public's business. It is
doing something the state dems useful for the public necessity 'or con-

venience. This is what differentiates the public utility which holds what may
be called a 'special franchise,' from an 'ordinary business corporation which
in common with all others is granted the privilege of operating in corporate
form but does not have that special franchise of using state property for
23 private gain to perform a public functiof."
See Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm., 283 F.2d 204, 214
(C.A.D.C. 1960) where the court observed: "The fact that abandonment of
public service requires Government approval symbolizes the special legal status
and obligati6ns of common carriers and public utilities. This includes an obligation, deeply embedded in the law, to continue service. When Panhandle
sought and obtained a certificate of public convenienc'e and necessity to serve
the Detroit market, it became the exclusive supplier for that market....
Abandonment may be allowed only if the 'public cofivenience or necessity
permit!"
24 Susquehana Transit Commuters Assn. v. Board of Public Utility Commrs.,
25 55 N.J. Super. 377, 151 A.2d 9, 17' (1959).
See Semon v. Royal Indem. Co., 179 F. Supp. 403, 405-6 (W.D. La. 1959),
quoting 13 C.J.S. Carriers, §§ 530, 538 as follows:
"Public or common carriers of passengers, like common carriers of goods,
are engaged 'in a public calling which imposes on them a duty to serve all
without discrimination. . . . The distinction between a public or, common
carrier of passengers and a special oi private carrier of the same is that it is
the duty of the former to'V-eceive all who apply for lpassage; so long as there
is room and no legal exctiseforrefusing, while such duty does not rest on the
latter ....
a common carrier of passengers is bound to receive for carriage
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which reserves the right to pick and choose its passengers is not a common carrier.26 Thus, common carriers of passengers could not engage
in racial discrimination merely by virtue of common law or statutory
rules prohibiting unreasonable discrimination, entirely aside from any
7
special statute banning racial discrimination.1
Under English common law, a similar rule applied to innkeepers,2
who were likewise bound to accommodate all travelers, unless they had
reasonable cause to refuse.2 9 The rule was similar in Scotland, although
there hotels could pick the class of guests they chose to accommodate."

33
32
3
Cases to the same effect are found in Australia, ' Canada, Ireland,

and South Africa. 34 Thus, when a Negro sued a London hotel for refusing him accommodations, he was allowed to recover on the theory
that such discrimination was simply one of the many types of unreasonable discrimination, and no special consideration was paid to the fact
that racial discrimination was involved. 35 The Lord Justice-Clerk of the

Scottish Court of Session observed in a similar case:
It is obvious that the defenders are not entitled to exclude the
pursuer from their hotel because he is a Jew; and it would have
made no difference, in my opinion, had it been proved that he is
a Jew of German origin. An individual is not responsible,
and
36
ought not to be made responsible, for his ancestry.

without discrimination all proper persons who desire and properly offer to
become passengers, if the accommodations are sufficient, unless some special
reason or excuse exists for refusing them; ....
See also Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Calif.
1961).
26Hunt v. Clifford, 152 Conn. 540 209 A.2d 182, 183 (1965) held:
"A common carrier of passengers undertakes to carry for hire, indiscrimin-

ately, all persons who may apply for passage, provided there is sufficient space
or room available and no legal excuse exists for refusing to accept them.
Since passengers were not accepted on this school bus indiscriminately but
were restricted to pupils embraced in the contract of transportation, the bus
was not being operated as a common carrier of passengers."
27 Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956)
Wright v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co., 223 F. Supp. 660 (N.D. Ill. 1963). See
also Quindry, Airline Passenger Discrimination, 3 3. Air Law 479 (1932);
Dixon, Civil Rights in Air Transportationand Government Initiative, 49 VA.
L. REv. 205, 209-211 (1963).
28 The cases are reviewed in Williams v. Linnitt, [1951] 1 K.B. 565, [1951] 1
All E.R. 278. See Beale, The Medieval Innkeeper and His Responsibility, 18
Green Bag 269 (1906).
29R. V. Higgins, [19481 1 K.B. 165, [1947] 2 All E.R. 619; Browne v. Brandt
[1902d 1 K.B. 696, 698.
30 See Cairns v. London, Midland & Scottish Ry. Co., 1930 Sess. Notes 123

(Scot. O.H.)

31 Webster v. Opitz, [1917] V.L.R. 107, 38 Aust. L.T. 125, 23 A.L.R. 38 (Vict.
Sup. Ct.) ;Miller v. Federal Coffee Palace, 15 Vict. L.R. 30, 10 Aust. L.T.
235 (Vict. Sup. Ct. 1889).
32 Carriss v. Buxton, [1958] S.C.R. 441, 13D.L.R. 2d 689; Carey v. Deveaux,
[1920] 2 W.W.R. 832, 13 Sask. L.R. 301, 53 D.L.R. 267 (C.A.); Re Kary and
City of Chatham, 20 Ont. L.R. 178 (1909) aff'd 21 Ont. L.R. 566 (C.A. 1910);
Newcombe v. Anderson, 11 Ont. R. 665 (C.A. 1886).
33 Hoban v. Royal Hibernian Hotel, Ltd., 80 Irish L.T.R. 61 (Cir. Ct. 1946).
34 Bennett v. Shaw, Cape of Good Hope 19 S.C. 248, 12 Cape T.R. 450 (1902).
35 Constantine v. Imperial Hotels, Ltd., [1944] 1 K.B. 693, [1944] 2 All E.R. 171.
36 Rothfield v. North British Ry. Co., [1920] Sess. Cas. 805, 820.
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The American authorities have likewise held that inns and hotels
have a common law duty to serve all travelers, 37 since they are public
servants.38 Although several cases have based this duty on the theory
that innkeepers hold themselves out to the public to accept all guests,
thus enticing travelers to come there, 39 this reasoning hardly seems to
constitute a persuasive distinction from other businesses. Other businesses also advertise for customers, yet they are not charged with the
same duty to serve all persons indiscriminately. The true reason seems
to be that innkeepers possessed, in many localities, a government monopoly.40 The duty to serve people without racial discrimination is simply one facet of the duty to serve everybody without unreasonable distinctions, although one court has indicated that if accepting Negro business would drive other trade away, an innkeeper need not admit them.4 '
However, at an early date it was held that a coffee house is not an
37Nelson v. Boldt, 180 F. 779 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1910); Vansant v. Kowalewski, 5

Boyce 92, 90 A. 421 (1914); Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, Inc., 106 Utah 517,
150 P.2d 773 (1944). For two good general surveys of the cases, see Comment, Innkeeper's Right to Exclude or Eject Guests, 7 FoRDHMAM L. REv. 417
(1938); Note, An Innkeeper's "Right" to Discriminate, 15 U. FLORIDA L. REv.
109 (1962). In Note, Refusing to Receive Guests at Hotel, 20 PrrTs. LEG. J.
39 (1872), it is stated: "The analogy between the rights and duties of common
carriers and innkeepers is very close .... "
38Jackson v. Virginia Hot Springs Co., 213 F. 969 (4th Cir. 1914). In De Wolf
v. Ford, 193 N.Y. 397, 86 N.E. 527, 529 (1908), it was observed: "For centuries
it has been settled in all jurisdictions where the common law prevails that the
business of an innkeeper is of a quasi public character, invested with many
privileges, and burdened with correspondingly great responsibilities."
30 In State v. Steele, 106 N.C. 766, 11 S.E. 478, 482 (1890), the court observed:
"It was formerly held by the courts of England that where an innkeeper
allured travelers to his tavern by holding himself out to the public as ready
to entertain them, and then refused to receive them into his house when he
had room to accommodate them, and after they had tendered the money to
pay their bills, he was liable to indictment." Similarly, Alpaugh v. Wolverton,
184 Va. 943, 36 S.E.2d 906, 907-8 (1946) held: "An innkeeper holds out his
house as a public place to which travelers may resort, and of course surrenders some of the rights which he would otherwise have over it. Holding
it out as a place of accommodation for travelers, he cannot arbitrarily profrom entering . . . ."
0 hibit persons who come under that character ....
4 See Avins, The Civil Rights Act of 1875: Some Reflected Light on the Fourteenth Anendment and Public Accommodations, 66 COL. L. REv. 873, 888, n.
81 (1966). See also Wickham, The Duties of Innkeepers, 32 PiTs. LEG. J.
299 (1885). New Jersey Act of April 17, 1846, N.J. REv. STAT., 487-8 (1877),

provides:

"3. That no person shall be licensed to keep an inn or tavern, unless the
freeholders who shall recommend him or her, shall also certify that such an
inn or tavern is necessary, and will conduce to the public good.
"13. That it shall be the duty of, and it is hereby expressly enjoined upon,
the said courts, to license no more inns and taverns, in their respective counties, than shall be necessary to accommodate and entertain travelers and
strangers, to serve the public occasions of the said counties, and for the convenience of men's meeting together to transact business ....
42In State v. Steele, 106 N.C. 766, 11 S.E. 478, 484 (1890), the court said:
"Guests of an hotel, and travelers or other persons entering it with the bona
fide intent of becoming guests, cannot be lawfully prevented from going in
put out ....

unless they be persons ....

so objectionable to the patrons of

the house on account of the race to which they belong, that it would injure the
business to admit them to all portions of the house ......
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inn. 42 Likewise, under English and Commonwealth law, a-tavern, bar,
restaurant, refreshment stand, licensed public-house where liquor is
sold by the drink, or other shop selling food or drink for consumption
on the premises is not an inn, and the owner has the legal right to refuse
service to anyone and ask them to leave.43 The same rule is true in
American law."4
Places of amusement have a peculiar history in English law. Until
1843 theatres in England had Crown patents or licenses giving them
monopolies. 45 Ireland had a similar system. 46 Licenses were also required for public dance-halls, 47 music halls, 48 and skating rinks. 49 But

places of amusement which were limited to subscribers, and to which
the public was not admitted indiscriminately, did not have to have a
license.50 The licensing or patent system was enforced by a statute punishing unlicensed actors as rogues- and vagabonds. 51 The American regulation and licensing requirements for places of public entertainment
were very similar to the English rules.u
At an early date, the English courts declined to impose upon theater
monopolies the same duties as were imposed upon common carriers
and inns, such as the obligation to charge reasonable rates, on the
ground that theaters were not a necessity of life.53 Places of amusement
were allowed to exclude patrons at will.54 While this English authority
was both known and, as far as can be ascertained, followed, in American law, 55 authority as a whole on the duty of monopoly theaters and
places of amusement was scanty. It could reasonably be believed that
theater monopolies had the same duty to serve the public as franchised
carriers and inns. This was the theory of Senator Charles Sumner, the
42 Doe d. Pitt v. Laming, 4 Camp. 73, 171 Eng. Rep. 24 (1814).
43 Q.R.S. Canadian Corp. Ltd. v. Coleman, 65 Ont. L.R. 462, [1931] 1 D.L.R.
277, aff'd [1931] S.C.R. 708, [1931] 3 D.L.R. 577; Sealey v. Tqndy, [1902] 1
K.B. 296 (C.A.) ; R. v. Rymer, 2 Q.B.D. 136, 13 Cox C. C. 378, 35 L.T. 774
(1877) ; Reg. v. Armagh Justices, [18971 2 Irish R. 57, 68.
44 State v. Brown, 112 Kan. 814, 212 P. 663. (1923).
45 For some excellent surveys of the history of English theatre patents, see The
Law of Theatres,22 LAW Jo. 420 (1887) ; The Law of Theatres and Theatrical
Performers,3 LEGAL OaS. 17 (1831) ; The Law for Licensing Theatrical Exhibitions, 7 MONTHLY L. MAG. 1, 138, 226, 318 (1840) ; 10 PARLIAIMENTARY HIsT.
ENG. 322 (1737). See also Parsons v. Chapman, 5 Car. & P. 33, 172 Eng. Rep.
865 (1831).
46 For an example of an early theatre monopoly in Ireland, which by royal patent
had only one theatre in Dublin, see Calcraft v. West, 2 Jo. & Lat. 123, 8 Irish
R. Eq. 74 (1845).
47See Brown v. Nugent, L. R.'6 Q.B. 693 (1871)'.
48 Theatres aizd Music Halls, 53 JUSI'. PEACE 355.(1889).

4oSee Reg. v. Tucker, L.R. 2 Q.B.D. 417 (1877).

50 Bells v. Burghall, 2 Esp. 722, 170 Eng. Rep. 509 (1799).
5' Stat. 10 Geo. II, c. 28 (1737):
52

See Avins, supra note 40, at 880 n. 33.

5 See Clifford v. Brandon, 2 Camp, 357,170 Eng. Rep. 1183 (1809).
5 Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M & W. 838, 153 Eng. Rep. 35.1 (1845).
55 Babcock v. Utter, 40 N.Y. 397, 403 (1864). See Avins, supra, note 40 at 896, n.
125. See also Note, Places of Amusement-Rights of Ticket-Holders, 7 ALB.
L. J. 225 (1873).
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equalithrian Radical who introduced the Civil Rights Act of 1875.5"
Sumner had spent two years in England and Europe and had studied'
law, read widely, and talked to marty fanious' English lawyers. He was
considered one of, the most erudite lawyers of his time, and can hardly
have been unaware of EAglish theater law."7
At for other businesses, the rule was well settled that a business
owner could bar whomever- he pleased from his premises. 58 As the
Vermont Supreme Court remarked: "It is a well settled principle; that
the occupant of any house, store or other building, has a legal right to
control it, and to admit whom' he pleases to enter and remain
there..'.
B. The Civil Rights Cases.
The Civil Rights Cases,°" which held unconstitutional the first section of the Civil Rights Act of 1875,61 has been'one of the most commented on decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Nevertheless,
this case, and the statute which gave rise to it, has engendered a remarkable amount of erroneous comment.' One recent writer has become
so confused that he has postulated the theory that the framers of the
1875 act believed that the Fourteenth Amendment directly prohibited
discrimination by owners of "public accommodations," and further asserted that the expectation of being served in such a place was deemed
to be the legal equivalent of a right to be served, thus making a private
business a place of "public accommodation." This confusion of {he
practice of admitting white persons with the legal right to be, admitted
was compounded by a failure to recognize the fact that the theory of
the framers originated from a belief that the businesses covered vere
2
public utilities which had a common law duty to admit the public.
The first section of the statute gives certain rights to "all persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States." This includes aliens, and
must therefore be intended to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, since the Privileges and Immunities Clause
extends only to citizens. 63 The fact that the law operates only "within
56 Avins, supra note 40, at 880.
57 18 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 208 (1943) ; 25
NiCA 81 (11th ed. 1911).
58 Woodman v. Howell, 45 I1. 367 (1867).
59 W~tatrous v. Steel, 4 Vt. 629, 631-2 (1829).

ENCYCLOPAEDIA

BRIrAN-

co 109 U.S. 3 (1883).

118 Stat. 335 (1875).
62

Lewis, The Role of Law in Regulating Discrimination in Places of Public
Accommodation, 13 BUFFALO L. REv. 402, 422-5 (1964). He asserts: "Whites

did not have a legal right to demand admittance to [theatres and places of
amusement] ....

For another example of error regarding the basis for the

1875 law, see Horowitz, The 1959 CaliforniaEqual Rights in "Business Establishments" Statute-A Problem in Statutory Application, 33 S. CAL. L. REv.

260, 277-8 (1960).

63 See the following erroneous theory of the law in Pingrey, 'Racial Discrimination, 30 Am. L. RFG. (n.s.) 69, 77 (1891) : "The negro is now, by the Con-

stitution of the United States, given full citizenship with the white man, and
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the jurisdiction of the United States" also shows that it was intended
to be co-extensive with the Equal Protection Clause. The statute gives
these persons "the full and equal enjoyment of . . . inns, public convey-

ances on land or water, theatres, and other places of public amusement."
Reading up to this point, the plain wording of the law is that all persons
are entitled to use the facilities named. In other words, the statute up
64
to that point re-enacted the common law as it was believed to be.
The statute then qualified the foregoing right, making it "subject
only to the conditions and limitations established by law." The phrase
"established by law" means established by state law, whether statutory
or judge-made, since there was no federal law conditioning the right
to use inns, carriers, or places of amusement. Moreover, only law could
establish the conditions or limitations. Conditions or limitations established by the proprietor could not prevail over the obligations of the
federal statute. A California court has so far forgotten the meaning of
this phrase that in a recent case construing a similar statute it has read
the words "by law" out of the statute and held that the proprietor could
establish his own conditions. 65 However, the original meaning seems
clear, and underscores the fact that the federal statute was intended to
deal with businesses governed by statute law, namely, public utilities.
The conditions and limitations had to be applicable "alike to citizens
of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude." The conditions had to be applicable, not to "persons of every
race," but t6 "citizens of every race," thus precluding discrimination
against aliens. And, of course, along with other types of discrimination,
discrimination against Negroes was forbidden.
The second section, penalizing discrimination, is somewhat narrower. It inflicts penalties for denying these facilities "to any citizen."
Aliens are not therein protected. An exception is made "for reasons
by law applicable to citizens of every race and color, and regardless of
any previous condition of servitude." A proprietor of a utility may not
all the rights and privileges of citizenship attend him wherever he goes. Whatever right a white man has in a public place, a black man has also, because of
his citizenship." See also Pence, Construction of the Fourteenth Amendment,
25 Ass. L. Ray. 536, 538 (1891): "The privileges and immunities of a citizen
are his civil rights."
64 See Pingrey, supra note 63, at 76: "The Civil Rights Act seems to have been
framed to correspond with the law applicable to innkeepers and common
carriers."
65 See Orloff v. Hollywood Turf Club, 110 Cal. App. 2d 340, 242 P.2d 660, 662
(1952), which declared:
"It is the privilege of an inn, railroad, or a race track to demand, in advance,
pay for the accommodation, facility or the privilege to be rendered. Hence,
a failure of a person to comply therewith is not a refusal of any equal accommodation, facility or privilege accorded to those who do comply. The
statute expressly provides that the equality called for by the statute is subject 'to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike
to all citizens.' Among such conditions and limitations applicable to all citizens
is that they shall pay the charges imposed, equally and without discrimination,
upon all citizens."
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himself establish conditions or limitations on the right to use his facility, but the law may do so, either by positive statute or by judicial decision declaring a particular discrimination to be reasonable. These
laws, however, cannot make racial grounds a ground for discrimination.
The statute imposed civil and criminal penalties, but saved to every
person discriminated against the right "to proceed under their rights at
common law and by State statutes," making one proceeding a bar to
the other. This assumed that there was a common law or statutory
right to use the facility in question, which would only exist in the case
of a public utility.
The failure to make a more direct reference to state law in the
statute, although this is what was intended to be affected, 66 resulted in
the invalidation of the statute by the Supreme Court. This ambiguity
was not so surprising since, as a contemporary writer who attacked the
constitutionality of the law noted: "There is no state law which makes
any discrimination in favor of any person which can by possibility be
' 67
construed to be embraced in the Civil Rights Bill.
In opening his analysis of the law, Mr. Justice Bradley, for the
majority, made his first major error. He said:
The essence of the law is, not to declare broadly that all persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the
accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns,
public conveyances, and theaters; but that such enjoyment shall
not be subject to any conditions applicable only to citizens of a
particular race or color, or who had been in a previous condition
of servitude. In other words, it is the purpose of the law to declare that, in the enjoyment of the accommodations and privileges
of inns, public conveyances, theaters, and other places of public
amusement, no distinction shall be made between citizens of different race or color.....8
As previously noted, this is the exact opposite of the legislative intent,
which was not merely to abolish racial discrimination, but to reinforce
the common law; the reference to racial discrimination was merely to
emphasize that states could not abolish the common law in this particular. But, this was not the first time that the Supreme Court had erroneously assumed that because Negroes were most in need of a provision,
69
that it was for their particular benefit.
66

Avins, The Civil Rights Act of 1875 and the Civil Rights Cases Revisited:

67

Cocke, Constitutionality of the Civil Rights Law, 1 SOUTHERN L. REv. (n.s.)

State Action, the Fourteenth Avnendment, and Housing, 14 U.C.L.A. L.
5, 12-13 (1966).

REV.

193,205 (1875).

6s Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 9-10 (1883). For the influence which this statement had on state legislation, see Walton Playboy Clubs, Inc. v. City of Chi-

cago, 37 Ill. App. 2d 425, 185 N.E.2d 719, 722 (1962) ; Woollcott v. Shubert,
217 N.Y. 212, 111 N.E. 829, 830 (1916).
69 Of the dictum on this point penned by Mr. Justice Miller in the SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873), Senator Timothy 0. Howe,
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Mr. Justice Bradley then proceeded to quite correctly point out that
the first section of the Fourteenth. Amendment inhibited only state legislation or other state action, and that the objects of his section limited the
scope of the fifth section." ° The core of his argument was that the law
"does not profess to be corrective of any constitutional wrong committed
by the States," but that "it steps into the domain of'local jurisprudence,
and lays down rules for the .conduct of individuals in society towards
each other, and imposes sanctions for the inforeement of those rules,
without referring in any manner to any supposed action of the State
or its authorities."'" He concluded that since the legislation punished
individuals without reference to whether they were acting under color
72
of state law, it was invalid. "

The legislative history shows clearly that this was not the intent of
Congress.7" The Radicals believed-that Congress could punish individuals who were acting pursuant to state laws which the Fourteenth
Amendment invalidated, 74 a position which Mr. Justice Bradley, himself a Radical Republican, did not dispute.75 What they intended to do
was to punish proprietors of inns, carriers, and places .of amusement
who discriminated against Negroes pursuant to a state statute or common law, rule exempting Negroes from the general coverage of state
public utility laws or common law, decisions. 7 , Poor legislative drafting
obscured this theory.
Fiinally, Mr. Justice Bradley rebutted the argument that discrimination in inns, carriers, and places of amusement, were badges of slavery
by pointing out'that many free Negroes in ante-,bellum days were subject to such discrimination, but yet were not slaves. He said that such
discrimination was essentially different from discrimination in the right
to sue, hold property, and make contracts,7 which had been forbidden
to slaves and which the Thirty-Ninth Congress abolished pursuant, in
part, to the Thirteenth Amendment. 8
a Radical former state supreme court justice from Wisconsin -who had helped
frame the Fourteenth Amendment, said:
"I am going to say that in that case the court did 'undertake to assert a
principle of constitutional law which I do not believe will ever be accepted
by the, pirofession or the people of the United States . . . . [The Statute]
made, I think, broad discrimination between the rights of white men-a
discrimination which upon my soul I believe the fourteenth amendment condemns .... 3 Cong. Rec. 4148 (1874).
70Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-14 (1883).
7x Id. at 14.
72 Id; at 14-19.
73Avins, supra note 40, passim.
74 See Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected Light on State
Action and thd Fourteenth Avnendment, 11 ST. Louis U. L. REv. 331 (1967);
Speech of former Representative Samuel Shellabarger in Proceedings in Memoriam of Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite, 126 U.S. App. 600 (1888).
,5 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 16-17 (1883).
70 See Avins, supra note 66, at 16-17. '
71 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20-26 (1883).
78 Avins, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, The Civil Rights Bill of 1966, and the
Right to Buy Propert:y,40 S. CAL. L. REv. 274, 292 (1967).
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Mr. Justice' Harlan agreed with the-majority that the only intent of
Congress -was to prevent racial discrimination." However, he argued
that the Thirteenth Amendment, although it did not give Congress
power to abolish discrimination in respect to all civil rights, "necessarily
involved 'immunity from, and protection against, all discrimination
against them, because of their race, in respect of such civil rights as
belong to free men of other racds."' ' 0 He relied heavily on the precedent 'created by the Civil Rights Act of 1866.1 The unsoundness;of this
reliance i§ immediately apparent. Not only were the Thirteenth Amendment and the 1866 act not limited to racial discrimination, but the
latter statute -related only to peculair forms of discrimination imposed
only on slaves and not on Negroes generally."2 As the majority pointed
out, discriminations in public places 'were made against free Negroes
also.
Mr. Justice Harlan was on sounder ground when he noted that the
federal law covered only public utilities with special franchises, and
therefo-e with public duties.83 His application of Munn v. Illinois,s8
upholding state regulation of 'monopoly transportation facilities, to
places of amusement licensed by the state, is especially significant.
When the dissent of Mr. justice Ha'lan' turned to the Fourieenth
Amendment, it declared that Negroes were entitled to the privileges of
state citizenship under the Fourteenth Aniendment (a manifest error),
one of which he believed was"freedom from racial discriminationf'by the
state or any agency thereof. The dissenting justice then argued that
under the doctrine of'Prig v. Pennsylvania, 5 Corigress' could directly
intervene to protect such asserted right. This was 'a second' error, since
the redraft of th Fourteenth Amendment in 1866 had elimin'ated the
analogy to that case.sG Mr. justice Harlan then urged that Congress
could legislate'respecting "ifidividuals and corporations exercising public functions" which denied Negroes their civil rights.8 7 He found state
action under the' Fdurteenth Amendment because "railroad corporations, keepers of inns, and managers of places of public amusement are
agents or iristrumentalities of the State, because they are charged with
duties to the public, and are amenable, in respect of their duties and
functions, to government regulation." 88 He drew an analogy between
79 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26-27 (1883).

so Id. at 36.
81 Id. at 35-37. See Avins, supra note 78.
82 Ibid.
83 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,37-42 (1883).
84 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
8541 U.S. (16,Pet.) 539 (1842).
86 See Avins, Federal Power to Punish Individual Crimes Under the Fourteenth
Amendment: the OriginalUnderstanding,43 Notre Dame Law. 317 (1968).
87Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 43-53 (1883).
881d. at 58-59.
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the right to use a public utility and the right to use a public building or
highway, which it would be a denial of civil rights to withhold. 9
The conclusion that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was only intended
to operate on state statute and decisional law in respect to public utilities is strongly reinforced by examination of a hitherto unpublished bill
introduced by Senator George F. Edmunds, a Radical Republican
lawyer from Vermont who had voted for the Fourteenth Amendment
and who was a prime exponent of the 1875 law.90 In 1883, when the
Supreme Court held this law unconstitutional, Edmunds was Chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and when Congress met on December 4th, right after the opinion was handed down, he introduced a bill
"to provide for the further protection of citizens of the United States
and others against the violation of certain rights secured to them by the
Constitution of the United States. '' 91 This bill, which is printed in full
in the appendix of this article, provided for removal to federal court
of any suit in state court where any issue, defense, or decision turned
on race, color, or previous condition of servitude,9 2 and for review by
the United States Supreme Court of any adverse state judgment which
turned on these grounds. The last section of the bill declared that any
state law or decision which discriminated on racial grounds in personal
or property rights was invalid. In introducing this bill, which was never
to become law, Edmunds said: "it undertakes, and I believe successfully, to accomplish the security for the protection of the colored citizens of the United States against the inhuman, and, as I believe, wicked
and cruel and prejudicial, distinctions that in some of the States are still
made against them in respect of their civil rights, and to protect them
consistently with the late decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States upon that subject." 93
A careful reading of the speech of Senator James F. Wilson, the
Iowa Republican lawyer who in 1866 was Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, supports this view.94 Wilson, in criticizing the decision of the United States Supreme Court, took the classical Radical
view. This involved three major elements. The first one was that the
failure of the state to enact laws to enforce common-law or statutory
rights in public utilities or to execute them amounted to a denial of
equal protection of the laws. Accordingly, he pointed out:
A failure to enact laws for the equal protection of citizens is a
denial of it. A neglect to enforce laws enacted to assure such equal
89 Id. at 59-60.
90 See 3 CONG. REC. 1869-70 (1875).
91 S. 15, 48th Cong., 1st Sess., Dec. 4, 1883, on microfilm in the Library of Congress.
92 This, no doubt, followed United States v. Rhodes, 27 Fed. Cas. 785 (No. 16,151)
(C.C.D. Ky. 1866).
93 15 CONG. REc. 12 (1883). The same bill was reported from the Judiciary Committee in the House of Representatives by Representative Hoar. Id. at 517.
94 Id. at 133-7.
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protection is a denial of it. Toleration of a custom or practice
which asserts inequality in the enjoyment of the common rights
of citizenship is a denial of equal protection.9 5
He added:
But if courts ...

conclude that because a citizen may bring a suit

at his own expense in a State court for the recovery of damages
the full measure of the Government's duty is discharged and protection, ample and complete, is assured, it will not be well for us
to accept these errors as proper rules of action .... 96
All of this was exactly the same as Representative Lawrence's theory.97
The second Radical proposition was that state denial of equal protection could not be cured by enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment against the states. He said: "A State cannot be punished for withholding the equal protection of the laws.""" This was also traditional
Republican theory. 99
The third proposition was that Congress, as a substitute for state
protection, could step in to grant federal protection. For this Wilson
cited Prigg v. Pennsylvania.'" This carried Wilson back to his own
views expressed in 1866.111 What Wilson forgot was that the authority
of this case as a guide to the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment was eliminated by the redraft of the first section of this amendment by Representative Bingham. 0 2 It is highly significant that Wilson's proposed constitutional amendment to cure the Supreme Court's
10 3
decision is essentially a copy of Bingham's first proposal.
Or Id. at 135. See Senator Edmunds' contention: "But when a State either by ac-

tion or by denial, either by commission. or omission, either by law or want
of law, either by administration of its executive or judicial departments or the
want of administration, does deny, does fail to give in the language of Magna

Charta from which this was drawn the equal protection of its laws to every-

body within its borders, then . . . as the Constitution itself says in express

and specific terms, Congress shall by law have the right to enforce that equality
of protection against all corners and everywhere." 8 CONG. REc. 959 (1879).

Edmunds added that "the failure to perform a duty is a denial to those who
are entitled to demand the performance of that duty." Ibid. He said that the
clause "imports an affirmative duty to see to it that an equal and a real protection to every citizen within these borders is accorded and vindicated." Id.
at 960. Senator George F. Hoar, a Massachusetts Republican, said the same

thing in the context of the Ku Klux Klan activities. Id. at 1024; S. Rep. No.
512, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. xiv-xv (1884). See also United States v. Blackburn,
24 Fed. Cas. 1158, 1159 (No. 14,603) (W.D. Mo. 1874).
90615
CONG. REc. 136 (1883).
9
7See Avins, supra note 40, at 899-900.
9 15 CONG. Rac. 135 (1883). Edmunds made the same point. 8 CONG. REc. 960
(1879). For the general discussion of ratification and enforcement of the 13th,
14th, and 15th Amendments, see 8 CONG. REc. 342, 567, 885-893, 954-962, 9979 1030 (1879).
DAvins, supra note 40, at 903-4.
10041 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
101 15 CONG. RFc. 135-6 (1883).

102 See Avins, Federal Power to Punish Individual Crines Under the Fourteenth
Amendment: the Original Understanding, 43 No=R DAmE LAw. 317, 320-7,

338-342 (1968).

103 Supra, n. 101.
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The final proposition is that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
all kinds of discrimination, not only racial discrimination. He said:
My purpose is ... to put the power of Congress in this regard
beyond dispute, and to do this without any reference to class or
race. It is better, in my judgment, in whatsoever we may do in
the matter of the organization ,and exercise of the power to protect citizens of the United States in the equal enjoyment of their
rights, that we proceed without. reference to 1the
distinctions of
04
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
2.

STATE LAWS COPYING THE FEDERAL STATUTE.

A. In General.
Some state laws ante-dated th federal statute. Massachusetts had
the earliest law forbidding discrimination in public accommodations. 10 5
The highest court of that state construed the law to apply only to places
which received a license to operate, and as to those the statute clearly
forbade all unreasonable discriminations. 10 6 An early Washington ordinance forbade racial discrimination in licensed places of amusement ;1o7
a few years later service to all persons was required, thus banning all
discriminatidn.10 s
A number of the southern reconstruction legislatures passed similar laws. 0 9 The Mississippi Supreme Court declared that its state law
was merely designed to reaffirm the common law as to'public businesses,
where everybody already had the privilege to enter. 1 0 The Louisiana
Supreme Court believed that all persons had the same right tcr enter licensed places of amusement,"' and while the court's belief that the
statute was only following common law may, in some instances, have
been erroneous, 1 2 this was the accepted theory. In one case the court
remarked: "In truth the right of the plaintiff to sue the defendant for
Id. at 136.
For a complete history of the Massachusetts statute, see Bryant v. Rich's Grill,
216 Mass. 344, 103 N.E. 925 (1914).
10GSee Commonwealth v. Sylvester, 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 247 (1866).
107 Central Amusement Co. v. District of Columbia, 121 A.2d 865 (D.C. Mun.
App. 1956).
108 District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson C6., 346 U.S. 100, 102-3 (1953).
109 Ark. Act of Feb. 25, 1873; Fla. Act df Jan. 25, 1873, ch. 1947, no. 13, Laws
of 1873; LA. CONST. art 13 (1868); La. Act 38 of Feb. 23, 1869, LA. REv.
STAT. §§ 456-9 (1870); Miss. REV. CODE §§ 2731-32 (1871) ; Miss. Act of Feb.
7, 1873, ch. 63; S.C. Act of Feb. 13, 1869, no. 98; S.C. REv. STAT. ch. 136
(1873) ; Tex. Act of Oct. 28, 1871, ch. 21, Laws of 1871.
110 Donnell v. State, 48 Miss. 661 (1873).
"' Joseph v. Bidwell, 28 La. Ann. 382 (1876).
Wyly, J., dissenting on another
point, said: "Under article thirteen of the constitution and act No. 38 of the
acts of 1869, an act to enforce the same, plaintiff had the same right to enter
the theatre as any other citizen, but he had no greater right. The fact that
he was a colored man ought not to give plaintiff the right to recover a larger
amount of damages against defendant than if he were a white man." Id. at
2 384.
11 See Sauvinet v. Walker, 27 La. Ann. 14 (1875), aff'd 92 U.S. 90 (1875), holding that a licensed coffeehouse is a place of public accommodation and must
serve Negroes.
104
105
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damages would be the same, whether act No. 38 existed. or not;.. .113
It appears clear that racial discrimination was. not the only discrimina1 4
tion banned by these laws.
While the federal bill was pendingin.1873, New York .State enacted
a similar statute. 1 5 A contemporary commentator declared that although the civil rights bill "was regarded, popularly, as, a great concession-to the colored classes," this bill "had made no real change in the
lialbilities of the keepets of places of amusement," and that "the statute
has not changed the common-law rule with reference to ,the rights of
colored persons at the places and -under the circumstances enumer'
ated."""
This writer observed: "A statute could not well have been
framed which should make a greater appearance of conferring new
rights and privileges upon the colored classes, but which should really
affect so little in what it should pretend to do.'." 7 In. fact, it was asserted that since the New York law only re-enacted the common-law
rule as to places of amusement, Negroes were just as liable to discrimination after the.law was passed as before s -.
The theory that the early anti-discrimination laws merely ire-enacted
the common law has persisted until quite recently." 9 The view has been
20
that the statutes provided a more efficient remedy but no new right.
213 De Cuir v. Benson, 27 La. Ann. 1, 5 (1875) rev'd on other grounds sub. noin.
Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878). The "Louisiana Supreme Court also

said: "The position that because one's property cannot be taken without due
process of law, therefore a common carrier can conduct his business as he
chooses, without reference to the rights of the public, is so illogical that it

is only necessary to state it to expose its fallacy: . . . If he be a common
carrier of passengers he must receive all who offer, carry them over the
whole route .... and treat all alike, unless there be actual or sufficient reason
for the distinction, . . " Ibid.

"1

"'s

I

But see Vogel v. Saenger Theatres, 17 So. 2d 467 '(La. App. 1944), rev'd on
other grounds 207 La. 835, 22 So. 2d 189 (1945), where the Court of Appeals

divided on this point.
New York Act of April'9, 1873. For. the history of the New. York law, see
Gibbs v. Arras Bros., 222 N.Y. 332, 118 N.E. 857, 858 (1918). ,

12ONote, The New York Civil'Rights Bill, 8 AIm.'L. J. 3 (1873).,
17 Ibid.
"'s See Note, The New York Civil Rights Bill and Places of Amusement, 7 AiB.

L.J. 355 (1873):
"But we must interpret the statute as a simple declaration of the equality

of all ticket holders at places of amusements-an equality which they had
before, as much as now. And as a ticket is but a mere license, liable to be
revoked at any time by the keeper of the 'theatre or other place' of amusement,' he may revoke the license of the colored ticket holder at any time;
...the keeper of a place of amusement may exclude a ticket holder, whether
he be white or colored, from the premises; and -we do not understand that
the New York statute alters this rule in the least."
110 Thomas v. Pick Hotels Corp., 224- F.2d 664 (10th Cir. 1955).
0
"2 Odom v. East Ave.- Corp., 178 Misc. 363, 34 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1942) aff'd. 264
App. Div. 985, 37 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1942). In Ferguson v. Giles, 82 Mich. 358,
46 N.W. 718, 720 (1890), the court said:
"The common law as it existed in this state before the passage of this
statute, and before the colored man became a citizen under our constitution
and laws, gave to the white man a remedy against any unjust discrimination
to the citizen in all public- places. It must be considered that; when this suit
was planted, the colored man, under the law of this state, was entitled to
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The federal and state laws merely provided that Negroes would get the
same legal rights that white persons had. Tennessee therefore performed
its duty under the federal statute and Fourteenth Amendment by
promptly repealing the common law duties of utilities, thereby giving
1 21
nobody any rights at all.

The consequence of construing the state anti-discrimination laws as
mere reaffirmations of the common law is well illustrated by the decision of the Iowa Supreme Court in Bowlin v.Lyon.1 22 In this case a
Negro who sued to recover damages for refusal of an unlicensed skating rink to admit him lost. The court first declared that the legal rights
of a Negro were the same as that of a white person, and if a white person similarly situated could be refused admission, the plaintiff was in
no better a position.123
The court then observed that the skating rink was an unlicensed and
purely private business, and "as a general rule, that the law does not
undertake to govern or regulate the citizen in the conduct of his private
1 24
business", and that "he is left free to deal with whom he pleases.'
The opinion noted that innkeepers and common carriers were excep-

121

the same rights and privileges in public places as the white man, and must
be treated the same there; and that his right of action for any injuries arising from an unjust discrimination against him is just as perfect and sacred in
the courts as that of any other citizen. This statute is only declaratory of
the common law, as I understand it to now exist in this state."
Tenn. Act of March 24, 1875, ch. 130; State v. Lasater, 68 Tenn. (9 Baxt.)
584 (1877). Delaware partially abrogated the common law rule. Del. Act of
March 25, 1875, ch. 194.

12267

Iowa 536, 25 N.W. 766 (1885).

123 The court said (id. at 767):

"The single question presented by the record is whether the refusal by
defendants on the occasions mentioned in the petition to permit plaintiff to
enter their skating rink was a denial to him of a privilege which he had the
right, under the law, to enjoy; and, in the outset, we deem it proper to say
that the question whether plaintiff had the right to demand admission to the
place is in no manner affected by the fact that he is a colored man. His legal
right in the premises is not different from that of white men whose character
and conduct are not different from his own. And if a white man of unobjectionable character and conduct could have demanded admission as a legal
right on the occasions in question, the refusal of defendants to admit him
operated as a denial to him of a legal right; for the law is no respecter of
persons, and it guarantees no rights or privileges to one class of citizens
which may not be enjoyed by every other class upon the same terms, and
under like circumstances. If, then, the defendants had the right to deny
plaintiff admission to their skating rink, this right must be based upon some
consideration upon which they might have denied any other man of like
character admission to it."
124 Ibid. See the comment in Pingrey, Racial Discrimination, 30 Am. L. REG.
(n.s.) 69, 78 (1891), approving this case:
"It must be presumed to have been conducted as a private business merely,
and that no person, black or white, had a right to enter against the will of
the proprietor of the skating rink. When members of the public entered the
building, they did so by permission of the proprietor, or under a contract
with him, and there was no reason why the owner of the skating rink might
not have limited his invitations to certain individuals or classes. This was so
because the business was private. The proprietor had the right, at any time,
to withdraw the invitation, either as to the general public or as to particular
individuals."
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tional businesses. They could not engage in unreasonable discrimination
because they "are in some sense servants of the public, and in conducting their business they exercise a privilege conferred upon them by the
public, and they have secured to them by the law certain privileges and
rights which are not enjoyed by the members of the public generally."' 25
The court thought that a licensed place of amusement would stand on
the same footing, but that this rink was a private business, since "Any
citizen of the state has the right to establish himself in it at his own
election, and no license or authority from the public is required therefor. ' " 26 The court concluded:

As the place belonged to them, and was under their exclusive
control, and the business was a private business, it cannot be said,
we think, that any person had the right to demand admission to
it. They had the right, at any time, to withdraw the invitation,
either as to the general public, or as to particular individuals.
The act complained of by plaintiff was the withdrawal by defendants as to him of the offers which they had made to admit
him, or to contract with him, for admission. They had the right
to do this as to him, or any other members of the public. This
right, as we have seen, is not based upon the fact that he belongs
to a particular race, but arises from the consideration that neither
he, nor any other person, could demand, as a right under the law,
that the privilege of entering the place be accorded to them. The
legal rights of the parties would not have been different from
what they are if defendant had excluded plaintiff on account of
the cut of his coat or the color of his hair instead of the color of
his skin; or if they had excluded him27 without assigning any reason for their action in the premises.

The foregoing case treats racial discrimination as no different from
any other arbitrary discrimination. This was the theory of the original
state civil rights laws. When the Supreme Court declared the federal
statute to be unconstitutional in 1883, a number of northern states
passed local statutes which were virtual carbon copies of the federal act
and which were designed to fill the gap left by the Supreme Court's
decision. 2 1 Indeed, Colorado even listed churches as places of public
accommodation,' 2 9 ignoring the fact that although it was in the original
125 Bowlin v. Lyon, 67 Iowa 536, 25 N.W. 766, 768 (1885).
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid. See a similar contention in Hargo v. Meyers, 4 Ohio C.C.R. 275, 2 Ohio

C.C. Dec. 543 (1889).

128 Pingrey, Racial Discrimination,30 Am. L. REG. (n.s.) 69, 81 (1891) ; Stephen-

son, Race Distinctionsin American Law, 43 Am. L. Ray. 547 (1909) ; Stephenson, Separation of the Races in Public Conveyances, 3 All. POL. ScI. REV.
180, 186, (1909). See also Walton Playboy Clubs, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 37
Ill. App. 2d 425, 185 N.E.2d 719, 722 (1962); Fruchey v. Eagleson, 15 Ind.
App. 88, 43 N.E. 146 (1896) ; Brown v. J. H. Bell Co., 146 Iowa 89, 123 N.W.
2 231 (1909).
' Colo. Act of April 4, 1885, 1 MnLLs ANN. STAT. COLO., § 423 (1891). The
present law no longer covers churches. COLO. REv. STAT. 25-1-1 (1963).
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Sumner bill, the church provision. was stricken therefrom as an unconstitutional interference with freedom of religion."30
One recent commentator has been.baffled by the fact that the original
Ohio statute, although designed to forbid a variety of irrelevant, discriminations, appeared to him to encompass only racial discrimination
in its coverage. 13 ' It seems clear .that this is a misconstruction. The
early version of the law did not even mention race, 132 and the law apparently was designed to forbid, among others, political discrimination. 3' The Coloradb statute to this very day is general in scope and
gives all persons a right to use the places enumerated without mentioning race or color at all.134 The Iowa law, which continues to use the
language of the 1875 federal act, 13 , originally was designed to forbid
all unreasonable discrimination, and did not mention racial discrimination in particular, nor was discrimination against Negroes the only type
of discrimination forbidden. Thus, an indictment against a barber was
dismissed because "There should have been n averment that there was
no good reason, and it should have been averred that at the time and
immediately after the alleged refusal he proceeded to shave others.""
The idea that anti-discrimination laws banned more than merely
racial discrimination persisted for a considerable period of time." 7 The
Washington Supreme Court declared:
"'oAvins, supra note 40, at 876 and 890.
131 Van Alstyne, A Critique of the Ohio Public Accommodations Law, 22 OHIO
ST. L.J. 201, 205-6 (1961) discussing 81 OHIO LAWS 15 (1884), a copy of the
1875 federal act, says:
"The statute is apparently limited to discrimination based on 'color or race,'
and thus ignores discrimination in places of public accommodation with
respect to religion, ancestry, and national origin. The omission is especially
puzzling since there would seem to be no sound argument to support the law
forbidding the indulgence of prejudice based on the adventitious difference
of race or color," nd tolerating the indulgence of prejudice based on equivalently irrelevant differences of religion, ancestry, or national origin. The
explanation is not to be found in the fact that the original law of 1884 responded' principally to the state's concern for fair treatment of Negroes.
because the preamble to the original public accommodations law expressed
the state's determination to eliminate discrimination based upon 'nativity' and
'religion or political persuasion,' as well as discrimination based on race or
,color. Since the state has regarded discrimination on account of religious,
ancestral, or ethnological differences just as repugnant to its policy on fair
employment practices as discrimination on account of race or color, consistency would require that the public accommodations law be expanded commensurately."
"'2Hargo v. Meyers, 4 Ohio C.C.R. 275, 2 Ohio C.C. Dec. 543 (1889)
reprints
the original first section of the statute.
"'3 See Johnson v. Humphrey Pop Corn Co., 24 Ohio C.C.R. 135 (1902) aff'd 70
Ohio St. 478, 72 N.E. 1160 (1904).
"34 COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1-1 (1963).
"'5See State v. Katz, 241 Iowa 115, 40 N.W.2d 41 (1949).
136 State v. Hall, 72 Iowa 525, 34 N.W. 315 (1887). See also Messenger v. State,
25 Neb. 674, 41 N.W. 638, 639 (1889), where the court said: "A barber,
by opening a shop, and putting out this sign, thereby invites every, orderly
and well-behaved person who may desire his services to enter his shop during
business hours."
137 See Valle v. Stengel, 176 F. 2d 697 (3rd Cir. 1949), holding that the New
Jersey civil rights statute gave any citizen the right to use a swimming pool
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Every person 'not .belonging to a proscribed class, has.a right to
go to any public-place, or visit a.resort where the public generally
are invited, and to remain there, during all proper hours, Ifree
from -molestation by any one, so
long as he conducts himself in a
1 3S
decorous and orderly manner.
The opinign of the New Yiork Appellate Divisioi in Grannan v.
Westchester Racing Ass'n.,139 is also quite instructive. In this case* defendant race track excluded the plaintiff, a ticket holder, from being a
spectator at thd track, and plaintiff sued to enjoin this exclusion.
The court first noted that horse racing was illegal except pursuant
to the statute under which the defendant track was incorporated, and
that this statute gave the track "quasi public funcions,' with the state
regulating it by a commission. The court quoted from Judge Cooley that
a business is affected, with a public interest if it engages in a "public
employment, with special privileges, which only the state can confer
upon him," and where it "is not of right, but is permitted by the state
as a privilege or franchise." The court observed that were if iot for the
"special privilege and franchise from the state," it wQuld be criminal
to run a race track. This distinguished horse racing from private businesses which did not require legislative sanction. 140- The' court therefore
concluded that the race track had a "quasi public function" and had the
same obligations as common carriers to admit all persons, unleis there
4
were reasonable grounds for exclusion.' 1
Turning to the New York Civil Rights Lmw, the court declared:
By the provisions of chapter 1042, Laws 1895, it is provided that
all persons. within the jurisdiction of the state shall be entitled to
full and equal privileges in all places of lublic amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and
applicable alike to all citizens. It is plain that the racing of horses
is in the nature of an amusement. As we have seen, the property
and place where such races are conducted have become clothed
with a public interest, and the association, by reason of its franchise from the state, is under the public obligation to conduct its
business for the benefit of the public, in pursuance of the obligation thereby created to fulfill the purpose of its existence. This
implies that its gates shall be open to all citizens, and its property
subject to use by all who desire to go thereon, and who comply,
as a privilege of citizenship. See also Note, Right of Admission to Theatre,
9 LAW NoTEs [N.Y.] 65, 66 (1905) :-"Many'of these [civil rights acts], on
first reading, seem very broad, and fully applicable to the case of any one
who is refused admission to a place of public amusement for other 'than
public reasons."
138 Davis v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 35 Wash. 203, 77 P. 209, 211 (1904).
See also Anderson v. Pantages Theatre Co.; 114 Wash. 24, 194 P. 813, 815
(1921) "it confers upon all persons, regardless of their race, creed-or'color,
the right to be admitted to 'the places enumerated on equal terms with all
others."
130

16 App. Div. 8, 44 N.Y.S. 790 (1897), rev'd 153 N.Y. 449, 47 N.E.'896 (1897).

14044 N.Y.S. at 792-3.

141 Id. at 793-4.
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with its reasonable rules and regulations. The first section of the
civil rights act is absolute in its declaration of right, and is not
qualified by anything contained in its subsequent sections. Its
declaration is that all persons shall be entitled to the privilege,
subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law.
The second section provides a penalty for denial of any of the
provisions of the first section. It does not aim, in any respect, to
qualify the declaration contained in the first section. By the law
of the land, as we have seen, it is the absolute right of any citizen
who conducts himself properly, and who complies with the reasonable rules of the public corporation, to enjoy the benefits secured to him thereby; and it is beyond the power of such an association to provide by any rule for the permanent exclusion of
any citizen from such place, or exclude him from participation in
its benefits. The argument of the learned counsel for the defendants, that the corporation has the right to exclude by a rule which
operates upon all citizens alike, cannot be sustained, as, if followed out to its logical result, it might be made to operate to the
exclusion of all citizens. But, as we have seen, this is beyond the
power of the corporation; it would be destructive of its public
obligation, and defeat the very purpose for which its franchise
was granted. We have already considered the law and its limitations. It requires corporations of this character to admit all persons who present themselves in fit condition, demean themselves
properly,
and who comply with the reasonable rules and regulations. 142
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division
on the ground that the exclusion was reasonable. In dictum it indicated
that the rules relating to common carriers did not apply because of
statutory regulation even if racing were a franchised business. It indicated that a race track probably could not exclude spectators arbitrarily,
but only pursuant to reasonable rules, although no firm opinion was
expressed on this point. The Court of Appeals also held the New York
Civil Rights Law inapplicable. Even though the first section of the
statute nowhere even mentioned race, creed, or color (which was only
in the penalty section) the court relied on Mr. Justice Bradley's opinion
in the Civil Rights Cases 4 3 to hold that as long as discrimination was
not based on race, creed, or color, the statute was inapplicable. 14 4
Id. at 797-8.
143 Note 68 supra.
144 Grannan v. Westchester Racing Assn., 153 N.Y. 449, 47 N.E. 896, 901 (1897)
where the court said:
"In those cases, the court, in substance, said that the purpose of that law
was not to declare that all persons should be entitled to the full and equal
enjoyment of the advantages mentioned in the statute, but that such enjoyment should not be subject to any conditions which were applicable only to
citizens of a particular race or color. We think the purpose of the statute
now under consideration was to declare that no person should be deprived
of any of the advantages enumerated upon the ground of race, creed, or
color, and that its prohibition was intended to apply to cases of that character,
and to none other. It is plain that the legislature did not intend to confer
upon every person all the rights, advantages, and privileges in places of
142
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B. The California Law.
The California statute had a curious history which is worthy of
passing note. Although it was copied from the federal law in 1893, the
courts of that state interpreted it as not being limited to racial discrimination alone.1 45 Until 1959, California law equated racial or ethnic
discrimination with unreasonable discrimination generally, and did not
put ethnic discrimination in a special category. All such unreasonable
discrimination could not be engaged in by places of public accommodation. 146 In 1959 the law was broadened to include all businesses and
1 47
narrowed to ban only racial and other ethnic discrimination.
Under the pre-1959 law all persons had a legal right to be admitted
to theatres and other places of public amusement. 14 Thus, all adults
who paid admission and conducted themselves properly were entitled
to be admitted to race tracks. 49 This statute was deemed to be an exercise of the police power to impose common carrier duties on other
public places. 50
The judges in California were divided on the question of whether
the state civil rights statute changed or merely reaffirmed the common
law. As to hotels, of course, the statute made no change.' 51 But it would
seem that a change was made as to places of amusement.' 5' Some California judges so held. 15 3 But a majority of the California Supreme
Court said:
amusement or accommodation which might be enjoyed by another. Any discrimination not based upon race, creed, or color does not fall within the

condemnation of the statute."

145

Klein, The California Equal Rights Statutes in Practice, 10

253, 257, 259 (1958).

STAN.

L.

REv.

Piluso v. Spencer, 36 Cal. App. 416, 172 P. 412 (1918).
147Horowitz, The 1959 California Equal Rights in "Business Establishments"
Statute-A Problem in Statutory Application, 33 S.CAL. L. REv. 260, 270-1,
146

3014 (1960).
14s Tarbox v. Bd. of Sup'rs, 163 Cal. App. 2d 373, 329 P.2d 553 (1958).
149Orloff v. Hollywood Turf Club, 110 Cal. App. 2d 340, 242 P.2d 660 (1952);
Pacific Turf Club, Inc. v. Cohn, 104 Cal. App. 2d 371, 231 P.2d 527 (1951);
Suttles v. Hollywood Turf Club, 45 Cal. App. 2d 283, 114 P.2d 27 (1941).
150 Greenberg v. Western Turf Assn., 140 Cal. 357, 73 P. -1050 (1903), 148 Cal.
126, 82 P. 684 (1905), aff'd 204 U.S. 359 (1907). In Stoumen v. Reilly, 37
Cal. 2d 713, 234 P.2d 969, 971 (1951) the court said: "Members of the public of lawful age have a right to patronize a public restaurant and bar so
long as they are acting properly and are not committing illegal or immoral
acts; the proprietor has no right to exclude or eject a patron 'except for
good cause,' and if he does so without good cause he is liable in damages.
See CIV. CODE, §§ 51, 52."

151 Perrine v. Paulos, 100 Cal. App. 2d 655, 224 P.2d 41 (1950).
152Discussing a New York statute which gave any orderly person over the age
of 21 the right to go to the theater, Christie v. 46th Street Theatre Corp.,
265 App. Div. 255, 39 N.Y.S.2d 454, 456-7 (1942), aff'd 292 N.Y. 520, 54
N.E.2d 206 (1944), cert. denied 323 U.S. 710 (1944), observed: "Under the
common law, these appellants would have the right to control their theatre
to the same extent as any other private business; they would have the right
to decide whom to admit."
1531n Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 208 P.2d 987, 990 (Cal. App. 1949),
rev'd 36 Cal. 2d 734, 227 P.2d 449 (1951), the intermediate appellate court
declared: "This section [civil rights] was enacted under the police power of
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The so called civil rights statutes, sections 51-54 Civil Code,
do not necessarily grant theretofore non-existent rights or free* doms. The enactments are declaratory of existing equal rights
, and' provide the means for their preservation by placing restrictions upon the power of proprietors to deny the
xerdise' o the
5
right and by providing penalties for violation. 4
3.

THE RIGHT-TO REFUSE SERVICE

A. Businesses in General.
Before going further into the development of the anti-discrimination
laws as they, affectplaces of public accommodation, it would be desirable, to pause in order to further note the common law development that
had occurred since 18&. in respect to the duty of businesses to serve
the public without discrimination. As to businesses generally, the rule
seems clear; no such duty exists, and a business may sell to whomever
it pleases' 55 and eject from its premises any unwanted customer at any
time. 156 The common law has therefore differentiated between public
utilities and businesses generally, for the latter do not have the duty to
refrain from arbitrary discrimination.' 57 Moreover, the mptive for such
the State and creates rights which did not exist at common law." In the
Supreme Court, Spence, J., dissenting, declared: "It must be remembered
that, contrary to the implications in the majority opinion, the source of plaintiff's. right, or the. right of any person, to be admitted to a place of public
amusement rests solely in the statutes under consideration. No such right
is accorded by the Constitution, and no such right existed at common law."

227 P.2d at 455.
P.2d at 453.

154 227

155 Brookside-Pratt Mining Co. v. Booth, 211 Ala. 268, 100 So. 240 (1924) ;'Avins,
Anti-DiscriminationLegislation in Housing: A Denial of Freedom of Choice,
in Open Occupancy vs. Forced Housing Under the Fourteenth Amendment
3, 5-8 (Avins ed. 1963). In Randolph v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 661, 119 S.E.
2d 817, 819 (1961), the court observed: "in the absence of statute the operator of a privately owned business may accept some customers.and reject
others on purely personal grounds." Likewise, in Commercial Telegram Co.
v. Smith, 47 Hun 494, 505 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1888), in holding that the New
York Stock Exchange may exclude whoever it wants, the court said:
"The Exchange is a private association; it has the right to admit to, its
floor whom it pleases . . it has sought no special privilege and obtained no
special powers. It is, therefore, jhst as much the master of its own business
and of the method of conducting the same as any private individual within
the State."
156Annot., 9 A.L.R. 379 (1920). See also City of Greenville v. Peterson, 239
S.C. 298, 122 S.E.2d 826, 828 (1961), where the court said:
"Although the general public has an implied license to enter any retail store
the proprietor or his agent is at liberty to revoke this license at any time
and-to eject such individual if he refuses to leave when requested to do so,
...and may lawfully forbid any and all persons, regardless of reason, race,
or religion, to enter or remain upon any part of his premises which are not
devoted to public use."
15r In Terminal Taxicab Co. v. District of Columbia, 241 U.S. 252, 256 (1916),
Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out:
"It is true that all business, and for the matter of that, every life in all its
details, has a public aspect, some bearing upon the welfare of the community
in which it is passed. But however it may have been in earlier days as to
the common callings, it is assumed in our time that an invitation to the public
to buy does not necessarily entail an obligation to sell. It is assumed that an
,ordinary shop ,keeper may refuse his wares arbitrarily to a customer whom
he dislikes . .
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discrimination, whether on racial grounds or otherwise, is deemed legally irrelevant.'5 Non-profit organizations or charities are also free to
pick.those who benefit from their services,l?9 as are irdividual professionals or other workers.Y0
.I"..
A particularly large body of law has grown up in respect to restaurants. Repeated attempts-to impose on them the duties of innkeepers
have been rebuffed by the courts, 8 ' and the law appears to be settled
that they may discriminate in choosing their customers in w hatever
way they desire. 8 2 In particular, in the 'absence of a statute to the contrary, a restaurant owner may select his customers on purely personal
5

sSee Henderson v. Trailway Bus Co., 194 F. Supp. 423, 426 (E.D. Va.' 1961),
where the coufrt bbservedt "the occupant may lawfully forbid any and all
persons, regardless of their reason, or their race or religion, to enter or
remain upon any part of his premises which are not devoted to a public use."
Likewise,' in State v. Fox, 254 N.C. 97, 118 S.E.2d 58, 59 (1961), the court
declared:
"Defendants contend a merchant who sells his wares to one must serve all,
and a refusal to do so is a violation of the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The contention
lacks merit. The operator of a private mercantile establishment has a right
to select his customers, serve those he selects, and refuse to serve others.
The reasons which prompt him to choose do not circumscribe his right."
IG9 Eaton v. Board of Managers, 261 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied 359
U.S. 984 (1959) (hospital).
10 Colenian v. Middlestaff, 147 Cal. App. 2d 833, 305 P.2d 1020, 1022 (1957),
where the court said: "In the absence of statute, a physician 6r surgeon is
under no legal obligation to render professional services to everyone who
applies to him or seeks to engage him. Physicians are not public servants
Iyho are bound to serve all who*seek them, as re innkeepers, common carriers, and the like."'i
181Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 252 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); ArmNrood
v. Francis, 9 Utah 2d 147, 340 P.2d 88 (1959). In Alpaugh v. Wolverton,
184 V. 943, 36 S.E.2d 906, 908 (1946) the court said:
"The proprietor of a restaurant is not subject to the same duties and responsibilities as those of an innkeeper, nor is he entitled to the privileges of the
latter. . . .His rights and responsibilities are more like those of a shopkeeper.
He is under no common-law duty to serve everyone who applies
to him. In the absence of statute he may accept some customers and reject
others on purely personal grounds."
182 Nash v. Air Terminal Services, 85 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Va. 1949); Briggs v.
State, 236 Ark. 596, 367 SW.2d 750 (1963), vacated 379 U.S. 306 (1964);
Mayor, etc. of Wilmington v. Smentkowski, 198 A.2d 685 (Del. 1964); State
v. Brown, 195 A.2d 379, 382 .(Del. 1963)- ("it is clear that at common law
the owner of a restaurant or other place of public refreshment, amusement,
or entertainment was free to select patrons upon any basis deemed satisfactory
to him"); Wilmington Parking Auth'y .v.Burton, 39 Del. Ch. 10, 157 A.2d
894, 902 (1960) rev'd on other grounds 365 U.S. 715 (1961) ("It acts as a
restaurant keeper and, as such, is not required to serve any and all persons
entering its place of business, any more that the operator of .a bookstore,
barber shop, or other retail business is required to sell its product to every'

one. This is the common law . . ."); Tynes v. Gogos, 144 A.2d 412, (D.C.

App. 1958) ; Walker v. State, 220 Ga. 415, 139 S.E.2d 278, 283 (1964) ("At
common law the. proprietor of a private business such as this restaurant was
free to serve only whom he pleased and could exclude others with or without
reason, according to his own personal wishes") ; Horn v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.,
327 Ill. App. 498, 64 N.E.2d 574, 578 (1946) ("There is no common law duty
of a . . .restaurant or eating house to serve all patrons without discrimination . . ."); Nance v. Mayflower, Tavern, Inc., 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 773,

776 (1944).
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grounds,163 and this includes the race or color of the person seeking to
be served in his establishment. 164 The right of the owner to thus discriminate has been placed on the theory that this is "a property right
65
incidental to his ownership of the business.
The fact that the restaurant may be licensed for health inspection
166
or tax purposes does not alter its right to select its own patrons.
Williams v. Howard Johnson's Inc., 210 F. Supp. 295, 297 (E.D. Va.
1962) the court said:
"A restaurant keeper may accept some customers and reject others on purely
personal grounds. A restaurant keeper may select his clientele or discriminate against prospective customers solely on a racial basis, without liability,
and he may revoke the license of any invitee and eject him from the premises
at any time for any reason."
Likewise, in City of Charleston v. Mitchell, 239 S.C. 376, 123 S.E.2d 512, 518
(1961), the court declared:
"In the absence of a statute forbidding discrimination based on race or color,
the rule is well established that an operator of a privately owned restaurant,
privately operated in a privately owned building, has the right to select the
clientele he will serve and to make such selection based on color or race
if he so desires ....
[Ifn the absence of statute the operator of a privately
owned business may accept some customers and reject others on purely personal grounds."
164 Williams v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 293 F.2d 835 (C.A.D.C. 1961); Williams v.
Owen, 179 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Ill. 1959). In Slack v. Atlantic White Tower
System, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 124, 128 (D. Md. 1960), aff'd 284 F.2d 746 (4th
Cir. 1960), the district court declared: "In the absence of statute, the rule is
well established that an operator of a restaurant has the right to select the
clientele he will serve, and to make such selection based on color, if he so
desires. He is not an innkeeper charged with a duty to serve everyone who
applies." In State v. Clyburn, 247 N.C. 455, 101 S.E.2d 295, 299 (1958), it
was observed: "The right of an operator of a private enterprise to select
the clientele he will serve and to make such selection based on color, if he
so desires, has been repeatedly recognized by the appellate courts of this nation." Similarly, in State v. Avent, 253 N.C. 580, 118 S.E.2d 47, 51 (1961),
vacated 373 U.S. 375 (1963), the court observed: "In the absence of a statute
forbidding discrimination based on race or color in restaurants, the rule is
well established that an operator of a privately owned restaurant privately
operated in a privately owned building has the right to select the clientele he
will serve, and to make such selection based on color, race, or white people
in company with Negroes or vice versa, if he so desires. He is not an innkeeper. This is the common law."
165 In Durham v. State, 219 Ga. 830, 136 S.E.2d 322, 326-7 (1964), the court
declared:
"Any intelligent court must hold that his liberty stops precisely where to
extend it would trespass upon another's property. If one is granted the liberty
to invade another's private property over the objection of the owner for any
period of time, that same liberty would continue for all time, and the result
is destruction of property without due process in direct violation of the
Constitution. Therefore, one could find no constitutional process that would
entitle him to commit the trespass forbidden by this statute, hence it denies
163In

him none. ....

"The opinion is a restatement of the first tenet of civilized society, that the
rights of the individual extend to and end at the boundary of the rights of
others.
"The proprietor of Morrison's Cafeteria had a legal right to choose his patrons and no law, State or Federal, denied him, the owner of a privately
owned establishment, operated upon private property, from confining the
services of the restaurant to members of a particular class or race."
166 In Williams v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant, 268 F.2d 845, 847-8 (4th Cir.
1959) the court held:
"The essence of the argument is that the state licenses restaurants to serve
the public and thereby is burdened with the positive duty to prohibit unjust
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Such a license does not make the restaurant a public instrumentality or
public utility which must serve all who apply. A federal court recently
declared:
The license laws of the State of Maryland applicable to restaurants are not regulatory... Neither the statute nor the ordinance
authorizes State or City officials to control the management of
the business of a restaurant or to dictate what persons shall be
served.
Even in the cases of licensees, such as race tracks and taverns,
where the business is regulated by the state, the licensee does not
become a state7agency, subject to the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment.16
B. Places of Entertainment.
As has been previously noted, theaters and other places of amusement were originally licensed monopolies, and were therefore treated
by the framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 as being in the same class
with other public utilities, such as common carriers and inns. The law
at that time had not been fully developed, and the members of Congress
assumed that since these places of amusement were monopolies, the
states would impose common law duties on them similar to the duties
imposed on other public utilities."' 8 But the common law in the several
states turned out differently, and it is important to understand how this
law ultimately developed in order to fully appreciate the odd turn which
many "public accommodation"I statutes took. Thus, by 1911 it had been
held in New York that "there is a distinction between common carriers
discrimination in the use and enjoyment of the facilities. This argument fails
to observe the important distinction between activities that are required by
the state and those which are carried out by voluntary choice. . . . The
license laws of Virginia do not fill the void .... The Code of Virginia . . .
makes it unlawful for any person to operate a restaurant in the state without
an unrevoked permit from the Commissioner, who is the chief executive
officer of the State Board of Health. The statute is obviously designed to
protect the health of the community but it does not authorize state officials
to control the management of the business or to dictate what persons shall
be Eerved."
167 Slack v. Atlantic White Tower System, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 124, 129 (D. Md.
1960), aff'd 284 F.2d 746 (4th Cir. 1960). In State v. Brown, 195 A.2d 379,
384-5 (Del. 1963), the court held:
"We are constrained to say that the sweeping opinion . . . that all licensees
are state instrumentalities subject to the Fourteenth Amendment would erode
and emasculate any distinction betveen private and public action. It has uniformly been held that the mere fact that a state licenses a business does
not clothe the business with the public character required to render the Fourteenth Amendment applicable.... Some language from the Mitchell decision
can be construed as postulating a distinction between licenses granted to certain 'privileged' businesses, such as those selling alcoholic beverages, and
those licenses granted to more 'general' businesses. Such a distinction has
been rejected for purposes of implying the presence or absence of state
action. . ..
"Accordingly, we are of the opinion that, with the exceptions noted above,
the owner or manager of a privately owned place of public accommodation,
entertainment, or refreshment may constitutionally refuse service to patrons
because of discrimination predicated upon a racial classification."
108 Note 56, supra.
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and innkeepers, who are obliged to serve all persons who seek accommodation from- them, and the keepers of public places of amusement
or resort, . . . and, in the absence of legislation, the keeper of such an
establishment may discriminate and serve whom he pleases." 1 9 Five
years later, in the celebrated case of Woollcott v.Shu4ert,"1 0 the New
York Court of Appeals declared: At the common law a theater, while affected by a public interest
which justified, licensing under the police power or for the purpose of revenue, isin no sense public property or a public efiterprise. It is niot governed by the rules which relate to common
carriers or other public utilities. The proprietor does not derive
from the state the franchise to initiate and conduct it. His right
to and control of it is the same as that of any private citizen in
his property and affairs.7 1He has the right to decide who shall
be admitted or excluded.

Accordingly, it has been held that there is no duty to serve the pub172
lic, and that discrimination is legally permissible, in amusement parks,
169

170
171

172

Aaron v. Ward, 203 N.Y. 351, 355, 96 N.E. 736, 737 (1911). In Homey v.
Nixon, 213 Pa. 20, 61 A. 1088, 1089 (1905), "the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
said: "But the difference between the duty of a common carrier and that of a
theater proprietor has been wholly overlooked. That of the former is absolite to carry whoever may wish to be carried. It is a duty growing out of
no contract, but rests at all times on the common, carrier in return for the
franchises and privileges conferred by the state..
The proprietor of a theatre is a private individual, engaged in a strictly private business, which, though for the entertainment of the public, is always
lhmted to those whom he may agree to admit to it. There is no duty, as in
the case of a common carrier, to admit everyone who may apply and be willing to pay for a ticket, for the theater proprietor has acquired no peculiar
rights and privileges from the state, and is therefore under no implied obligation'to serve the public."
More recently, in Dfews v. State, 224 Md. 186, 167 A.2d 341, 343 (1961),
the Maryland Supreme Court declared:
"Early in the common law the duty to serve the public without discrimination
apparently was imposed on many callings. Later this duty was confined to
exceptional callings as to which an urgent public need called for its continuance, such as innkeepers and common carriers. Operators of most enterprises,
including places of amusement, did not and do not have any such common
law obligation, and in the absence of a statute forbidding discrimination, can
pick and choose their patrons for any reason they decide upon, including
I
the color of their skin."
217 N.Y. 212, 111 N.E. 829 (1916).
Id. at 830. In Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club, 35 App. D.C. 82, 87-88
(1910)- aff'd 227 U.S. 633 (1913) the court likewise said:
"The rule as to places of amusement is entirely different from that of utilities chartered and created by law for the accommodation and benefit of the
public. For example, it is undoubtedly true that anyone presenting himself
for transportation on a railway train is entitled, upon paying his fare, to be
carried, unless there is something in his conduct when he presents himself,
which justifies his exclusion. On the other hand, theaters, race tracks, circuses, private parks, and places of amusement and entertainment, in the
absence of some statutory regulation or restriction as to the manner in which
such private enterprises shall be conducted, are entirely under the. control
of the proprietor or manager, and he may exclude or admit whomsoever he
chooses."
See Griffin v. Collins, 187 F. Supp. 149, 153 (D. Md. 1960), holding that an
amusement park has the right "to serve or refuse to serve whomever they
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76
75
74
and race tradks,'1
baseball stadiuiis, 173 daice halls, private parks,
. 7
none of which are deemed to be public'callings
The' comm 6 n'lhw -ag it develbped in rdspect to theaters is particularly abuhdant. The uniform rule now is that 'a -theater owner may arbitr'arily admit oi exclude'whomever he"pleases for any reason fie desires.1 7 A person who is refused admission to a'theater has no common
law fight to recover d'amages fibm the owner on accourt of such refusal, because "there is no vested civil right in'a person intending-to
visit a theatre to, have admission. given him, and no. tort is committed
at comm6n law by refusiilg r cancelling such admission." 17?

please." Fletcher 'v.Coney. Island, Inc.,. 165 Ohio. St. 150, 134 N.E.2d 371,
375 (1956), observed: "at common law those who own and operate private
places of amusement and entqrtainmeht can adinit or exclude whomsoever
they please. . .. "
.73 Finnesey v. Seattle Baseball Club, 122 Wash. 276, 210 P. 679 (1922).
27 4 Tynes v. GQgos, 144,A.2d 412 (D.C. App. 1958).
175 Griffin v. State, 225 Md. 422, 171 A.2d 717 (1961), re'd on other joiunds,
378 U.S. 130 (1964).
'176 Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club, 227 U.S. 633 (1913). In Griffin v. Southland Racing Corp., 236 Ark. 872, 370 S.W2.d 429, 430-1 (1963) it was held:
"The proprietor of a privately owned place of amtisement, such as a race
track or a theater, is not under, a common carrier's duty to render service
to everybody who seeks it. It i's upiformly held that the proprietor may refuse
to' admit, . . .persons, he thinks to be undesirable . .'. owing to. the management's right to exclude anyone it pleases, the patron cannot obtain the aid
of the courts, in seeking to compel his admission to the premises."
Similarly, in Flores v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., 55 Cal. 2d 736, Cal.
.Reptr. 201, 361 P.2d 921, 924 (1961); the court observed:
"it appears to be the almost universal 'rule in the United States that in the
absence of statute there 'exists no constitutional or common law right of
access to race tracks or other places of public amusement comparable to the
'right to accommodation' at inns. On the contrary, the common law right appears to have been one of exclusion on the part of the race track proprietor."
77
1 See Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 1165 (1948), where the commentator notes:
"Although at common law a person engaged ir a public calling, such as an
innkeeper or common carrier, was under an obligation to serve, without discrimination, all who sought service,. it appears that proprietors of privately
operated places of public amusement and entertainment were under no.such
obligation and could deny admission to whomever they pleased."
'78 'Bailey v. ,Washington.-Theatre Co., ,218 Ind. 513,. 34 N.E.2d 17, 19 (1941)
("at common law the operation of a theater is a private business and that
in the absence of a statute anyone may be arbitrarily excluded therefrom") ;
Vogel v. Saenger Theatres,. 207 La. 835, 22 So. 2d 189 (1945).; People ex
rel. Burnham v. Flynn; 189 N.Y. 180, 82 N.E. 169 (1907); Daniels,v. Firm
Amusement Corp., 158 Misc. .251, 285 N.Y.S. 557 (1935); Taylor v. Cohn,
47 Or. 538, 84 P. 388 (1906); Anderson v. Pantages Theater Co., 114 Wash.
24, 194 P. 813 (1921). For a good general review, see Turner & Kennedy,
Exclusion, Ejection and Segregation of Theater Patrons,32 IowA' L. Rv. 625
(1947); Whittaker, The Law of the Theatre, 12 CENT. L.J. 390 (1881). For
a similar view in Canada, see Loew's Montreal Theatres, Ltd. v. Reynolds, 30
Que. K.B. 459; 465-6 (1919) (Martin, J.).
9
17 Commonwealth v. George, 61 Pa. Super. 412, 418 (1915). In De Ia Ysla v.
Publix Theatres Corp., .82 Utah 598, 26 P.2d 818, 820 (1933), the court
I
declared:
"The carrying on of a theater or other place of public amusement is a private business which is not governed by rules governing common carriers
or other kind of business affected 'with a public duty, and, in the absence
of statutory regulations of the business or of a statute the proprietors are
not, as in the case of common carriers, obliged to admit any one who may
apply and be willing to pay for a ticket, but may admit or exclude, persons
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The right of a place of amusement to discriminate arbitrarily in its
admission policies extends to racial grounds. 180 For example, it was
held that a private swimming pool could refuse to admit a person because he was of Mexican descent."' Similarly, in a private preshowing
of a film, the owner may exclude people on racial grounds even in states
1
with anti-discrimination laws. '1
The whole subject is ably summarized in State v. Cobb.' 8 3 In that
case, the court declared:
...the proprietor of a private business has the right to select
the clientele he will serve and, if he so desires, he may arbitrarily
exclude from his premises any individual or group of individuals.
Therefore, he may select his customers or patrons upon the
basis of sex, color, creed or caprice. This power of selection and
exclusion is a right which is protected by law and one which has
always been regarded as basic to the institution of private property ....

The law does not look to the motive of the proprietor,

but to the wrongful invasion of his property
84 and to the disturbance of his right to undisputed possessionY.

The court also added:
However, it is equally well settled that in the control of his own
business, the proprietor of a privately owned place of amusement
may admit or exclude any person for any reason satisfactory to
himself or for no reason whatever. In the absence of civil rights
at their pleasure, and if any one applies at the ticket office of a theater and
desires to purchase tickets of admission and is refused, he has no cause
of action against the proprietor of a theater for such refusal; that in the
absence of a statute or statutory regulation, the proprietor may make such
rules and regulations for the conduct of the business as he sees fit; he may
segregate or exclude persons of all classes or races and admit only whomsoever he desires ..
"
180 In Fletcher v. Coney Island, Inc., 165 Ohio St. 150, 134 N.E.2d 371, 373
(1956) the court said:
"It will thus be observed that the owner or operator of a private amusement
park or place of entertainment may arbitrarily and capriciously refuse admittance to whomsoever he pleases, be they Africans, Chinese, East Indians,
Germans, Italians, Poles, Russians or any other racial group, in the absence
of legislation requiring him to admit them."
181 In Terrell Wells Swimming Pool v. Rodriguez, 182 S.W.2d 824, 825 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1944) the court said that "the proprietor of a place of amusement
which is privately operated can refuse to sell a ticket to and may thereby
exclude any person he desires from the use of his facilities for any reason
sufficient to him, or for no reason whatever."
112 In MacLeod v. Fox West Coast Theatres Corp., 10 Cal. 2d 383, 74 P.2d 276,
278 (1937), the court observed:
Fox West Coast Theatres was the owner of the theatre and that at any
showing of a motion picture therein to which the public was not invited, in
the absence of any release or qualification of its rights in that regard, the
said defendant alone had the exclusive right to determine who should be
permitted to attend ....

For example, if .

.

. the parties . . . had stipulated

that members of the white race only were to be admitted to the 'preshowing'
it would seem unlikely that any one would contend that Charles Chaplin
Film Corporation properly might disregard that element of the contract and
as a result legally fill the theater with persons who were members of a race
other than the white race."
183262 N.C. 262, 136 S.E.2d 674 (1964).
14 Id. 136 S.E.2d at 676.
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legislation, and North Carolina has none, the law imposes no
obligation upon the owner or proprietor of a theater or other
public amusement with respect to whom he shall admit or exclude. Unlike a public utility, his business is not affected with a
public interest, and he is under no legal obligation to admit every
person who applies and is ready to pay the price of admission....
His license to operate is not a franchise for "with the possible exception of ancient Rome-amusement of the populace has never
been regarded as a function or purpose of government."' 185
4.

THE COVERAGE OF THE TERM "PUBLIC ACCOmmODATION."

A.

The Influence of People v. King.

As the first northern case to discuss and uphold the constitutionality
of anti-discrimination legislation, and as the first case in the country
to discuss it extensively in relation to the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the influence of the decision of the New York
Court of Appeals in People v. King 86 has been very extensive throughout the country in the field of state anti-discrimination laws in places
of "public accommodation." For this reason, the opinion in this case
warrants close attention.
In this case, the defendant was convicted of discrimination by refusal to sell a Negro a ticket to a skating rink. Counsel for the defendant contended that the statute constituted a deprivation of property
without due process of law because it restricted the owner in respect
to his use of his own property. The court conceded that this constitutional provision protected property "not only in a strict and technical
sense, against unlawful invasion by the government in the exertion of
governmental power in any of its departments, but also protects every
essential incident to the enjoyment of those rights."' 87 Thus, if the
legislative restriction on the owner's liberty to admit whomever he
wanted on to his property was unjustified, the statute would be unconstitutional. The court, however, observed that the use of property
may be limited by statutes passed under the state's police power to
secure public peace, good order, health, morals, and general welfare.
The court noted that this power was broad but not unlimited.
Next the court said that the statute was passed primarily to prevent
discrimination against Negroes. It added that under the Fourteenth
Amendment, no state could pass a law preventing Negroes from using
places of amusement, which was true but irrelevant. 188 (For example,
a statute excluding poor people from places of amusement would be
equally unconstitutional if the owner cared to admit them, yet the owner
obviously could refuse to let them in.) 8 9 The court added that in view
1s5 Id. 136 S.E.2d at 677.
186 110 N.Y. 418, 18 N.E. 245 (1888).
187 Id. 18 N.E. at 246.
188 Id. 18 N.E. at 246-7.
189 During the debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1875, Senator Thomas F. Bayard,
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of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 "in the opinion of Congress the amendments had a much broader scope, and prevented, not only discriminating legislation of this character by the states, but also such discrimination by individuals, since the jurisdiction of Congress to pass a law
forbidding the exclusion of persons of color from places of public
amusement and annexing a penalty for its violation must be derived,
if it exists, from the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments."' 90 This analysis is manifestly erroneous. As previously noted, 191
Congress intended only to abolish state statutes or common law rules
which allegedly discriminated against Negroes. No member of Congress asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment prevented discrimination
by individuals, and the New York Court of Appeals was mistaken in
believing the contrary.
The court went on to declare that the law was designed to uplift
Negroes, and was therefore a legitimate exercise of the police power for
the public good. 1 92 It at length turned to the question of whether the
statute was an unconstitutional invasion of property rights. The court
noted that the legislature did not interfere with the right of a person
giving a private entertainment to restrict admission thereto, and further
asserted that the law did not "seek to compel social equality." The court
concluded:
It is not claimed that that part of the statute giving to colored people equal rights at the hands of innkeepers and common carriers
is an infraction of the constitution. But the business of an innkeeper or a common carrier, when conducted by an individual, is a
private business, receiving no special privilege or protection from
the state. By the common law, innkeepers and common carriers
are bound to furnish equal facilities to all without discrimination,
because public policy requires them so to do. The business of
conducting a theater or place of public amusement is also a pria Democrat from Delaware who opposed the bill, jokingly suggested that
funds be appropriated to pay the theater and railway tickets of paupers, "for
impecuniosity is as much a condition under the fourteenth amendment as race
and color, and entitled to the same protection," 3 CONG. REc app. 105 (1875).
Cf. Avins, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Civil Rights Bill of
1966, and the Right to Buy Property, 40 S. CAL. L. Rav. 274 (1967).
190Id. 18 N.E. at 248.
191 Note 76 supra.
192 18 N.E. at 248, where the court said:
"The members of the African race, born or naturalied in this country, are
citizens of the states where they reside and of the United States. Both justice and the public interest concur in a policy which shall elevate them as
individuals, and relieve them from oppression or degrading discrimination,
and which shall encourage and cultivate a spirit which will make them selfrespecting, contented, and loyal citizens, and give them a fair chance in the
struggle of life, weighted, as they are at best, with so many disadvantages.
It is evident that to exclude colored people from places of public resort on
account of their race, is to fix upon them a brand of inferiority, and tends
to fix their position as a servile and dependent people. It is of course impossible to enforce social equality by law. But the law in question simply
insures to colored citizens the right to admission, on equal terms with others,
to public resorts, and to equal enjoyment of privileges of a quasi public
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vate business, in which anyone may engage, in the absence of
any statute or ordinance. But it has been the practice, which has
passed unchallenged, for the legislature to confer upon municipalities the power to regulate by ordinance the licensing of theaters and shows, and to enforce restrictions relating to such places,
in the public interest; and no one claims that such statutes are an
invasion of the right of liberty or property guaranteed by the
constitution. The statute in question assumes to regulate the conduct of owners or managers of places of public resort in respect
to the exclusion therefrom of any person by reason of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude. The principle stated by
Waite, C.J., in Munn v. Illinois,supra, which received the assent
of a majority of the court, applies in this case: "Where," says the
chief justice, "one devotes his property to a use in which the public have an interest, he in effect grants to the public an interest
in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for
the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created." In the judgment of the legislature, the public had an
interest to prevent race discrimination between citizens on the
part of persons maintaining places of public amusement; and the
quasi public use to which the owner of such a place
193 devoted his
property gives the legislature a right to interfere.
By this opinion, the New York Court of Appeals compounded the
error of Mr. Justice Bradley in the Civil Rights Cases'" that the antidiscrimination laws were only meant to abolish racial discrimination.
The court failed to realize that it was only franchised public utilities
which the statute was designed to govern. The court was manifestly
wrong in saying that common carriers had no special privileges, 195 and
at least partially wrong in respect to inns. 1 96 The assertion that places
of amusement stood on the same footing as any other private business
was correct as the common law had developed, but was contrary to
the assumption of the legislators. 1 97 Having ignored the public utility
basis of the statute, the court was forced to use the far vaguer and more
imprecise test that the legislature could forbid discrimination in any
business affected by a public interest or devoted to a public use. As
a means for determining what businesses can be covered and what
businesses the legislature cannot cover, these tests are utterly meaningcharacter. The law in question cannot be set aside, then, because it rias no
basis in the public interest; and the promotion of the public good is the main

purpose for which the police power may be exerted."

18 N.E. at 248-9.
194 Note 68, supra.
195 See Avins, The Civil Rights Act of 1875: Some Reflected Light on the Fourteenth Amendment and Public Accommodations, 66 COL. L. REv. 873, 888,
n, 80 (1966).
196 Id.at n. 81.
197 See Pingrey, Racian Discrimination,30 Am. L. REG. (n.s.) 69, 82-83 (1891):
"A public skating rink comes under the same provision of law as other places
of public amusement. The law gives every person certain rights. These rights
thus given, include the equal enjoyment of privileges furnished by managers
of public skating rinks, and any other place of public amusement."
2931d.
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less, since the concepts of public interest and public use are liable to
indefinite expansion and furnish no ascertainable guidelines for the
legislature. 19 Thus, denuded of the two guiding principles that the
legislature could forbid racial discrimination only when it forbade
other arbitrary discrimination, and that it could forbid arbitrary discrimination only in return for granting a public utility an economic
monopoly or quasi-monopoly, the law in respect to "public accommodations" drifted out into a sea of uncertainty without either rudder or
compass to guide it.
B. The Search for a Rationale as to Public Accommodations

By restricting anti-discrimination laws to places of "public accommodation," the legislatures of the various states obviously did not intend
to include all businesses199 since otherwise the statutes would have said
so, as does the law of California now. 200 Without any significant guidelines to distinguish one business from another, for the last 80 years the
courts have struggled to make some meaningful sense out of the phrase
"place of public accommodation." The result has been an incomparable
20
crazy-quilt, without rhyme or reason.

1

Some early decisions attempt to adhere to the public utility concept.
Two in particular are worth noting. In Faulkner v. Solazzi,2 0 2 the

court held that a barber shop was not a "place of public accommodation."
It declared that "places of public accommodation" were similar to businesses "affected with a public interest," so as to permit state regulation.
The court stated that such interest arose either "from their enjoyment
of some franchise or special privilege granted by the state to be exercised by them for the public convenience, as in the case, for example,
of all those so-called quasi public utilities upon which the power of
108 See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).

I" As the court observed in Brown v. J.H. Bell Co., 146 Iowa 89, 123 N.\V.
231, 233-4 (1909):
"As applied to business of a public or quasi public character conducted for
the accommodation, refreshment, amusement, or instruction of the public,
these statutes have been held to be a valid exercise of the police power....
It has also been held that, as applied to carriers and innkeepers, these statutes
are merely declaratory of the common law ...
Manifestly, the statute under consideration was not made to, nor does it
apply to every private business. . . . These civil rights acts do not confer
equality of social rights or privileges, nor could they enforce social inte-course, and it is doubtful, to say the least, if they could be made to apply
to purely private business. It is the right of a trader whose business is
purely of private character to trade with whom he pleases. This thought
was evidently in the mind of the Legislature, for it did not attempt to
cover all kinds of business, and, except at to barber shops, the business referred to in hte act has always been regarded as being semi or quasi public."
200 Note 147, supra.
201 See Caldwell, State Public Accommodation Laws, Fundamental Liberties and
Enforcement Programs,40 WASH. L. REv. 841, 857-862 (1965). For a lengthy
attempt to define what businesses are public and what are private, see Matter
of Rose Hill Securities Co., 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 749 (Ohio Civil Rights
Comm. 1963).
20279

Conn. 541, 65 A. 947 (1907).
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eminent domain is properly conferrable," or from using the property
in a business which "affects the community at large, and especially if
a natural or virtual monopoly is enjoyed, as in the case of railroads,
telegraph and telephone companies, theaters and places of public amusement, gas and water companies, public warehouses, grain elevators,
etc. ''1-"° The court classed carriers and inns in this group as "a public
employment involving a public service for the public accommodation. 2"
The court then rejected the argument that because a barber is
licensed to assure that he is competent and will not spread disease or
injure his customers, this makes his shop a place of public accommodation. The court reasoned that this license was not in the nature of a
franchise possessed by public utilities. 20 5 This view seems clearly correct since a public utility franchise is designed to limit competition, while
a license to secure the safety of a business or the competency of its
workmen is not designed to reduce the number of competitors; all who
meet the required standard in the latter case will be licensed. Nevertheless, two more recent cases have held the contrary on virtually identical
200

facts.

203 Ibid.

204 Id. at 65 A. 948.
205

The court said at 65 A. 948:
"The plaintiff has sought to array barber shops with the class of business
agencies first above referred to, to wit, those operating under a franchise or
privilege bestowed by the state, and therefore exercising a power not open
to all. The reason for this claim is found in the fact that a barber cannot
ply his trade without a license and that all barber shops are under sanitary

regulation, and subject to sanitary inspection by a state board. Pub. Acts 1903,
p. 91, c. 130. The object thus sought is not, as we understand, to demonstrate
that the state possesses the power of regulation, for it is not denied by the
defendant that legislation such as is contained in the act in question could
be lawfully aimed at barber shops, but to affect the defendant's employment
with the public interest, and thus give it a public color as introductory to a
claim that its accommodations therefore properly fall within the descriptive
term of the statute, 'public accommodations.' It will be observed, however,
that no license is required to conduct a barber shop. Any one can do that.
The only license required is of the individual who practices his trade therein.
The law thus seeks to secure competent and proper workmen in the interest
of public safety and health. The proprietor may be unlicensed. If he has
qualified as a barber by obtaining authority to ply that trade, he is still in
a class with lawyers, physicians, dentists, and permissibly plumbers. The
sanitary provisions prescribed are only an exercise of the power which the
state has to so regulate and investigate the conduct of any business as may
be reasonably necessary to conserve the public health and safety. Whether
the state is licensing workmen or inspecting premises, it is only in the exercise of its power of regulation. It is not conferring franchises or privileges."
206 In Sellers v. Philip's Barber Shop, 46 N.J. 340, 217 A.2d 124 (1966), th Neew
Jersey Supreme Court noted that to become a barber, an applicant had to
take certain training and apprenticeship and pass an examination, and that
barber shops were regulated for sanitation and operations to preserve the
health and safety of patrons. The court therefore concluded that a barber
shop was a "place of public accommodation," saying: "As we have indicated
the license and registration of the barber and his shop, with the accompanying
monopoly of the practice of barbering have brought him into the public domain and given him a special status. So long as he holds that status he cannot discriminate against a prospective patron who seeks his service, be he
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Finally, the court considered the question of whether the fact that
a barber advertises for business and serves customers who come in
makes his shop a place of public accommodation. The court concluded
that it did not. It said:
Wherein in all this does his service or place of service differ
from either the service or place of service of every other man
who keeps an office, shop, or other place where personal attention
in any line is given to patrons who desire the ministrations afforded? Is he in any different position from the physician, the
dentist, the manicurist, the chiropodist, the massage giver, the
turkish bath proprietor, etc. ? Wherein, to go a step further, does
his business differ in essence from that of every shopkeeper or
tradesman, unless it be in the personal feature of the service
rendered, and that would seem rather to suggest a reason why
such an employment should not, both for the sake of the service
giver and receiver, be among the first selected to be deprived of
the right of selection of patrons? In a sense, every business
which has a promise of success within it is one which appeals
to a public need, and in the sense that it supplies a need it is for
the public accommodation. But the term "public accommodation,"
as descriptive of places within the purview of the act, clearly was
not chosen as one to be interpreted in any such all-embracing
sense. The statute plainly embodies an attempt to discriminate
between different forms bf business and to select certain only
for the operation of the statute. No basis for that discrimination
can be found in the descriptive language employed except the
well-understood one which the common law recognizes, and which
is aptly indicated by the language.20 7
Another case adopting this same point of view is People v. Forest
Negro or of any other race, any more than a lawyer or other professional
person may discriminate for that reason."
Id. at 217 A.2d 125.
In Gegner v. Graham, 1 Ohio App. 2d 442, 205 N.E.2d 69, 71 (1964), appeal
dismissed 1 Ohio St. 2d 108, 205 N.E.2d 72 (1965), the court said:
"Ordinarily, the law does not undertake to govern or regulate a citizen in the
conduct of his strictly private business. In matters of mere private concern,
he is free to deal with whom he pleases. However, there are certain classes
of business in the management and conduct of which the general public also
has an interest. The plaintiff carries on his business under a license granted
him by the state. He has secured to him by the law certain privileges and
rights which are not enjoyed by members of the public generally. The power
which granted the license represented each member of the public in making
the grant, and each member, with reference to those privileges which accrue
to the public under it, must be on an equality with every other member ...
when he accepts the privileges afforded by a public license, he must also
accept the obligation to treat all members of the granting authority alike.
Thereafter, he may not refuse to serve any citizen for any reason which
is not applicable alike to all citizens.
"The Legislature has heretofore provided careful supervision over barbers
in the interests of public health, safety and welfare. .

207

.

. The Board of

Barber Examiners is required to prescribe sanitary requirements subject to
the approval of the Department of Health. This is a valid exercise of police
power in the interest of public health, safety and welfare.
79 Conn. 541, 65 A. 947, 948-9 (1907) Sellers v. Philip's Barber Shop, 46 N.J.
340, 217 A.2d 124 (1966) disagrees with this point of view.
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Home Cemetery Co.2 0 8 In this case the court held that a cemetery was
not a place of public accommodation. It first declared that public utilities
must serve all applicants on reasonable terms because they have a
monopoly and if they discriminate those who are refused service cannot
go elsewhere.2 0 9 In the case of the cemetery under consideration, the
court noted that it had no monopoly, nor did it have the right to condemn
property for public use. Therefore the court concluded that it was not
a "place of public accommodation."
Many statutes did not fit the public utility concept, because the
legislature had included places which were clearly not public utilities.
Foremost among them were a variety of places of amusement. By 1900,
places of amusement had long since ceased to possess a franchise or
monopoly. Some statutes included places such as restaurants, which
also had no state-granted monopoly franchise. How to rationalize the
inclusion of such businesses without including all businesses taxed
judicial ingenuity to the utmost.
One test developed by a group of cases may be termed the "haggling
test." This test consisted of an inquiry as to whether the proprietor of
the business offered admission on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, or whether
the court expected that the buyer and seller would engage in "horsetrading" to determine the terms and conditions of the contract.2 10 The
208258 Ill. 36, 101 N.E. 219 (1913).
209 The court said at 101 N.E. at 220-1:
"If they are created for the purpose of performing a service for the public,
or invested with powers concerning which the public at large have a direct
and substantial interest, they cannot arbitrarily select the persons for whom
they will perform the service or exercise their powers, contrary to the public
policy of the state. A corporation formed to serve the public must serve all
who apply, on equal terms, and if the corporation devotes its property to a
use in which the public have an interest, the owner must submit to be controlled and regulated by the public to the extent of the interest created. Corporations organized to serve the public generally, such as those which furnish
water, gas, or electric lights in cities, cannot select their patrons, but must
furnish accommodations to all who apply, on equal terms and at reasonable
rates ....
As to such corporations there is the additional reason that they
have exclusive control of the supply, and those whom they refuse to serve
cannot be served at all, which impresses the property with a public interest.
One reason for determining that the property of the corporation is affected
with a public interest and devoted to a public use is that the corporation may
exercise the sovereign power of eminent domain, which can only be granted
21 to a corporation for a public use."
OSee Goff v. Savage, 122 Wash. 194, 210 P. 374, 375 (1922), where the court

said:

"In our opinion there is a further distinction between the position of one who
buys an admission ticket or pays a fixed entrance price into a place commonly
accepted as public, and one who enters a place of trade to which the public
generally are invited but whose subsequent treatment is dependent upon the
mutual agreement between the proprietor or the one conducting the place
and the customer. In the latter case the extent of the dealings and the nature
of the same, whether upon credit or for cash, or whether in fact any dealing is to be had or not, are a matter of subsequent agreement in the same
sense that a prospective patient visits a doctor's office or a client the office
of an attorney. The element of discretion on the part of the one who is to
part with his goods or his professional services is reserved until a contract
is entered into."
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theory of the courts which enunciated this test apparently was that
Negroes, like everybody else, should have to go through the haggling
gauntlet, or otherwise the proprietor's liberty of contract would be
restricted.

21 n

For example, one case held that a roller skating rink was a place
of public accommodation, and differed from a shop, because the public
was admitted upon payment of a fixed charge. 212 Another case held that
a restaurant was a place of public accommodation if meals were served
without prior reservation at the same price to everybody; otherwise
the place was private.

213

These tests are of little practical value. Aside from the sale of automobiles, it is difficult to think of any business which merchandises its
products like an oriental bazaar. It is a rarity to find food and clothing
sold at a price, or on other terms, which are negotiable. The average
person would no more think of offering a supermarket manager 27c
for a 29c can of peas, or tendering a five-and-dime store $3.42 for a
broom priced at $3.98, than he would offering a movie theater $1.12
211 Id. 210 P. at 374, where the court said: "it is only upon the theory of the
public character of the places regulated that these statutes have been sustained as constitutional, for the right of private contract is one of those
guaranteed by the same Fourteenth Amendment which is so frequently appealed to for the protection of colored people."
222 Jones v. Broadway Roller Rink Co., 136 Wis. 595, 118 N.W. 170, 172 (1908),
where the court declared:
"We find ourselves unable, however, to conceive any class of places of public
accommodation or amusement which would not include a roller skating rink
to which the public were generally invited upon no condition but the payment
of a fixed charge-public, in as broad a sense as the common carrier or the
innkeeper, the exclusion from which of an individual or a class must infer
discrimination and denial of privileges which all other persons enjoy by
virtue merely of their membership in the public or general community. Public accommodation and amusement is the test prescribed by our statute. The
amusement offered by the usual skating rink is to the public as such and
generally. It differs radically from the tender or accommodation offered by
the ordinary merchant or professional man who, while he impliedly, by
opening the door of his shop or office, invites every one to enter, does so
only for the purpose of selling to each individually either service or merchandise. This distinction has often been noted."
213 See Humburd v. Crawford, 128 Iowa 743, 105 N.W. 330, 330-1 (1905):
"If then, the object and practice of defendants was to serve meals to whomsoever applied, at prices charged to all, their place was an eating house
within the meaning of this statute. If meals were served only in pursuance
of previous arrangements, and therefore to particular individuals, rather than
to any who might apply, it was a private boarding house only. . . . 'If . . .
the defendants conducted a place where those who came were received as
guests and served with meals without any previous agreement as to the
duration of their stay or the terms of their entertainment, then . . . the
defendants kept a public eating house.' . . . Not from advertisements or
signs alone was the true character of the establishment to be ascertained,
but from the manner of conducting the business as well, and, if meals were
served by defendants to whomsoever came, at a uniform price, as the evidence tended to show, this was a sufficient holding out to the world to constitute it a public eating house."
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for tickets priced at $1.50. A federal court has more recently noed how
illusory this distinction is.214
As a slight variation of the foregoing theme, two courts have
offered what may be described as the "socialist" test, namely, does the
business serve society as a whole or does it serve each individually as
an individual? One court reasoned that a soda fountain is not a place
of public accommodation because it serves individuals, one at a time,
and not the masses. 215 An innkeeper, however, at least in serving food,
serves each person individually. A barber certainly does individual
work.
A majority of the New York Court of Appeals hold that the only
businesses included as public accommodations were those "created and
operated for the common advantage, aid, and benefit of the people, the
denial of which to any person would be a discriminatory obstruction
214 Powell v. Utz, 87 F. Supp. 811, 813-5 (E.D. Wash. 1949):
"In Goff v. Savage the court stressed the requirement of the statute that the
establishment must be a 'public' one, and reasoned that since one operating a soda fountain has the right to contract or refuse to contract with
prospective customers as he sees fit, the business is private, even though the
general public is invited to enter the place where the business is carried on.
The court endeavored to distinguish that kind of place from one such as a
theatre where the customer buys an admission ticket. I do not see any sound
basis for the distinction. A theatre owner, as well as a soda fountain operator,
has the right to select his patrons on a proper individual basis and may
decline to serve those who are personally objectionable because of uncleanliness, disorderly conduct and the like. The only difference is that as to the
theatre the selection is made at the entrance to the establishment whe-ea-,
in the case of the soda fountain it is exercised after the patron has entered.
The civil rights statute does not curtail the right to reject patrons on an
individual basis since it applies only where the refusal to serve is because of
race, creed or color....
"According to the foregoing dictionary definitions, 'public accommodation'
clearly includes a restaurant open to the general public. . . . If the statute
were to be construed to exclude any business establishment where at common
law and in the absence of statutory restrictions the proprietor has the right
to govern the terms of his dealings with patrons by private contract, then
no privately owned and operated place of business would be included, and
the civil rights statute would be a farce and a sham. Manifestly, the legislature did not intend to limit the reach of the act to government owned and
operated establishments."
215 Deuwell v. Foerster, 12 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 329, 331 (C.P. 1912), where the
court stated:
"In the discussion by the court it was reasoned that if the word 'accommodation' as defined in the dictionaries was to be used in the interpretation of
the statute, this would include every article of property that is a subject of'
sale, but that it was not understood that places where dry goods, groceries,
hardware or other like articles of accommodation, are places of public accommodation. The proprietor in running his soda fountain dealt not x ith
masses as such, but with individuals, one at a time, just as merchants dogenerally. All the accommodation sought or furnished was a glass of drink;
that which accommodated one never accommodated another. The place maintained by the defendants was not public or common, but private, exclusiveand individual.
"It is not the public character of accommodation that makes the place a.
public place, because if it was, then every place in which any article is
sold to individuals generally is within the statute, and no merchant in anyline of trade could lawfully decline to sell to any citizen for any reason
not applicable alike to all."
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or deprivation in achieving prosperity, health, development, or happiness." 216 That sounds quite broad and all-inclusive at first reading, but
the court then proceeded to assert that a sharp distinction exists between
217
a restaurant or barber shop, named in the law, and ordinary stores.
It is difficult for this author to follow the distinction in light of the test
which the court itself laid down. Moreover, the court declared that a
liquor saloon where drinks were sold for consumption on the premises
was more like a store than a restaurant or other business specifically
named in the law. In fact, the court declared that a saloon was very
much like a tobacco or cigar shop. It reasoned that a saloon was not
within the statute because:
All successful occupations and every kind of business satisfies
wants or needs of citizens; but the Legislature clearly had in mind
in enacting this statute that it should apply only to those it selected
and named and to such others, if any, devoted to the general
advantage, comfort or benefit, and essential or directly auxiliary
to the
prosperity, health, development, or happiness of the citi218
zen.

Unless the court meant to say that tobacco and liquor were equally
deleterious to health, 1 9 the foregoing test is thoroughly incomprehensible.
Still another test is the "necessity" doctrine. One court noted that
the legislature had extended the common law duty of public utilities
not to discriminate "to carefully limited places of public accommodations
which, while not public utilities, like them, are open to the general public for the supplying of necessities. ' ' 220 Another court made the test one
of whether all persons would, at some time or other, have to use the
facility. Thus, the court said that a hotel or carrier would have to be
used by all, but a soda fountain was not a place of public accommodation
since not everybody drank soda water. 22 This distinction is not very
218 Gibbs v. Arras Bros., 222 N.Y. 332, 118 N.E. 857 (1918).

217Id. 118 N.E. at 858, where the court declared:
"The existing legislative classification is not based upon the existence of a
license or franchise from the state to the proprietor of the place or to the
place itself; nor is it based upon the accessibility of the place for the public.
The places of business of lawyers, physicians, dentists, embalmers and of
many other occupations are operated under licenses and are accessible for
the public. Stores, shops, the studios or galleries of artists or photographers,
and very many other places are accessible for the public. It has never been,
and could not be, claimed that civil rights in behalf of the citizen attach to
those places under the existing or any prior civil rights act. Having in view
the common advantage and benefit, the distinction between a restaurant or
barber shop and the ordinary shop or store is not broad and conspicuous,
but is real and indestructivle. On the other hand, many of the places specifically named in the statute are neither licensed nor operated under a license."
218 Ibid.
219 This was the reasoning in Rhone v. Loomis, 74 Minn. 200, 77 N.W. 31 (1898).
220 Barnes v. State, 236 Md. 568, 204 A. 2d 787, 794 (1964).
221 Deuwell v. Foerster, 12 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 329, 329-30 (C.P. 1912), where the
court asserted:
"The civil rights statute had its origin in the common law principle that inns,
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helpful. Theaters and other *places of amusement, entertainment, and
culture, while included as places of public accommodation among the
earliest laws, are not necessities of life,222 and are not used by everybody.
Indeed, such places as opera houses, symphony halls, and similar cultural activities, have not attracted the masses in the United States even
when freely open to them. If the concept of a "place of public accommodation" is to be limited to facilities which every member of the
222
public needs, many specialized facilities will necessarily be excluded.
When businesses failed to meet these nebulous tests, they were
deemed to be merely private businesses. The proprietor was at liberty
224
225
or in any other way which
to
based on
prejudice
business.
his racial
in discriminate
his view promoted
hotels and public carriers held themselves out for the service of the general

public, that is the masses, everybody. The idea was, and is, that all classes
of people at some time or other will need the services of the proprietors of

such places and instrumentalities. They hold themselves out for the service
of everybody alike. The service in such places and instrumentalities is wholly
unlike the service of a candy store or a soda fountain, or a hardware store,
and the like. It is not everybody that has a taste or desire for candy or
soda water. This comparison shows the material distinction between the two
classes of business, the one being clearly public, and the other being clearly
22 2 private and individual.
See Meisner v. Detroit, B.I. & W. Ferry Co., 154 Mich. 545, 118 N.W. 14,
15 (1908): "It appears to be settled by the authorities that these [theaters,
circuses, race tracks, private parks] are private enterprises, under the control
of private parties, and that they may license whomever they will to enter
and refuse admission to whomsoever they will. . . .Pleasure grounds of
this character are not necessaries of life, anymore than are theaters and
race tracks; and, unless restrained by some provisions of their charters, their
owners can impose any terms of admission they choose."
222 See, e.g. Gardner v. Vic Tanny Compton, 182 Cal. App. 2d 506, 6 Cal. Reptr.
490 (1960) :
...it was not a place of public accommodation or amusement. Membership
in defendant's facility was not open to the public in general. It was limited
to those granted membership after an application, an interview, and satisfaction of the manager. There is nothing in the statutes which has the effect
of preventing defendant from maintaing a gymnasium for such persons as
it saw proper to accommodate, and from excluding such persons as it saw
224 proper to exclude."
if the
See Aaron v. Ward, 203 N.Y. 351, 16 N.E. 736, 738 (1911): "...
Legislature can forbid discrimination by the owners of such resorts on the
ground of race, creed, or color, it may equally forbid discrimination on any
other ground.... On the other hand, no one will contend that the Legislature
could forbid discrimination in the private business affairs of life-prevent
an employer from refusing to employ colored servants, or a servant from
refusing to work for a white or for a colored master. So it has been held
that a bootblack may refuse to black a colored man's shoes .... Such conduct may be the result of prejudice entirely, but a man's prejudices may be
part of his most cherished possessions, which cannot be invaded except when
displayed in the conduct of public affairs or quasi public enterprises. That
public amusements and resorts are subject to the exercise of this legislative
control shows that they are not entirely private."
225 In Meisner v. Detroit, B.I. & W. Ferry Co., 154 Mich. 545, 118 N.W. 14, 15
(1908) the court said:
"The sole business in which the defendant is engaged with these two boats
is carrying passengers to and from its private pleasure grounds. It caters
to a particular class of people. It desires to keep out those whom, for reasons
of its own, it deems objectionable. Unless it did this, it would not secure
the class of patrons it desires. If it secures the better class of people, which
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C. The Conflict and Confusion in the Cases
The lack of any ascertainable rationale in the law as to what constitutes a place of public accommodation has resulted in no end of
conflict and confusion in the cases. More recent decisions have recognized that anti-discrimination legislation in business creates rights
unknown to the common law, 226 and the fact that such legislation is
deemed penal in nature 227 has led some courts to hold that if an employee of the business is disobeying the proprietor's instruction in discriminating, the normal rule of respondeat superior cannot be used to
22 8
hold the proprietor liable.

The decisions are not even in harmony as to who the beneficiaries
of these laws are. One case has held that only a citizen, and not an
alien, may recover under these laws,229 while another court declared
that any person within the jurisdiction of the state, even if he were no'
a citizen, was covered. 230 Still a third case from California has decided
that the term "citizen" in the law includes an alien, 23 1 a result which
surely would have startled the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
who expended so much energy in making Negroes into citizens. One
is relieved to find that California does not count her corpses among her
2
citizenry also.

32

There is also a considerable conflict among the cases as to what
types of places are covered by the public accommodation laws. The
cases have split regarding coverage of a bar or tavern, 2 33 barbershop. 2 -1
its managers probably believe would make the enterprise a success, beneficial
financially to themselves and attractive to respectable people, it must exclude
the rough, boisterous, and rowdyish element from its boats and grounds. It
is not engaged in the general carriage of passengers for business and pleasure. It invites such persons and parties as it chooses, and upon such terms
as it chooses to make, to visit its own grounds, provided, as above stated,
with the means of entertainment, amusement, and sport. It is in all essentials
as private an enterprise as that of a theater, a circus, or a race track."
226 People ex rel. Clark v. McCurdie, 75 Ill. App. 2d 217, 220 N E.2d 318, 319
(1966) ("The Civil Rights Statute is remedial and imposes obligations and
duties, and gives to persons wishing to patronize places of public accommodation, as therein defined, rights unknown to the common law") ; City of
Chicago v. Corney, 13 Ill. 2d 396, 142 N.E. 160 (1957) ; Horn v. Illinois
Cent. R. Co., 327 Ill.;App. 498, 64 N.E.2d 574, 576 (1946) ("The Civil Rights
Act, as applied to restaurants and eating houses, creates a cause of action
unknown to the common law"); Grace v. Moseley, 112 Ill. App. 100 (1904);
Fletcher v. Coney Island, Inc., 165 Ohio St. 150, 134 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
'227 Pryce v. Swedish-American Lines, 30 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
22S Hart v. Hartford Lunch Co., 81 Misc. 237, 142 N.Y.S. 515 (1913) ; Hubert
v. Jose, 148 App. Div. 718, 132 N.Y.S. 811 (1912); Thomas v. Williams,
48 Misc. 615, 95 N.Y.S. 592 (1905).
229 Fuller v. McDermott, 87 N.Y.S. 536 (1904).
230 Hubert v. Jose, 148 App. Div. 718, 132 N.Y.S. 811 (1912).
231 Prowd v. Gore, 57 Cal. App. 458, 207 P. 490 (1922).
232 Long v. Mountain View Cemetery Ass'n, 130 Cal. App. 2d 328, 278 P.2d 945,
946 (1955) (Kaufman, J.) ("I also agree with the view that Sections 51
and 52 of our Civil Code only apply to living citizens of this state").
:233 Holding no: Kellar v. Koerber, 61 Ohio St. 388, 55 N.E. 1002 (1899). Holding
yes: Evans v. Fong Poy, 42 Cal. App. 2d 320, 108 P.2d 942 (1941) ; Denny
v. Dorr, 333 Ill. App. 581, 78 N.E.2d 114 (1948) ; Bryant v. Rich's Grill,
216 Mass. 344, 103 N.E. 925 (1914) ; Scruggs v. Borgman, 3 Race Rel. L.
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bootblacking stand,23 5 cemetery, 23 coffee or lunch counter or restaurant, 23 7 ice cream parlor, 2 38 reducing salon or beauty parlor, 23

clothing store,

24 0

241

saloon,
24

and soda fountain.

242

9

retail

Trailer parks are in the

doubtful category.
Some of the more recent cases have given the concept of "place of
public accommodation" a broader meaning. Included in this definition
Rep. 1227 (Mich. Ch. Ct. 1958) ; Jackson v. Imburgia, 184 Misc. 1063, 55
N.Y.S.2d 549 (1945); McCrary v. Jones, 39 N.E.2d 167 (Ohio App. 1941);
Matter of Frye, 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 1293 (Ohio Civil Rights Comm.
1962); Armstrong v. Bell, 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 1295 (Pa. Human Rights

234

Comm. 1962).
Holding no: Faulkner v. Solazzi, 79 Conn. 541, 65 A. 947 (1907). Holding
yes: Messenger v. State, 25 Nebr. 674, 41 N.W. 638 (1889) ; State v. Sprague,
105 N.H. 355, 200 A.2d 206 (1964) ; Sellers v. Philip's Barber Shop, 46 N.J.

340, 217 N.E.2d 121 (1966); State Commission Against Discrimination v.
Mustachio, 6 Race Rel. L. Rep. 355 (N.Y. State Comm. Ag. Disc. 1961);
Matter of Gegner, 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 974 (Ohio Civil Rights Comm.
1962); Brown v. Draper, 11 RACE REL. L. REP. 1053 (Pa. Human Rel.
Comm. 1965); Johnson v. Cafaro, 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 1283 (Pa. Human
Rel. Comm. 1963); Wheeler v. Washington State Board Against Discrimina'ion, 10 RACE REL. L. REP. 841 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1965); Johnson v.
Wheller, 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 1725 (Wash. St. Bd. Ag. Disc. 1963).
235 Holding no: Burks v. Bosso, 180 N.Y. 341, 73 N.E. 58 (1905). Holding yes:
Darius v. Apostolos, 68 Colo. 323, 190 P. 510- (1919).
230 Holding no: Long v. Mountain View Cemetery Ass'n, 130 Cal. App. 2d 328,
278 P. 2d 945 (1955) ; People v. Forest Home Cemetery Co., 258 I1. 36 101
N.E. 219 (1913): Rice v. Soiux City Memorial Park, 245 Iowa 147, 60
N.W.2d 110 (1953), aff'd 348 U.S. 880 (1954). Holding yes: Matter of
George Washington Memorial Park Cemetery Ass'n, 52 N.J. Super. 519,
145 A.2d 665 (1958); Matter of Rose Hill Securities Co., 8 RACE REL. L.
REP. 749 (Ohio Civil Rights Comm. 1963). For cases holdnig racial restrictions in cemeteries to be invalid, see Spencer v. Flint Memorial Park Ass'n,
9 RACE REL. L. REP. 1393 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1964), aff'd 4 Mich. App. 157, 144
N.W.2d 622 (1966); Erickson v. Sunset Memorial Park Ass'n, 259 M;nn.
532, 108 N.W.2d 434 (1961).
237Holding no: Brown v. J.H. Bell Co., 146 Iowa 89, 123 N.W. 231 (1909).
Holding yes: District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100
(1953); Powell v. Utz, 87 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Wash. 1949); Marshall v.
Kansas City, 355 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. 1962) ; Wilson v. Razzetti, 88 Misc. 37,
150 N.Y.S. 145 (1914).
233Holding no: Chochos v. Burden, 74 Ind. App. 242, 128 N.E. 696 (1920 ;
Brown v. Meyer Sanitary Milk Co., 150 Kan. 931, 96 P.2d 651 (1939). Holding yes: Fowler v. Benner, 13 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 313 (C.P. 1912).
230 Holding no: Campbell v. Eichert, 155 Misc. 164, 278 N.Y.S. 946 (1935).
Holding yes: Browning v. Slenderella Systems of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 440,
341 P.2d 859 (1959).
240 Holding no: Harvey, Inc. v. Sissle, 53 Ohio App. 405, 5 N.E.2d 410 (1936).
Holding yes: Lambert v. Mandel's of Cal., 156 Cal. App. 2d 855, 319 P.2d
469 (1957).
241 Holding no: Rhone v. Loomis, 74 Minn. 200, 77 N.W. 31 (1898); Gibbs v.
Arras Bros., 222 N.Y. 332, 118 N.E. 857 (1918). Holding yes: Springer v.
McDermott, 173 N.Y.S. 413 (1919); Tobias v. Riehm, 162 N.Y.S. 976 (1917);
Babb v. Elsinger, 147 N.Y.S. 98 (1914).
242 Holding no: Cecil v. Green, 161 Ill. 263, 43 N.E. 1105 (1896); Deuwell v.
Foerster, 12 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 329 (C.P. 1912); Goff v. Savage, 122 Wash.
194, 210 P. 374 (1922). Holding yes: Hutson v. Owl Drug Co., 79 Cal. App.
390, 249 P. 524 (1926) ; State v. Katz, 241 Iowa 115, 40 N.W.2d 41 (1949).
243 Gregory v. Madison Mobile Homes Park, Inc., 24 Wis. 2d 275, 128 N.W.2d

462 (1964).
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have been a bathhouse, 2 " bowling alley,245 dance hall or pavilion, 2 "
dancing school, 2

47

51

elevator,'"

golf course, 24 '

night club, 250

skating

25 2

rink,
and theater. It has been held that a swimming pool is a place
of public accommodation ;253 one case decided that the statute covered
pools even though the law enumerated over forty specific places without
mentioning them.

254

The federal Civil Rights Act of 1964255 creates a new and fertile field
for litigation over what is included thereunder. Restaurants are covered, 256 especially if they are on public facilities,

57

and drive-in places

25 8

to eat are also included.
But it has been held that neither bars nor
taverns are included. 25 9 It has been held that a barbershop located in a
hotel is covered by the federal law although 95 percent of its patrons
are local. 26 0 Likewise, a federal court enjoined a gas station from posting a sign saying: "we serve white customers only."' 26 1 Movie theaters
244 Norman v. City Island Beach Co., 126 Misc. 335, 213 N.Y.S. 379 (1926).
245 Central Amusement Co. v. District of Columbia, 121 A.2d 865 (D.C. Mun.
App. 1956) ; Orchard Lanes, Inc. v. Pontiac Community Bowling League, 10
RACE REL. L. REP. 1856 (Mich. Civil Rights Comm. 1965); Johnson v.
Humphrey Pop Corn Co., 24 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 135, 4 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 49
(1902), aff'd 70 Ohio St. 478, 72 N.E. 1160 (1904).
246 Amos v. Prom, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 615 (N.D. Iowa 1954); Johnson v. Auburn
& Syracuse Elec. R. Co., 222 N.Y. 443, 119 N.E. 72 (1918); Anderson v.
Ohio, 29 Ohio Ct. App. 61, 40 Ohio C.C.R. 510 (1918); Youngstown Lark &
Falls St. Ry. Co. v. Tokus, 4 Ohio App. 276 (1915).
247 Crawford v. Kent, 341 Mass. 125, 167 N.E.2d 620 (1960).
248 Dean v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 183 Ill. App. 317 (1913).
249 Clark v. Sherman, 7 RECE REL. L. REP. 308 (Colo. Anti-Discrimination
Comm. 1962); Gillespie v. Lake Shore Golf Club, 91 N.E.2d 290 (Ohio App.
1950).
25o Sweet v. Leon, 5 RACE REL. L .REP. 472 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1959).
251 Proctor v. Mount Vernon Arena, 292 N.Y. 168, 54 N.E.2d 349 (1944) ; Lyons
v. Akron Skating Rink Co., 18 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 202, 32 Ohio C.C. Dec.
690 (1908); Matter of Rollercade Skating Rink, 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 985
(Ohio Civil Rights Comm. 1962).
252Miller v. Stampul, 83 N.J.L. 278, 84 A. 201 (1912); Davis v. Euclid Ave.
Garden Theatre Co., 17 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 495, 32 Ohio C.C. Dec. 690 (1911).
253 State v. Rosecliff Realty Co., 1 N.J. Super. 94, 62 A. 2d 488 (1948) ; People
ex rel. State Commission Against Discrimination v. Ackley-Maynes Co., 4
RACE REL. L. REP. 358 (N.Y.S. Ct. 1959); Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa. 123,
110 A.2d 383 (1955).
254 Commonwealth v. Figari, 51 Lanc. Rev. 377 (Pa. Quar. Sess. 1949), aff'd 166
Pa. Super. 169, 70 A.2d 666 (1950).
25578 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 a-2000 a-6 (1964).
256 Blow v. North Carolina, 379 U.S. 684 (1965); Hamm v. City of Little Rock,
379 U.S. 306 (1964) ; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) ; Gregory
v. Meyer, 376 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1967) ; United States v. Clark, 249 F. Supp.
720 (S.D. Ala. 1965) ; Willis v. Pickrick Restaurant, 231 F. Supp. 396 (N.D.
25 Ga. 1964).
7 See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth'y., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Derrington
v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957).
258 Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 377 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967).
259 Cuevas v. Sdrales, 344 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1965) ; Dupre v. Young's Service
Station & Lounge, 12 RACE REL. L. REP. 993 (U.S.D.C., W.D. La. 1967);
Tyson v. Cazes, 238 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. La. 1965) vacated on other grounds
2 363 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1966).
60Pinkney v. Meloy, 241 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Fla. 1965).
261 Rodgers v. Gardner, 10 RACE REL. L. REP. 1290 (U.S.D.C., N.D. Ala. 1965.

19681

PLACE OF "PUBLIC" ACCOMMODATION

also come under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.262 But neither an amusement park 263 nor an outdoor dance ground and picnic area2 64 are covered
under the federal law. If there is any logical pattern to the foregoing
examples of inclusion and exclusion it has escaped the attention of this
author, at least.
One federal district court held that the 1964 federal statute did not
cover a bowling alley,265 while another federal judge enjoined a bowling
alley from staging a tournament which was not open to Negroes. 266 In
still a third case, a federal district judge held that a lunch counter on a
golf course brings the whole course within the scope of the federal law.
This is certainly a case of the tail wagging the dog. The principal facility is clearly the golf course. The lunch counter is there for the convenience of the golfers; the golf course is not there so that people who
came to have lunch can play 18 holes while waiting to be served. Service at some restaurants may be deplorably slow, but it could hardly
be that poor anywhere. In the alternative, the court held that a golf
course is a place of exhibition and entertainment moving in interstate
commerce because once a year an out-of-state team plays there. The
court ruled that Negroes were not limited to watching this out-of-state
team play, but were entitled to play on the course themselves, even
though a private social organization conducts the team matches on the
course. This is quite a load for so slender a legal connection with
67

2
interstate commerce to carry.

Some of the broadest language to be found in the cases which construe what constitutes a place of "public accommodation" is contained
in several New Jersey decisions. It has even been held in that state that
a camp for blind men offering a two-week free vacation, which is
operated by a charity, is a place of public accommodation and cannot
discriminate.26 s Thus, not even the gifts of donors are exempt from
government coercion.
The New Jersey law has a provision which exempts any "place of
accommodation which is in its nature distinctly private." It is not entirely clear what this exemption means, but from two quite recent decisions in that state, as applied to business, it seems that this proviso
means nothing at all. In Evans v. Ross, 269 the defendant owned a public
262 United States v. Sampson, 256 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. Miss. 1966) ; T-witty v.
Vogue Theatre Corp., 242 F. Supp. 281 (M.D. Fla. 1965).
Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 523 (E.D. La. 1966).
264 Kyles v. Paul, 263 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
265 Shields v. Midtown Bowling Lanes, 11 RACE REL. L. REP. 1492 (U.S.D.C.,
M.D. Ga. 1966).
266 United States v. Galiney, 12 RACE REL. L. REP. 999 (U.S.D.C., E.D. Va.
263

1967).

267 Evans v. Laurel Links, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Va. 1966).

Wade v. New Jersey Blind Men's Ass'n, 12 RACE REL. L. REP. 1122 (N.J.
Div. on Civil Rights, 1967).
269 55 N.J. Super. 226, 150 A.2d 512 (1959), aff'd 57 N.J. Super. 223, 154 A.2d
441 (1959).
268
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dining room, which it was conceded that the statute covered, and several
banquet or meeting rooms adjacent thereto. These rooms were rented
by a variety of private organizations for either meetings without food or
for organization banquets. Although the rooms as well as the restaurant
were advertised, no fixed price was set, and the rooms could only be
rented by private contract, the terms of which varied according to the
organization. Nevertheless, it was held that these rooms were places
of public accommodation. The trial court based its reasoning on the
fact that the rooms could be hired by others who made contracts with
the owner. 270 The Appellate Division, however, reasoned as follows:
[A] n establishment which caters to the public, and by advertising
and other forms of invitation induces patronage generally, cannot refuse to deal with members of the public who have accepted
the invitation, because of their race, creed, color, national origin
or ancestry. The law is designed to insure that all citizens of this
State shall have equal rights as members of the public and not
be subjected to the embarrassment and humiliation of being
invited to an establishment, only to find its doors barred to them.
Once a proprietor extends his invitation to the public he must
treat all members of the public alike. The present case is just such
a one as the law was expressly designed to cover.
The Holly House banquet or meeting rooms are "private"-to use
appellant's word-only in the sense that they can be hired for
the exclusive use of a particular group or organization. They
are still public accommodations, just as any private hotel room
or private
hospital room would be within the meaning of the
27 1
law.
This line of reasoning was approved by the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Fraser v. Robin Dee Day Cainp,27 2 wherein that court held
that a combination day camp, private school and nursery was a place
of public accommodation because it advertised in the newspapers, telling
the public what facilities it had available. The court rejected the argument that the camp was exempt from the law because in its advertisement it stated: "Submission of a personal application is only considered
an offer to enroll and is subject to acceptance." The court declared:
270

271

150 A.2d at 515, where the court said:
Appellant concedes his place of business is available to all types of individuals, groups and organizations. Query: Is it appellant's reasoning that his
facilities are available to all types of people or groups of people who make
specific reservations for a specific room with or without food provided they
are not of the colored race? This interpretation would render the law against
discrimination in New Jersey futile and abortive. Adequate services must be
available to all citizens regardless of race, color, creed or national origin.
The refusal of such equality of opportunity to any individual citizen or
group of citizens by reason of race, color, creed or national origin is discrimination."

154 A.2d at 445.
N.J. 480, 210 A.2d 208 (1965).

27244
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"No device, whether innocent or subtly purposeful, can be permitted
' 273
to frustrate the legislative determination to prevent discrimination.
This reasoning is entirely circular. The business cannot discriminate
only because it is a "place of public accommodation" under the law.
The court says that it is a place of public accommodation because it
invites the general public. The court also says that it cannot refuse to
invite the general public because it is a place of public accommodation.
The business cannot restrict its advertising because it falls under the
statute, and it falls under the statute because it cannot restrict its adver274
tising. This is clearly a "bootstraps operation."
If an independent statutory basis exists for deeming a place one of
"public accommodation," then it can justifiably be said that advertising
it as restricted will not exempt it from the law. 275 But if the sole basis
for the law is an unrestricted invitation to the public to enter, it is
difficult to understand why a restricted invitation will not remove that
single connection with the statute. If the object is to spare Negroes the
inconvenience of being lured to a place only to be rejected when they
get there, that object can be accomplished just as effectively by telling
them in advance that the facilities are restricted as it can by opening the
facilities when they arrive to them.
Since the court has held that if a place is advertised, it thereby becomes a place of public accommodation, and that no restriction in the
advertising will suffice to exempt it from the law, it is difficult to imagine
any business in New Jersey which will be considered private in nature.
All businesses have to advertise, and all will therefore be covered. The
only enterprises exempt from the law will be secret activities, like speakeasies of the 1920's, where advertising was by word-of-mouth.
Once it is found that a business is a place of public accommodation,
the restrictions on the proprietor are considerable. Even if he himself
is not white he must serve Negroes.2 76 A Negro refused service may
273
274

Id. 210 A.2d at 213.
For another such example of circular reasoning, see Lambert v. Mandel's

of Calif., 156 Cal. App. 2d 855, 319 P.2d 469, 470 (1957) : "A retail shoe
store is a place of public accommodation that is essentially like a place
where ice cream and soft drinks are sold; each is open to the public general-

ly for the purchase of goods. It cannot be argued that either is not a place
of public accommodation because the proprietor undertakes to limit his
patrons to those of the white race, for it is this discrimination that the law
condemns. The fact that the defendant, in this case, sells shoes and neither
ice cream nor soft drinks, does not serve to distinguish its services, at the
point of importance, from those of the vendor of refreshments."
275 See, e.g., Amos v. Prom, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 615, 629 (N.D. Iowa, 1954): "It
would seem that an establishment which has the attributes of a place of
public amusement cannot, by adding to the rules generally and properly
followed by establishments or business within the Act the rule of exclusion
because of color, change its character from a place of public amusement
upon the theory of 'social acceptability.'"
276 See Evans v. Fong Poy, 42 Cal. App. 2d 320, 108 P.2d 942 (1941)
(holding
a Chinese restaurant liable for not serving Negroes).
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recover under the statute even if he was not a bona fide customer and
only applied for service to create the opportunity for litigation.2 7 In
one case a tavern owner was enjoined to serve a Negro even though the
owner claimed that the man was intoxicated and that service would
render the owner liable under the state Dram Shop Act to anybody
injured as a result of his condition.27 8 Orders against places of public
29
accommodation are enforced by fine and imprisonment. 1
Considering the restrictions which these statutes forbidding discrimination in places of "public accommodation" place on owners of private
businesses, it is not surprising to find occasional judicial protests being
raised. One Ohio court criticized the local "civil rights" law for violating
freedom to sell to whomever the proprietor chose . 0 Another Ohio court
naively predicted that Negroes would not force themselves into places
where the proprietor did not want to serve them. 28 ' A dissenting judge
from Washington protested:
Cash registers ring for a Negro's as well as for a white man's
money. Practically all American businesses, excepting a few having social overtones or involving personal services, actively seek
Negro patronage for that reason. The few that do not serve
Negroes adopt that policy either because their clientele insist
upon exclusiveness, or because of the reluctance of employees to
render intimate personal service to Negroes. Both the clientele
and the business operator have a constitutional right to discriminate in their private affairs upon any conceivable basis. The right
to exclusiveness, like the right to privacy, is essential to freedom.
No one is legally aggrieved by its exercise .... The statute refers
to "place[s] of public resort." (Italics mine.) This phrase is
without constitutional or legal significance. It has no magic to
convert a private business into a governmental institution. If one
man a week comes to a tailor shop, it is a place of public resort,
but that does not make it a public utility or public institution,
and the tailor still Shas the right to select his private clientele if he
chooses to do so.2 2
277Young v. Pratt, 11 Ohio App. 346 (1919).

27s People v. Grabner, 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 1148 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1963).
279 See, e.g., People ex rel. State Commission Against Discrimination v. AckleyMaynes Co., 4 RACE REL. L. REP. 358 (N.Y.S. Ct. 1959).
280 Harvey, Inc. v. Sissle, 53 Ohio App. 405, 5 N.E.2d 410 (1936).
281See Fowler v. Benner, 13 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 313, 320 (C.P. 1912), where the
court said:
"It is true that the civil rights statutes are, to some extent, in derogation of
private rights, and restrictive of the liberty which a citizen ordinarily enjoys
to deal only with those persons with whom he chooses to hold business relations . . . we believe that, as a general rule, a gentleman, whether white
or colored, will never obtrude himself into a place where he knows his
presence may be embarrassing or objectionable to the proprietor or his customers."
282 Browning v. Slenderella Systems of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 440, 341 P.2d 859,
868-9 (1959).
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5. THE EQUAL PROTECTION PROBLEM AS TO BUSINESS GENERALLY
A. The Banning of Ethnic Discrimination

The constitutionality of anti-discrimination legislation in business
is Typically defended on the ground that such laws are an exercise of
the police power to assure access and service to the public in places
which advertise for public patronage.28 3 Presumably, the theory is that
the public would be inconvenienced if it were induced to come to a
place only to find that it was in fact restricted. This might be likened
to false and misleading advertising. 284 It has been argued that state antidiscrimination laws merely apply the principles of the Fourteenth
Amendment to private individuals.3 5
However, over half a century ago it was noticed that the "civil
rights" laws were concerned with only ethnic discrimination, particularly
against Negroes, while offering no protection against other forms of
discrimination.28 s It is settled law that a business owner does not violate
these "civil rights" statutes if his discrimination is not motivated by
race, creed, color, or national origin. 2 7 No matter how discourteous the
owner is, if he is not motivated by one of the key proscriptions, his
conduct is immune from judicial correction.2 8 While a person who is
refused service in a hotel restaurant on purely personal grounds may
recover damages from the owner, 28 9 if service is refused on such
grounds in an ordinary restaurant the "civil rights" statutes afford no
relief. 29 0 On the other hand, courts have even gone to the extent of
283

See, e.g., Marshall v. Kansas City, 355 S.W.2d 877 (Mo. 1962); People v.

King, 110 N.Y. 418, 18 N.E. 245 (1888). In Bolden v. Grand Rapids Operating Co., 239 Mich. 318, 214 N.W. 241, 243 (1927), the court said:
the public safety and general welfare of our people demand that, when
the public are invited to attend places of public acconunodation, amusement,
recreation, there shall be no discrimination among those permitted to enter
because of race, creed, or color. It is bottomed upon the broad ground of the
equality of all men before the law."
2s4 The Federal Trade Commission, on just this theory, has commenced proceedings to compel housing restricted to white persons to advertise this fact.
See N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1967, P. 1, Col. 1.
28 People v. King, 110 N.Y. 418, 18 N.E. 245 (1888) ; Bryan v. Adler, 97 Wis.
28 124, 72 N.W. 368 (1897).
See Note, Right of Admission to Theatre, 9 LAw NOTES (N.Y.) 65, 67
(1905): "It follows, curiously enough ....

that while a colored man may

not be denied admission to a theatre because of his color, he, or any other
person, white, black, or yellow, may, be excluded from a theatre for any
reason other than that of color."
2s Williams v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 90 Kan. 478, 135 P. 671 (1913) ; State
Commission for Human Rights v. Harvey Properties, Inc., 50 Misc. 2d 672,
271 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1966); Garfield v. Sands Beach Club, 137 N.Y.S.2d 58
(1954) ; Zlotowitz v. Jewish Hospital, 193 Misc. 124, 84 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1948),
aff'd 277 App. Div. 974, 100 N.Y.S.2d 226 1950); Heuman v. Panhellenic
House Ass'n, 179 Misc. 736, 39 N.Y.S.2d 629 1943); Finnesey v. Seattle
Baseball Club, 122 Wash. 276, 210 P. 679 (1922).
288 Williams v. Deer's Head Inn, Inc., 4 Misc. 2d 281, 158 N.Y.S.2d 666 1956);
Seward v. New York Cent. R. Co., 133 Misc. 584, 233 N.Y.S. 411 (1928);
Beckett v. Pfaeffe, 157 N.Y.S. 247 (1916).
280 Gemmell v. Goldsworthy, 1942) S. Aust. S.R. 55 (S. Aust. Sup. Ct.); Kenny
v. O'Loughlin, 78 Irish L.T.R. 116 (Cir. Ct. 1944).
290 Noble v. Higgins, 95 Misc. 328, 158 N.Y.S. 867 (1916).
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ordering proprietors to change their entire mode of admitting customers
29
in order to protect Negroes against potential discrimination. '
When other forms of discrimination have come before the courts,
the customer has been unable to obtain relief. It has been held that a
restaurant may refuse to serve a person who refuses to wear a coat
in hot weather, 292 or who was not wearing a collar and would not put
94
2
293
or who was a soldier in uniform,
a handkerchief around his neck,

or a construction worker in his work clothes. 295 A public place may
require whatever fee it wants for admission, 296 and may impose whatever requirements it chooses by way of advance reservations.2 97 A
theater may exclude a drama critic because the owner does not like
what he writes, 298 or because he is a cripple.2

99

Where there is a pre-

showing of a film, the theater may exclude anybody except film critics
and emp!oyees of the producer.

3

1

When not dealing with racial or religious discrimination the courts
have been most emphatic about the rights of business owners to control
291 See. e.g., Plummer v. Brock, 9 RACE REL. L. REP. 1399, 1409 (U.S.D.C.,
M.D. Fla. 1964):
"... here's a policy of not admitting local people, . . . it's a loose policy,
it's a discretionary matter; it's submitted to the discretion of whoever is on
the desk by each of these motel owners, 'If you know him or you think he's
all right or you know there's nothing wrong or if there is an emergency, if
he gets married, or if he'sgotemployment here' or anything of that sort,
it would be a legitimate reason to admit a white person, a local white person.
"... I think that sort of policy may not be used hereafter at this time and in
the circumstances to say that 'We are going to exercise the same wide discretion in turning away Negroes,' because that simply doesn't lay down any
recognizable standard on which to accept or reject guests, if you say go
and put them under that same standard.
"I thing that Mr. Chew must be told to take them on the same basis that
he takes whites. And if he refuses accommodations to a Negro guest, who
are what are protected by this Order, that the burden will have to be on
him if he is brought back in Court to show me what was wrong with thatt;
and it can't be just simply that it was a local guest.
292 Fred Harvey v. Corporation Comm. of Oklahoma, 102 Oki. 266, 229 P. 428
(1924). See also Opinion of the Atty.-Gen. of Maryland, June 19, 1963, 8
RACE REL. L. REP. 763:
"To illustrate our point that the trespass statute would still be functional after
the passage of a public accommodations ordinance, we cite as an example the
situation wherein the proprietor of a restaurant might insist, as a rule of
his establishment, that no man would be served unless he wo-e a coat and
tie. Under such a rule, if a patron sought service in his shirtsleeves, the proprietor could lawfully refuse to serve him and in the event the patron insisted on remaining in the dining area of the premises, the proprietor could
have him arrested under the state trespass statute if he refused to leave
after reasonable warning."
293 Brandt v. Mink, 38 Misc. 750, 78 N.Y.S. 1109 (1902).
294Baer v. Washington Heights Cafe, 168 N.Y.S. 567 (1917).
292Larson v. R. B. Wrigley Co., 183 Misc. 28, 235 N.W. 393 (1931).
296 Walton Playboy Clubs, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 37 Ill. App. 2d 425, 185 N.E.2d
719 (1962).
297 Gilmore v. Paris Inn, 10 Cal. App. 2d 353, 51 P.2d 1103 (1935).
29sWoollcott v. Shubert, 217 N.Y. 212, 111 N.E. 829 (1916) ; People ex rel.
Burnham v. Flynn, 1 9 N.Y. 180, 82 N.E. 169 (1907).
299 Vogel v. Saenger Theatres, 207 La. 835, 22 So. 2d 189 (1945).
300 MacLeod v. Fox West Coast Theatres Corp., 10 Cal. 2d 383, 74 P. 2d 276,
(1937).
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their own business policy. One Michigan decision held that owners of
places of amusement "can impose any terms of admission they choose,"
and that the reason for exclusion is immaterial.30 It has been observed
that anti-discrimination laws constitute an exception to the right of
theater owners to choose their customers, 30 2 and that the only purpose
of the law is to prevent "membership of any particular class of citizens"
from justifying exclusion from such places.30 3 Why race, creed, color,
and national origin are the only classes is hard to see; one would think
that people could also be classified on many other bases, such as politics,
occupation, income, type of residence, and so forth. The Scottish Court
of Session has held that a hotel owner has a discretion as to the class
of people whom he will admit, and he may reject working class patronage. 30 4 This would seem to be as much a class as race is.
Article 15 of the Constitution of India of 1949 forbids discrimination
in shops, restaurants, hotels, places of entertainment, and publicly supported facilities maintained out of state funds based on race, religion,
caste, sex, or place of birth. It was held that this does not prevent discrimination because of the social or political importance of the individual's family.305 A British statute forbids discrimination in any hotel,
restaurant, cafe, tavern, place where food and drink is sold for consumption on the premises, place of public resort maintained by a public
authority, public carrier, theater, cinema, dance ball, sports ground,
swimming pool, or "other place of public entertainment or recreation"
based on color, race, or ethnic or national origin of the person seeking
to use the facility.308 Several of the Canadian provinces follow the
American pattern, banning only discrimination based on race, creed,
color, nationality, and ancestry. 307 This would seem to indicate that
different classes can be set up for the purpose of forbidding discrimination. However, British Commonwealth jurisdictions need not be concerned with the reasonableness of these classifications since legislative
discrimination is not forbidden by their own constitutions.30 8
301

Meisner v. Detroit, B.I. & W. Ferry Co., 154 Mich. 545, 118 N.W. 14, 15

(1908).
Commonwealth v. George, 61 Pa. Super. 412, 418 (1915).
Woollcott v. Shubert, 217 N.Y. 212, 111 N.E. 829, 830 (1916). See also Foster
v. Shubert Holding Co., 316 Mass. 470, 55 N.E.2d 772, 775 (1944):
1... the [theatre] proprietor is not bound to admit everybody who presents
a ticket-apart from discrimination on account of race or color ....
It has
been said that witnessing a theatrical performance is not a necessity of life.
304 Strathearn Hydropathic Co. v. Inland Revenue, 4 R. 798, 801 (Scot Ct. of
Sess. 1881).
305 Raja Harmahendra Singh v. Punjab State, A.I.R. 1953 Punjab 30, 35, I.L.R.
1953 Punjab 279.
306 Race Relations Act of 1965, § 1, 13 & 14 Eliz. 2, C. 73.
307 See, e.g., R. v. McKay, 24 C.R. 71, [1956] Ont. W. N. 564, 115 Can. Cri. C.
104, 5 D.L.R.2d 403 (Kent Co. Ct.).
308 See Lee Foy v. Vincent, 7 Comm. L.R. 389, 15 A.L.R. 35 (Aust. H.C. 1908);
Ogilvie v. Lowe, (1963) Vict. R. 225; Walter v. Attorney General, 54 W.W.R.
385, 54 D.L.R.2d 750, 752 (Alta. 1965).
302
303
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It is interesting to note that the statutes forbidding racial discrimination have resulted in a special, ancillary class of people, who are protected, those who, although not discriminated against because of race,
are refused service because they want to associate with Negroes. Two
early New York cases held that anti-discrimination laws did not protect
white people who were not served because they came with Negroes. 30 9
However, more recently it has been held that a place of public accommodation cannot exclude a person because he belongs to the NAACP
or a local "civil rights" group, 310 or is a white "civil rights" worker who
is engaged in helping Negroes desegregate the facility which refuses to
serve him. 311 It has also been held that a white wife and her Negro
husband may both recover damages from a hotel for refusing to serve
them on account of their miscegenous marriage. 3' 2 Considering the fact
that the drive for interracial association comes almost wholly from
Negroes, these decisions, while in theory protecting association by members of both races, in reality protect Negroes in their right to associate
with white persons. Other association, however, remains unprotected.
In Cohn v. Goldgraben, 103 Misc. 500, 170 N.Y.S. 407, 407-8 (1918), the court
said: "There was no refusal to serve because of color or race. The plaintiff
was white and his companion was colored. They were both refused service,
so it could not have been on account of color. It was, as stated by the
waiter, because the rule forbade serving 'mixed parties.' The rule that
'mixed parties' should not be served applied to white as well as colored.
There was no discrimination as to one color in favor of the other ...
The rights granted to the citizen by the statute are strictly personal, and the
statute may only be invoked when the refusal is based upon the ground
personal to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was not refused service solely upon
his own color, but upon the fact that his companion had a different color.
Had the plaintiff been alone, or had he separated himself from his companion, he would have been served." In Matthews v. Hotz, 173 N.Y.S. 234, 235
(1918), the court likewise declared: "We think it is quite plain that that act
cannot be availed of by a white man because of discrimination against him
that is based upon his association with colored men."
310 Fletcher v. Coney Island, Inc., 121 N.E.2d 574, 581 (Ohio C.P. 1954), rev'd
100 Ohio App. 259, 136 N.E.2d 344 (1955), aff'd 165 Ohio St. 150, 134 N.E2d
371 (1956) : "The blanket exclusion of all members and of all persons who
associate with members of a particular group or organization, because of the
misconduct of some members and without regard to the fact that a particular
person. who may be affected by such blanket exclusion, is without personal
fault, is not a reason applicable alike to all other citizens."
311 Offner v. Shell's City, Inc., 376 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1967).
312 Hobson v. York Studios, 208 Misc. 888, 145 N.Y.S.2d 162, 167 (1955)
"[The statute] . . . must include protection for white persons as well as
Negroes who are rejected because of race. To all but the naive, it is clear
that a white woman may be the butt of a racial discrimination because she
has elected to marry a Negro. I am convinced that both plaintiffs were rejected by the defendant because Mr. Hobson is a Negro and his wife
is a white woman. Such a refusal, as applied to Mrs. Hobson, is a rejection
of her because of her color . . . a white plaintiff must receive equal protection with her Negro husband. The law looks with favor upon marriage . ..
and New York does not frown upon an interracial marriage.
In effect, what the defendant's desk clerk said to Mrs. Hobson was that if
she had been married to a white man, her reservation for a room would have
been honored. If the rejection was based upon some private theory of
'social acceptability,' where Negroes and white are in intimate association,
it is still offensive to the law."
309
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A place of public accommodation is still free to refuse service to other
groups who associate together. Once again, a special class is set up
to whom protection is afforded against discrimination.
Another good example of how banning ethnic discrimination alone
is in itself discriminatory is afforded by Spencer v. Flint Memorial Park
Assn. 3 13 In this case a contract with the defendant cemetery provided

that it only had to bury the bodies of white people. The cemetery refused
to bury a Negro. The court observed: "Obviously, under the law of
contracts, we must deny the plaintiff recovery if the restriction is enforceable for aside from valid public regulation, a cemetery lot owner's
rights are contractual and subject to the ordinary rules of contract
law." 314 However, the court held that to allow the cemetery to rely on
its own contract was state action which violated the Fourteenth Amendment. In any other case not involving racial discrimination, a business
would only be bound by its contract. If, for example, a business agreed
to print pamphlets only for lawyers, who could be found to contend that
under the Fourteenth Amendment it was required to print them for
farmers merely because a farmer who sued for breach of contract would
bring his action in a state court which would necessarily pass on the
validity of the contractual limitation? Yet farmers are as much of a
class as Negroes and are equally entitled to the benefits of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Moreover, the court here approved of religious discrimination in
cemeteries. 315 Religion is as much a class as race, and members of
one class are entitled to as much protection as those of another. Indeed,
the court rejected the theory that the cemetery was entitled to make any
discrimination at all. In commenting on the cemetery's contention that
"there is nothing to prevent the plaintiff from choosing a place of burial
among his own kind," the court pointed out that "rights under the
14th Amendment are personal rights that are not attached to white
persons or to Negroes or to Indians, etc., but to individuals." 31 6 This
3139 RACE REL. L. REP. 1393 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1964), aff'd on opinion below, 4
Mich. App. 157, 144 N.W.2d 622 (1966).
RACE REL. L. REP. at 1394.
311Id. 9 RACE REL. L. REP. at 1398, where the court said: "In reaching the
conclusion that such restrictive covenants as are here involved are unenforceable, this writer would make it absolutely clear that such conclusion in no way
prevents cemeteries maintained by a particular religious faith from restricting
burial rights to members of that faith. That is not the case with the defendant
cemetery in this cause."
316 Id. 9 RACE REL. L. REP. at 1399, where the court declared:
"How valid and significant is defendant's statement that plaintiff could 'seek
burial among his own kind'? Does the defendant assume that plaintiff's own
kind is restricted to skin pigmentation? May not the plaintiff select the burial
place of his loved ones on the basis of location, price, esthetic appreciation
or whatever personal factors an individual may want to use to select a burial
plot? It is a bizarre interpretation of the equal protection of the laws clause
of the 14th Amendment to conclude that this protection is to afford a white
person what all white people would want-burial among whites; and to the
314 9
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leads to the logical conclusion that the cemetery not only is forbidden
to make any religious distinctions (which is flatly contrary to the court's
own decision), but cannot discriminate in any way whatsoever, even by
its own contract, a result which is both practically as well as legally
absurd. Thus, to apply the rule against racial discrimination to other
forms of discrimination leads to an impossible situation for a business,
and to limit it to racial discrimination requires a justification which
has no legal or constitutional basis. The Fourteenth Amendment neither
mentions race nor was it intended to bar racial discrimination any more
than any other discrimination.3 1

7

As one court said:

Management can arbitrarily order white persons to leave lunch
counters for any reason whatever. While appellants expound
forcefully of the equal privileges and immunities provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment, we cannot escape the conclusion that
they are urging this court to grant them an unequal privilege,
that is the right to be served in a restaurant because they are
colored, even though a corresponding right does not exist in
white persons. Appellants' argument must fail because they, regardless of color, had no right or privilege to be served.' 18
B. Monopoly Businesses
The extent to which anti-discrimination laws in so-called "places
of public accommodation" in fact discriminate against those to whom
the proprietor chooses to deny service on grounds other than race, creed,
color, and national origin, is nowhere better illustrated than in respect
to those businesses which enjoy a monopoly of service, either through
government regulation or by economic factors. Of the former group.
race tracks constitute an excellent example. That these tracks are places
of "public resort" has even been recognized in New Zealand. 31 9
It has been uniformly held that there is no right of access to a race
track comparable to the common-law right of accommodation at an
inn, in spite of the fact that race tracks are so closely regulated and
limited in number as to amount to substantial monopolies. 320 The MaryNegro a burial 'among his own kind.' The law of this land looks to
enforcement of the rights of individuals without presuming to force upon
the individual what we imagine such individuals want and without assuming
that there is recognized in the law a social, economic, racial, religious or
political caste system with a different set of rights and desires for all members o1f
each group."
317 See Avins, Fourteenth Amendment Limitations on Banning Racial Discrimination: The Original Understanding, 8 ARiz. L. Ray. 236 (1967).
318 Briggs v. State, 367 S.W.2d 750, 756 (Ark. 1963).
319 Champion v. Fleetwood, 26 N.Z.L.R. 983 (Sup. Ct. 1907).
320 Epstein v. California Horse Racing Bd., 222 Cal. App. 2d 831, 35 Cal. Reptr.
642 (1963) ; Gottlieb v. Sullivan County Harness Racing Ass'n, 25 A.D. 2d
798, 269 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1966). In Martin v. Monmouth Park Jockey Club.
798, 269 N.Y.S. 2d 314 (1966). In Martin v. Monmouth Park Jockey Club,
145 F. Supp. 439, 440 (D.N.J. 1956), aff'd 242 F.2d 344 (3rd Cir. 1957), the
court noted: "Although it is intensely regulated, the defendant Club is a private organization. Nothing is more elementary than its right as a private
corporation to admit or exclude any persons it pleases from its private prop-
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land Court of Appeals rejected the argument that since a race track
can only be conducted by a "public franchise" granted to it by the
State, the track was a "public calling" or "public utility" and had to
accept all who sought admission. The court observed: "Licensing, regulation, and taxation of a private carrier do not make it a common carrier. "321 The Supreme Court of New Jersey similarly held that a race
track has a right to exclude anybody it desires to if racial discrimination
is not involved. 322 It rejected the contention that the owner's "commonlaw right of exclusion from its race-track should be limited because
as a licensee 'it has secured the advantage of a State monopoly.' ")323
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has held that even though
there is no common law right to operate a race track and that tracks
were closely regulated and licensed because of the social problem of
gambling therein, the "business is still a private enterprise since it is
affected by no such public interest as to make it a public calling as is a
railroad for example.

3

24

The court therefore adhered to "the over-

whelming weight of authority in regard to the right of owners of private
enterprises to discriminate as they choose between those seeking admission to their places of business. ' 325 The court refused to change this
rule to conform to "altered social concepts" because of "certain rights
of owners and taxpayers, which still exist in this state, as to their own
property."326 All of this language would apply as much to racial discrimination as to any other kind of discrimination.
The whole question has been thoroughly analyzed by the New York
Court of Appeals in Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club.3 27 In this
case, the plaintiff sued as a citizen and taxpayer to establish his right
to enter defendant's race track. The court held that "the operator of a
race track can, without reason or sufficient excuse, exclude a person
erty, absent some definite legal compulsion to the contrary. For example, the

But nowhere
defendant may not exclude patrons because of their race ....
in the statutes or rules governing race tracks is there any indication that
simply because he has a license from the New Jersey Racing Commission a
jockey thereby possesses a right to ride at any race track in the state despite
the wishes of its owners."
321 Greenfield v. Maryland Jockey Club, 190 Md. 96, 57 A.2d 335, 338 (1948).
322 Garfine v. Monmouth Park Jockey Club, 29 N.J. 47, 148 A.2d 1, 5 (1959),
where the court observed: "The statute was obviously aimed at discrimination
based on color and race and left unimpaired the right of exclusion for unrelated reasons."
323 Id. at 148 A.2d at 6. The court also said: "defendan's operation was not under
a franchise for the performance of a public function but was under a license
imposed for revenue and the regulation of a private business which, like
the alcoholic beverage industry, entailed inherent dangers and was clearly
affected with a public interest."
324 Tamelleo v. New Hampshire Jockey Club, 102 N.H. 547, 163 A. 2d 10, 12
(1960).
325 Ibid. The court also said: "It is firmly established that at common law proprietors of private enterprises such as theaters, race tracks and the like, may
admit or exclude anyone they choose." Id. 163 A.2d at 11-12.
326 Id. 163 A.2d at 12.
327 296 N.Y. 249, 72 N.E.2d 697 (1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
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from attending its races," because the track owner "has the power to
admit as spectators only those whom he may select, and to exclude
others solely of his own volition, as long as the exclusion is not founded
on race, creed, color or national origin." 328 The court distinguished the

duty of innkeepers and common carriers at common law to serve the
public without discrimination from the right of an owner of a place
of amusement, who had "an absolute power to serve whom they pleased."
The court declared that this common law right continued until changed
by statute, and that the Civil Rights Law had barred
discrimination
329
based solely on race, creed, color, and national origin.
The plaintiff, however, asserted an equal protection argument. This
argument, unfortunately, was not directed to the discrimination in the
Civil Rights Law. Instead, the plaintiff contended that the track was
either a state agency or had a franchise for a public purpose, and therefore the track was constitutionally incapable of discrimination. The
court disposed of the theory that the track was a unit of state government by pointing out that the track was no more a governmental agency
by paying a tax than any other business which paid a license tax for
the privilege of doing business.
The court rebutted the argument that the track had a franchise by
first noting that amusement was not a governmental function. It then
declared:
Plaintiff's argument results from confusion between a "license,"
imposed for the purpose of regulation or revenue, and a "franchise." A franchise is a special privilege, conferred by the State
on an individual, which does not belong to the individual as a
matter of common right ....

It creates a privilege where none

existed before, its primary object being to promote the public
welfare ....

A familiar illustration is the right to use the public

streets for the purpose of maintaining and operating railroads,
waterworks and electric light, gas and power lines. A license, on
the other hand, is no more than a permission to exercise a preexisting right or privilege which has been subjected to regulation
in the interest of the public welfare. The grant of a license to
promote the public good, in and of itself, however, makes neither
the purpose a public one nor the license a franchise, neither renders the enterprise public nor places the licensee under obligation
to the public ...
Observing, however, that the conduct of races for stakes had
long been declared illegal "excsept as specially authorized," plain328
329

72 N.E.2d at 698.
Ibid. In Castle Hill Beach Club, Inc. v. Arbury, 2 N.Y.2d 596, 162 N.Y.S.2d
1, 6, 142 N.E.2d 186 (1957), the court observed:
"places of amusement and resort as distinguished from those engaged in a
public calling, such as innkeeper or common carrier, enjoy an absolute power
to exclude those whom they please, subject only to the legislative restriction
that they not exclude one on account of race, creed, color, or national origin.
In the Madden case this court upheld the right of a race track to exclude
Madden even though the exclusion was without good cause.

Id.
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tiff argues from that that the license was in effect a franchise,
since it granted a privilege not previously enjoyed by common
right. That, though, overlooks the fact that the privilege of conducting horse races for stakes does not exist at the common law,
that it is taken away only by statute, and that the statute's prohibition is removed only under certain circumstances and upon
compliance with specified conditions. . . Consequently, the license, instead of creating a privilege, merely330 permits the exercise
of one restricted and regulated by statute.

The courts have treated natural monopolies in the same way that
they have treated state-created monopolies. For example, newspapers
have virtually become a natural monopoly, 331 but most authorities still
3 32
hold that they may refuse to sell space to whomever they choose.
When the foregoing policy is compared with the reasoning given
to sustain the constitutionality of anti-discrimination legislation, the incongruity becomes manifest. In one case it was held that laws forbidding
barbers to discriminate based on race, creed, color, or national origin
are valid because the legislature has the power to regulate barbers to
safeguard the health of customers.3 3 3 The New Hampshire Supreme
Court has likewise upheld the constitutionality of such laws in respect
to barbers under the police power, 33 4 while the Maryland Court of Appeals has decided that the legislature may make non-discrimination a
condition of running a restaurant even where the restaurant does not
33072 N.E.2d at 699-700. In Madden v. Queens Co. Jockey Club, 269 App. Div.

644, 58 N.Y.S.2d 272, 274 1945), the court declared:
"We are, therefore, constrained to disagree with the dictum in Grannan v.
Westchester Racing Ass'n, . . . to the effect that a race course is endowed
by the State with a franchise which obliges it to serve all alike as if it
were a common carrier or a public utility."
331See Uhlman v. Sherman, 31 Ohio Dec. 54 (C.P. 1919), holding that newspapers are public utilities and cannot unreasonably discriminate in selling
advertising space.
332 See, generally, Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right,
80 HARv. L. REv. 1641 (1967). For example, Commonwealth v. Boston Transscript, 249 Mass. 77, 144 N.E. 400, 402 (1924) held that a statute requiring
a newspaper to print a government advertisement was an unconstitutional
violation of freedom of contract. The court declared:
"It cannot be said on this record that newspapers are affected with a public
interest so as to stand on a less favorable ground with respect to legislative
regulation like the present than the ordinary person ...
The legislative power as to price fixing and as to regulation, which recently
was discussed and upheld with reference to theaters . . . clearly does not
reach to the facts here disclosed. That opinion rested chiefly on historical
grounds."
333 Gegner v. Graham, 1 Ohio App. 2d 442, 205 N.E.2d 69, 72 (1964), appeal
dismissed 1 Ohio St. 2d 108, 205 N.E.2d 72 (1965) where the Court of Appeals argued:
"If barbers were fre to turn away Negroes because of their race, then this
group would be denied the safeguards to health provided by law and be
denied on their part the equal protection of the laws. . . . Barbers and
customers will continue to deal together on the basis of personal preference.
But the right of any member of the public not to be discriminated against
because of race must be upheld."
334 State v. Sprague, 105 N.H. 355, 200 A.2d 206 (1964).
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have a monopoly. 35 The Supreme Court of New Jersey has justified
anti-discrimination laws in respect to barbers and classiiication of
barber shops as "places of public accommodation" on the ground that
it was necessary to license barbers to protect the pubic health. The
court declared that "the practice of barbering and the operation of
barber shops have a sufficiently intimate relationship with the public
interest and welfare to justify licensing and regulation of barbers and
their shops." The court added that "once licensed or registered the
barbers have a lawful monopoly of the practice of barbering." 336
Considering the fact that the Supreme Court of New Jersey approved anti-discrimination legislation on the ground that licensed
barbers have a monopoly in that state, it is relevant to examine the
amount of competition which actually exists. New Jersey is a relatively
small state and it is possible to drive the entire length of the state on
the New Jersey Turnpike in slightly over two hours. As of 1968 there
were 10,056 licensed barbers, 629 apprentices, and 4,668 barber shops
in New Jersey. 37 Assuming that a man got a haircut once a week,
which is certainly enough for good grooming, and used a different
barber each week, it would take him about 200 years to exhaust the
list of barbers in the state. By that time he would not need to concern
himself with getting haircuts.
The same is true in other states. In 1963 a survey showed that
there were 9,488 barber shops in New York State employing 8.447
employees and 10,112 proprietors. 33 New York City alone had 5.093
339
barber shops in 1968.
As has been previously noted, restaurants have been deemed places
of "public accommodation." In 1968, New York City alone had a total
of 19,425 places for the consumption of food on the premises. '"340 This
means that if a person went to a different restaurant, cafeteria, or lunch
counter each day in the year it would take him over 50 years to eat
in all of them. In 1963 the State of New York had a total of 35,026
such places while New Jersey had 13,781 such places.3 41 If this constitutes a monopoly business, what could competition require? Moreover, it is relevant to note that New York State had only 827 race
track operations, stables for race horses, and similar businesses 3 43 vet
the courts have said that race tracks are not franchised public utilities
required to serve everybody.
335 Barnes v. State, 236 Md. 568, 204 A.2d 727 (1964).
336 Sellers v. Philip's Barber Shop, 46 N.J. 340, 217 A.2d 121, 124 (1966).
337 Letter of Frank Marchese, Secretary, New Jersey State Board of Barber
Examiners, to Alfred Avins, dated Jan. 2, 1968.
338 New York State Dept. of Commerce, Business Fact Book 30 (1967-68 ed.).
339 New York City Department of Health statistics, on file in the department.
340 Ibid.
341 New

York State Dept. of Commerce, Business Fact Book 26 (1967-68 ed.)

342 Id. at 30.
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Another excellent illustration of the inconsistency of the judicial
decisions is found in Camp-of-the-Pines v. New York Times Co. 343
In this case, the court held that a resort camp had no right to publish
an advertisement saying "selected clientele," "restricted clientele," or
"restricted," on the ground that such phi ases indicated that Negroes and
Jews were unwanted, in violation of the state anti-discrimination law.
After rejecting the right of the camp to select its own customers, the
court held that the New York Times had a right to sell its product to
whomever it pleased, and to refrain from selling it to those persons it
did not want to deal with. The court declared: "Newspaper publishers
have a legal right to deal with whom they please."3 44 The court then
did an about-face, saying in reference to the camp: "Reflection causes
me to wonder and observe who confers on any person the right to
select those who select the 'selected clientele.' "345 This would seem
as applicable to a newspaper as a camp. Yet the court did still another
about-face, declaring:
[I]n the absence of legislative regulation . . . a publisher

of a newspaper is not required to accept for publication an advertisement in proper form, where the rate which the newspaper
charges for publishing is tendered to the newspaper. A newspaper in the absence of regulatory legislation is not in the same
category as common carriers or inn-keepers. The newspaper
business, in the absence of statutes to the contrary, is a business
essentially private,
just as much as that of the baker, the grocer,
346
or the milkman.

In 1968, New York City had 690 hotels and 65 lodging houses 347
but only three daily metropolitan newspapers, the New York Times,
the New York Daily News, and the New York Post. New York State
had 5,491 hotels, motels, tourist courts and camps in 1963; California
had 9,246 such establishments, and other states were equally well
provided.3 48 To call inns, hotels, or resort camps a monopoly is to turn

this concept upside down. 349 Nothing can be further from reality. One
184 Misc. 389, 53 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1945).
3.14 Id. 53 N.Y.S.2d at 486. The court quoted a prior case as follows:
"'It is the well-settled law of this state that the refusal to maintain trade
relations with any individual is an inherent right which every person may
exercise lawfully, for reasons he deems sufficient or for no reasons whatever;
and it is immaterial whether such refusal is based upon reason or is the result of mere caprice, prejudice, or malice. It is a part of the liberty of action
which the Constitutions, state and federal, guarantee to the citizen. It is
not within the power of the courts to compel an owner of property to sell
or part with his title to it, withous his consen and against his wishes to
any particular person.'
a41Id.53 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
346 Ibid.
34 Annual Report, New York City Dept. of Buildings 38 (1966).
-8 New York State Dept. of Commerce, Business Fact Book 28 (1967-68 ed.).
34 See Note, An Innkeeper's Right to Discriminate, 15 U. or FLA. L. RPv. 109,
127 (1962):
"It has been previously suggested that the probable reason for imposing the
34a
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American case has already questioned the whole basis for the common
law as to innkeepers, 35 0 and a half century ago the Lord Justice Clerk
of the Scottish Court of Session questioned applying the common law
duty of innkeepers to metropolitan hotels where competition assured
every traveler some accommodation. 3 1 With thousands of places to
stay in New York when on vacation, the court imposed the duty of
public utilities on a resort lodging, while leaving the tiny number of
metropolitan newspapers free to discriminate capriciously in any way
they desired. Hotels were treated as monopolies, while newspapers were
treated as if there was plenty of competition. This flight from reality
illuminates anti-discrimination laws and their rationale.
It is clear from an examination of the cases that a duty not to discriminate based on race, creed, color, and national origin has been
carved out of the general right of business proprietors to choose their
customers in any way they desire. When such proscribed discrimination
is considered, sundry businesses in which competition may be very
great are treated like public utilities with monopolies; when this discrimination is not present many monopolies are treated as if there was
sufficient competition for a person who is denied service at one place
to obtain it elsewhere. The "civil rights" statutes thus confer a special
legal privilege on persons discriminated against because of ethnic
grounds, to the disadvantage of persons discriminated against based on
other grounds. The latter are not equally protected from discrimination
against them, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It has been argued that such a law "it not a discrimination in favor
of colored persons, as it applies to all races and all colors. 3 5 2 This is
duty to receive upon the medieval innkeeper was
the scarcity of inns and the
immediate need of the traveler to find shelter.113 Thus, the business of innkeeping was labeled a 'natural monopoly' and treated as a public enterprise. Because of the tremendous advances in the modes of transportation
and communication, the urbanization of a great portion of the country, and
the almost complete change in the modus operandi and growth of the business
in innkeeping, it is absurd to say that the same reasons exist today for
classifying inkeeping as a public enterprise. In Florida alone there are
over 7,100 hotels and motels, with a total of over 188,000 rooms; their
average monthly employment is over 34,000 persons, and their average
monthly wages are over $6,900,000. The large number of accommodations
available throughout Florida enable the traveler to pick and choose, and it
can hardly be said that the innkeeper has a natural monopoly."
35OIn Armwood v. Francis, 9 Utah 2d 147, 340 P.2d 88, 91 (1959), the court
said: "Parenthetically, however, we might suggest that the world has come
a long way since necessity created the innkeeper-guest relation as known at
common law, with its own distinct liability. We think courts may be prone
to take a second look at that relationship before applying it to the hostelries
of the space age. .. "
351 See Rothfield v. North British Ry. Co., [190] Sess. Cas. 805, 828: "But the
pursuer, when he did not find accommodation at the defenders' hotel, was
able to find other good hotels in close proximity, where he was readily received, he says, as a welcome guest. I do not think the same considerations
apply here as in the case of the traveller at night-fall coming to an isolated
and remote Highland hotel in a snow-storm ... "
352 Commonwealth v. George, 61 Pa. Super. 412, 418 (1915).
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sheer sophistry. As a practical matter, the only persons discriminated
against based on race or color in the United States are Negroes. Other
instances of such discrimination are negligible. Of course, many people
other than Negroes are arbitrarily discriminated against, but not on
the grounds of race or color. Anti-discrimination laws do not protect
these people.
In addition, we may examine the actual purpose of the legislation
to determine its constitutionality.3 53 As one case put it: "It cannot be
doubted that it was enacted with special reference to citizens of African
descent. 354 This, of course, applies to the ban on racial and color discrimination; discrimination based on religion and national origin was
added in New York and later copied in other states to establish social
and cultural rights.35 The adjudicated cases based on religious and
ancestral discrimination are so rare as to be insignificant from a practical
point of view. From a practical point of view, the effect of antidiscrimination statutes in "places of public accommodation" is not to
confer equal rights but to accord special privileges to Negroes not enjoyed by the rest of the population. If there is any constitutional justification for this, it has escaped the attention of this author.

6.

EQUAL PROTECTION AND PERSONAL SERVICES

The typical anti-discrimination law speaks of giving people equal
access to "places" of public accommodation. It does not refer to giving
people access to services rendered by other persons. However, the effect
of these laws is often to give people a right to the services of other
people. Going through the whole category of businesses covered by these
laws, it is clear that they range, from one extreme, to those in which
services are non-existent or negligible, and in which use of the place
is dominant, through those in which the services and place are both
required, to those in which the service is dominant and the use of the
facility is incidental.
33 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).

354 People v. King, 110 N.Y. 418, 18 N.E. 245, 247 (1888).

355

See also Amos v.
Prom, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 615, 620 (N.D. Iowa 1954) ("it seems plain considering the time and the setting in which the Iowa and other state Civil Rights
Acts were passed that their principal purpose was to prevent discrimination
based upon color") ; Brown v. J. H. Bell Co., 146 Iowa 89, 123 N.W. 231,
237 (1909) (Evans C. J. dissenting) ("It is an embodiment in statutory
form of the sympathy of the dominant race for the weaker race in its struggle for the higher levels of worthy citizenship") ; DeCuir v. Benson, 27 La.
Ann. 1, 4 (1875), rev'd sub nor. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878) ("It
was enacted solely to protect the newly enfranchised citizens of the United
States within the limits of Louisiana, from the effects of prejudice against
them") ; Bolden v. Grand Rapids Operating Co., 239 Mich. 318, 214 N.W. 241,
242 (1927) ("While it [Civil Rights Act] applies to 'all persons within the
jurisdiction of this state,' it cannot be doubted that it was enacted with
special reference to those of African descent") ; Rhone v. Loomis, 74 Minn.
200, 77 N.W. 31 (1898); Johnson v. Humphrey Pop Corn Co., 24 Ohio Cir.
Ct. R. 135, 139, 4 Ohio C.C.D. (n.s.) 49 (1902), aff'd 70 Ohio St. 478, 72 N.E.
1160 (1904).
See Bachrach v. 1001 Tenants Corp., 21 App. Div. 2d 662, 249 N.Y.S.2d 855
(1964), aff'd 15 N.Y.2d 718, 205 N.E.2d 196, 256 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1965).
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For example, an automobile parking lot in which numbered places
are rented by the month is clearly a facility in which the car owner
wants the place only. He need never see the owner, and may send his
rent in by mail. The use of a private park or lake is a similar facility.
Even if anti-discrimination legislation constitutes a taking of property
without due process of law, as it appears to do, 56 it does not compel
the rendition of personal services. In seeking access to a restaurant,
however, the patron wants both the facility and the service. At the other
end of the scale are purely service occupations, such as those rendered
by professional men. Nobody goes into a physician's office or a lawyer's
office to use the office as such. The office is simply the place in which
services are to be rendered. If the physician or lawyer left, the full use
of the office would be valueless to the patient or client. To speak of
access to a "place of public accommodation" when referring to service
occupations is itself misleading. Access is not soufxh" to the place; what
is sought is the right to be served by another person.
Certain non-professional personal service occupations have been
covered by anti-discrimination laws for a considerable period of time,
such as barbers and shoe-shine men. 57 More recently, these laws have
been held to cover certain business occupations, such as advertising
and travel agencies,15 8 and real estate brokers.3

59

But until quite recently,

professional services were generally considered exempt.3 6° Now, how36 1
ever, they have also been held to be covered.
See Tansill, Avins, Crutchfield & Colegrove, The Fourteenth Amendment and
Real Property Rights in Open Occupancy vs. Forced Housing Under the
Fourteenth Amendment 68, 88 (Avins ed. 1963).
57 Note 234-5, supra. See Darius v. Apostolos, 68 Colo. 323, 190 P. 510, 511
(1919): "the principal business of barber shops and bootblacking stands is
the furnishing of personal service."
358 Peoples v. Club Primadonna, 5 RACE REL. L. REP. 1164 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1960).
Crowell v. Isaacs, 235 Cal. App.2d 755, 45 Cal. Reptr. 566 (1965) ; Washington
State Board Against Discrimination v. Interlake Realty Inc., 7 RACE REL. L.
REP. 555 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1962). Cf. Diona v. Lomenzo, 26 App. Div.2d 473,
275 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1966). In Lee v. O'Hara, 57 Cal.2d 476. 20 Cal. Reptr.
617, 370 P.2d 321, 322 (1962) it was held: "The office which a real estate
broker is required by law to maintain at a specified location, and from which
his business must be transacted, is a business establishment within the meaning of the Unruh Act."
360 Coleman v. Middlestaff, 147 Cal. App.2d 833, 305 P.2d 1020 (1957) ; Rice
v. Rinaldo, 95 N.E.2d 30 (Ohio C.P. 1950), aff'd 119 N.E.2d 657, 659 (Ohio
App. 1951) ("Physicians are not public servants who are bound to serve all
who seek them, as are innkeepers, common carriers, and the like"); Van
Alstyne, Civil Rights: A New Public Accommodations Law for Ohio, 22 Ohio
St. L.J. 683, 688 (1961). In Washington State Board Against Discrimination
v. Interlake Realty, Inc., 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 555, 557 (Wash. Super. Ct.
1962) the court said:
"Whether or not we refer to a real estate salesman as a professional person
is not too important here. I do not believe that the Act would apply to
truly professional people-physicians, lawyers, and others who must, of
necessity, have a right to restrict the nature of their practice and their
clientele."
36l Washington v. Blampin, 38 Cal. Reptr. 235 (Cal. App. 1964). See also Buefort
356
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In prior articles, this author has pointed out that such statutes, as
applied to personal service occupations, constitute involuntary servitude
and hence violate the Thirteenth Amendment. 362 This article is not
concerned with that amendment. 363 Instead, an examination of antidiscrimination laws in personal service occupations in light of general
common law rights and duties shows that such laws also take liberty
without due process of law and deny the equal protection of the laws.
The uniform rule at common law is that the "relation of master
and servant cannot be imposed upon a person without his consent,
express or implied. ' 364 Thus, a federal court recently noted:
Like every other contract, the relation of employer and employee
arises out of a meeting of minds, with an offer on the part of one
v. Elias, 11 RACE REL. L. REP. 2186, 2189 (Pa. Human Rel. Comm. 1965),
where it was held:

"Professional offices such as the respondent's dental office in Wilkinsburg,
Professional offices such as the respondent's dental office in Wilkinsburg,
Pennsylvania, are clearly places which are 'open to the patronage of the
general public.' The respondent admitted in his testimony that his Wilkinsburg dental office was open to the general public. It is therefore a place of
public accommodation and persons seeking professional services therein
may not be discriminated against because of their race, color, religious creed,
ancestry or national origin. In the opinion of the Hearing Commissioners, it
is as important, if not more important, that professional services be rendered
by doctors, dentists and lawyers without racial or religious discrimination,
than non-professional services in such places as theatres, restaurants, swimming
pools and amusement parks."
Avins, Freedom of Choice in Personal Service Occupations: Thirteenth
Amendment Limitations on Antidiscrimination Legislation, 49 CoRm. L.Q.
228 (1964) ; Avins, Freedom of Choice in Personal Service Occupations Revisited, 18 SYRACUSE L. Ruv. 515 (1967). See also Avins, Involuntary Servitude in British Commonwealth Law, 16 INT'L & CoAip. L.Q. 29 (1967). See
also Stevens, Involuntary Servitude by Injunction, 6 CORN. L.Q. 235 (1921).
363 In addition to the articles mentioned in note 362, supra, and the authorities
therein, the following additional authorities are relevant: Poultry Producers
v. Barlow, 189 Cal. 278, 208 P. 93, 97 (1922): "Some courts have based the
rule upon the fact that it would be an invasion of one's statutory liberty to
compel him to work for, or to remain in the personal service of, another.
It would place him in a condition of involuntary servitude--a condition which
the supreme law of the land declares shall not exist within the United States,
or in any place subject to their jurisdiction." Willingham v. Hooven, 74 Ga.
233, 247 (1884) : "We are not aware of any power possessed by a court of
equity, or any other court, to compel a party to perform personal service for
another, which he had contracted to perform, but was unwilling to render;
this would reduce him to involuntary servitude, not as a punishment for
crime, but for an alleged breach of contract ,and would be directly in the
teeth of the constitution." Fitzpatrick v. Michael, 177 Md. 248, 9 A.2d 639,
642 (1939) : "for it would result in a species of peonage on the part of the
servant, or, an enforced association with an obnoxious employee on the part
of the master which would be intolerable." Beatty v. Chicago, B & Q. R. Co.,
49 Wyo. 22, 52 P.2d 404, 406 (1936): "the correlative right of injunction,
wvill not be granted to enforce such contract . . . [for personal services].
It is believed that an award of that character against an employee would
trench too closely in involuntary servitude... "'
s4 Corbin v. George, 308 Pa. 201, 162 A. 459, 460 (1932). In Copp v. Paradis,
130 Me. 464, 157 A. 228, 229 (1931) it was held: "The relation of master and
servant arises out of contract, and the assent of both parties is essential.
Every person has a legal right to work for whom he pleases ....
The relation of master and servant cannot be imposed upon a person without his
consent."
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and an acceptance on the part of the other. No person can be
contract
caused, against his will, to enter into an employment
365
. . . consent to the relationship being imperative.
Since under common law the employment relationship is purely
voluntary, "every man may engage to work for or deal with, or refuse
to work for or deal with, any man or class of men as he sees fit-whatever his motive or the resulting injury-without being held in any way
accountable therefor."3 6 As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared:
"The right of a workman to freely use his hands and to use them for
just whom he pleases, upon just such terms as he pleases, is property ....
367
The fact that an employee is willing to work in his trade for one
employer does not give any other employer the privilege of commanding
his services. As one court observed:
The relation of master and servant is a contractual one . . .
there must be a contract in order to create the relationship.
A new master cannot be foisted upon a servant unwittingly. The
right to select one's employer is implicit in freedom from involuntary servitude. 3bg
Even where an employer has a contract with an employee, he cannot
obtain the aid of the courts to force the employee to do what the latter
has promised. 36 9 The United States Supreme Court has declared that
365 N.L.R.B. v. Knoxville Pub. Co., 124 F.2d 875, 882 (6th Cir. 1942). In People
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 306 Ill. 486, 138 N.E. 155, 158 (1923), the
court observed: "The relation of employer and employee is purely voluntary,
resting upon the contract of the parties. Every man has a natural right to
hire his services to any one he pleases, or refrain from such hiring ....
366 Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 18 So. 2d 810,
825 (1944), cert denied 325 U.S. 450 (1945). See also Reinforce, Inc. v.
Birney, 308 N.Y. 164, 124 N.E.2d 104, 106 (1954): "so may a worker or a
group of workers refuse, or quit employment for any reason or no reason."
367 Purvis v. Local No. 500, United Bro. of Carpenters & Joiners, 214 Pa. 348,
63 A. 585, 588 (1906).
368 Gonyea v. Duluth, M. & I.R. Ry. Co., 220 Minn. 225, 19 N.W.2d 384, 387
(1945). See also Selid Const. Co. v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 355 P.2d 389, 393
(Alaska 1960):
"The relationship of employer-employee can only be created by a contract,
which may be express or implied. Once created, the relationship cannot be
changed to substitute another employer without the employee's consent. The
employee must have understood and agreed before there can be any transfer
to another employer."
369 See Henderson v. Fisher, 236 Cal. App.2d 468, 46 Cal. Rptr. 173, 179 (1965):
In contracts involving the performance of personal services by one of the
contracting parties, it is clear that at the inception of the contract specific
performance cannot be decreed against this party because of the rule of long
standing that a person cannot be compelled to perform personal services. See
also Bunns v. Walkem Development Co., 53 Tenn. App. 680, 385 S.W.2d
917, 922 (1965):
"The operation of a recreation center . . . requires constant expert care and
supervision by highly qualified personnel, and the operators of such recreational center must constantly exercise judgment in making decisions about
the operation involved. Specific performance, either in whole or in part,
would, therefore, require personal services of considerable magnitude and
much detail. The general rule is that specific performance may not be granted
in cases of that character."
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in the "case of a contract of hiring and service, it is well settled that a
'
court of equity cannot compel the performance of the service."3
0
Another federal court has noted that, the right of a person "to refuse
to serve, even though under a binding contract to do so, is a part of the
constitutional personal liberty of the land" and that "no court will enforce the service." 37 ' Still a third federal court has said:
"It would be intolerable if a man could be compelled by a court of equity
to serve another against his will; ... courts of equity exercise no such
power and grant no such relief."372
For these reasons, it is only those service contracts which do not
require the personal labor of the defendant which can be specifically
enforced by the courts. 373 The uniform rule in the United States is that
personal service contracts requiring the defendant himself to work cannot be specifically enforced against him.3 7 4 The same rule, that the only
370
3 71

Karrick v. Hannaman, 168 U.S. 328, 336 (1897).

Birmingham Trust & Savings Co. v. Atlanta B. & A. Ry. Co., 271 F. 743 (N.D.
Ga. 1921).
Roller v. Weigle, 49 App. D.C. 102, 261 F. 250, 252 (1919). Accord: Boyer
v. Telegraph Co. 124 F. 246, 249 (E.D. Mo. 1903).
373Pike v. Hayden, 97 Cal. App.2d 606, 218 P.2d 578 (1950); Thompson v.
Commonwealth, 197 Va. 208, 89 S.E.2d 64 (1955); Grubb v. Sharkey, 90
Va. 831, 20 S.E. 784 (1894).
374Rutland Marble Co. v. Ripley, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 339 (1870); Mitchell v.
Stanolind Pipe Line Co., 184 F.2d 837, 838 (10th Cir. 1950) ("nor is it the
function of the courts to compel any person against his will to remain in
the employ of another"); Tucker v. Warfield, 73 App. D.C. 278, 119 F.2d 12
(1941); Solinsky v. McPherson, 45 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1931); Weeks v.
Pratt, 43 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1930), cert. denied 282 U.S. 892 (1930); Engemoen v. Rea, 26 F.2d 576 (8th Cir. 1928), cert. denied 278 U.S. 627 (1928) ;
Robbp v. Crawford, 56 App. D.C. 394, 16 F.2d 339, 342 (1927) ("it is settled
law that no one can be compelled by a court of equity to serve another against
his will"); Roquemore & Hall v. Mitchell Bros., 167 Ala. 475, 52 So. 423
(1910) ; Miller v. City of Phoenix, 51 Ariz. 254, 75 P.2d 1033 (1938) ; Hall
v. Milham, 225 Ark. 597, 284 S.W.2d 108 (1955); Rautenberg v. Westland,
227 Cal. App.2d 566, 38 Cal. Rptr, 797 (1964) ; Levy v. Firks, 222 Cal. App.
2d 429, 35 Cal. Rptr. 207, 212 (1963) ("Specific performance of the agreement whereunder the parties were to be personally active in the conduct of
the enterprise could not be compelled") ; Coykendall v. Jackson, 17 Cal. App.
2d 729, 62 P.2d 746 (1937) ; Moore v. Heron, 108 Cal. App. 705, 292 P. 136
(1930); Sheehan v. Vedder, 108 Cal. App. 419, 292 P. 175 (1930); Hill v.
Waiting Mining Co., 87 Cal. App. 297, 261 P. 1115 (1928) ; Archer v. Miller,
73 Cal. App. 678, 239 P.92 (1925); Emerzian v. Asato, 23 Cal. App. 251,
137 P. 1072 (1913); Jolliffe v. Steele, 9 Cal. App. 212, 98 P. 544 (1908);
Grimmer v. Carlton, 93 Cal. 189, 28 P. 1043 (1892) ; Connell v. Mittendorf,
147 So. 2d 169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Bacon v. Karr, 139 So. 2d 166
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) ; Greer v. Pope, 140 Ga. 743, 79 S.E. 846 (1913) ;
Cowen v. McNealy, 342 Ill. App. 179, 96 N.E.2d 100 (1950); Barker v.
Hauberg, 325 Ill. 538, 156 N.E. 806 (1927) ; Truitt v. Clark, 81 Ill. App. 652
(1899), aff'd 183 Ill. 239, 55 N.E. 683 (1899); Wollensak v. Briggs, 119 Ill.
453, 10 N.E. 23 (1887) ; Dukes v. Bash, 29 Ind. App. 103, 64 N.E. 47 (1902) ;
Wilson v. Airline Coal Co., 215 Iowa 855, 246 N.W. 753 (1933) ; H. W.
Gossard Co" v. Crosby, 132 Iowa 155, 109 N.W. 483 (1906) ; Snyder v. Wilder,
146 La. 811, 84 So. 104 (1920); Belote v. Brown, 193 Md. 114, 65 A.2d
910 (1949); McKeever v. Washington Heights Realty Corp., 183 Md. 216,
37 A.2d 305 (1944); Wright v. Houdaille-Hershey Corp., 321 Mich. 21, 31
N.W.2d 845 (1948); Sword v. Aird, 306 Mich. 14, 9 N.W.2d 907 (1943);
Heth v. Smith, 175 Mich. 328, 141 N.W. 583 (1913); Buck v. Smith, 29
Mich. 166 (1874); Sims v. Vanmeter Lumber Co., 96 Miss. 449, 51 So. 459
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remedy for breach of a contract for personal services is recovery of
damages, is followed in English law, which likewise denies specific
performance of personal service contracts. 375 Thus, the Supreme Court

of Canada has observed that an employee cannot be forced to remain
in the employ of the employer because "in such a case there is involved
a question of human will and liberty against which direct execution is
powerless." 37 6 This rule was known prior to the enactment of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, 37 7 and can be presumed to have
been in the minds of the framers thereof, who specifically protected the
37
right to work as liberty and a property right. 8

From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that classification of a personal service as a "place of public accommodation" places a person who
is denied the service based on race, creed, color or national origin, and
who has no contractual right to be served, in a much better position
than a person who has such a contract which is broken for other reasons.
For example, let us assume that a real estate broker is under a binding
contract to search for a house for a white client, but subsequently to
the making of this contract the client makes a speech of which the
broker disapproves. Let us also assume that the broker also refuses to
search for a house for a Negro because of race, the broker being under
no contractual duty to the Negro. A state anti-discrimination commission at state expense, can get an order from a court of equity compelling
the broker to work for the Negro and find a house for him. The client
(1910) ; Beets v. Tyler, 365 Mo. 895, 290 S.W. 76 (1956) ; Beach v. Ryan, 155
Mo. App. 33, 133 S.W. 635 (1911); Rudolph v. Andrew Murphy & Son, 121
Nebr. 612, 237 N.W. 659 (1931) ; Lambert v. Lambert, 96 N.H. 376, 77 A.2d
34 (1950); Knox v. Allard, 90 N.H. 157, 5 A.2d 716 (1939); McCrillis v.
34 (1950); Knox v. Allard, 90 N.H. 157, 5 A. 2d 716 (1939); McCrillis v.
Americal Heel Co., 85 N.H. 165, 155 A. 410, 412 (1931) ("for refusal to accept service there is no more liability than for refusal to render it") ; Kann
v. Wausau Abrasives Co., 81 N.H. 535, 129 A. 374 (1925); Quigley Co. v.
Tsbestos Ltd., 23 N.J. Misc. 301, 44 A.2d 89 (1945), aff'd 138 N.J. Eq. 111,
46 A.2d 787 (1946); Mowers v. Fogg, 45 N.J. Eq. 120, 17 A. 296 (1889);
Stern v. Freeport Acres, 107 N.Y.S.2d 810 (1951) ; Auburn Draying Co.
v. Wardell, 178 App. Div. 270, 165 N.Y.S.2d 469, 471 (1917) ("the right of
the individual to freely contract for disposal of his services"); Martin v.
Platt, 5 N.Y. St. Rep. 284 (1886); Harlow v. Oregonian Pub. Co., 45 Ore.
520, 78 P. 737 (1904); Kapcia v. Lessing, 122 Pa. Super. 421, 186 A. 760
(1936); McCann v. South Nashville St. R. Co., 2 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 773
(1877); Starnes v. Newson, 1 Cooper's Tenn. Ch. 239 (1877); Carrico v.
Stevenson, 135 S.W. 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911); Campbell v. Rust, 85 Va.
653, 8 S.E. 664 (1889). See generally Annot., 135 A.L.R. 279 (1941) ; Note,
3 TEMPLE L.Q. 431 (1929).

375 Johnson v. Shrewsbury & B.R. Co. 3 DeG. M. & G. 914, 927, 43 Eng. Rep.
358, 363 (1853) : "It is clear in the present case that, had the Defendants been
minded to compel the Plaintiff to perform their duties against their will,
it could not have been done."
376 Dupree Quarries v. Dupree, [1934] Can. S.C.R. 528, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 618, 620.
37 Teeter v. Williams, 42 Ky. (3 B. Mon.) 562 (1843) ; Burton v. Marshall, 4
Gill 487 (Md. 1846) ; Sanquirico v. Benedetti, 1 Barb. 315 (N.Y. 1847); Port
Clinton R. Co. v. Cleveland & T.R. Co., 13 Ohio St. 544 (1862); Ford v.
Jermon, 6 Phila. 6, 22 Leg. Int. 44 (Pa. 1865).
378 Avins, The Right to Work and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original
Understanding, 18 LAB. L.J. 15 (1967).
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who has a valid contract cannot, even at his own expense, get a court
of equity to specifically enforce his contract by ordering the broker to
find the house for him. This means that the client's contractual rights
are not as well protected by the law as the Negro's non-contractual,
statutory rights. It is difficult to imagine a more clear-cut violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment provision that no state shall "deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' ' 3 79

Moreover, as previously noted, the right to dispose of personal
services is deemed both a liberty and a property right. Insofar as the
state compels one person to work for another, liberty and property are
taken without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
7. CLUB EXEMPTION
Anti-discrimination legislation typically exempts private clubs, either
expressly or by implication from the fact that only "public" accommodations are covered.- s0 Even a business subject to the law will be exempt
if it turns itself into an actual, bona fide membership club. 381 A divided
New York Court of Appeals has held that a golf course run by a
membership corporation and open only to members and guests is a
club and not a place of public accommodation within the coverage of
the law, even though signs advertised the club as "Public under club
rules."3

2

The major area of judicial concern in respect to the club exemption
has been the question of what constitutes a bona fide club. It has been
held in several cases that where a place of public accommodation adopts
the form of a club as a subterfuge to avoid serving Negroes, but in fact
remains open to the rest of the white population generally, the courts
will look through the form to the substance and hold that the place is
covered by the law.- 3 In one case, a membership corporation leased a
bathing and recreation park from the owner. The owner's officers con379

See generally Avins, The Equal "Protection" of the Laws: The Original Un-

derstanding, 12 N.Y.L.F. 385 (1966); Avins, The Right to Bring Suit Under
the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding, 20 OLA. L. REv.

284 (1967).

See uarfeld v. Sands Beach Club, 137 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1954). See generally,
Note, Public Accommodation Laws and Private Club, 54 GEG. L.J. 915 (1966).
38
1 Babberts Club of Columbus, Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm, 11 RAcE REL.
L. REP. 1057 (Ohio Ct. of Common Pleas, 1965).
382Delaney v. Central Valley Golf Club, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 932 (1941), aff'd 263 App.
Div. 710, 31 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1941), affd 289 N.Y. 577, 43 N.E.2d 716 (1942).
383 Gillespie v. Lake Shore Golf Club, 91 N.E.2d 290 (Ohio App. 1950)
(golf
course); Matter of Holiday Sands, Inc., 9 RACE REL. L. REP. 2025 (Ohio
Civil Rts. Comm. 1964) (swimming pool); Lackey v. Sacoolas, 411 Pa. 235, 191
A.2d 397 (1963) (swimming pool) ; Commonwealth v. Gibney, 5 RACE REL.
L. REP. 475 (Pa. Comm. Pleas 1959) (swimming pool); Brackeen v. Ruhman, 3 RACE REL. L. REP. 45, 48 (Pa. Comm. Pleas 1957) ("The so-called
club possessed none of the attributes of a club in the legal sense that it was
owned, operated, and controlled by and for its members and for the membership") (roller skating rink). See also Jackson v. Dearmore, Inc., 10 RACE
REL. L. REP. 451 (Kans .Comm. on Civil Rights 1965) (super club).
380
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trolled the membership corporation, and received substantially the whole
profit from the facilities. Applications of white persons were approved
automatically and in unlimited numbers. The New York Court of Appeals held that the club was a sham and that the park was a place of
4
public accommodation.3
The federal courts have also had to deal with whether a facility was
a public accommodation or a club under Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.-8 They have held that a restaurant which is turned into
a simulated private club to evade the statute, but which admits all white
persons upon signing a membership blank and paying a nominal fee, is
a mere facade for a facility covered by the law. 8s 6 The same result has
occurred when a club operated a cafeteria in a state capitol.38 7 or a
public fire company operated a swimming pool as a club. 388 In such a

case, the purpose of the exemption, which seems to be a desire to make
some concession to the associational preferences of small groups, is not
38 9

served.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey has recently narrowed the club
exemption quite considerably in Clover Hill Swimming Club v. Goldsboro.3 90 In this case, the club was operated by a stock corporation the
officers of which appointed a membership committee for the club. The
club was limited to 400 families, each of which had to buy a $350 debenture bond and pay an annual fee of $150. The bond was non-interest
bearing and non-transferrable. The club advertised for members by a
brochure lauding its facilities, which was sent to those persons who wrote
for information. It advertised in local newspapers, and placed a sign
384 Castle Hill Beach Club, Inc. v. Arbury, 2 N.Y.2d 596, 162 N.Y.S.2d 1, 142
N.E. 2d 186 (1957).
385 See 110 CONG. REc. 13697 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey):
"The test as to whether a private club is really a private club, or whether it
is an establishment, really not open to the public, is a factual one. . . . It
is not our intention to permit this section to be used to evade the prohibitions
of the title by the creation of sham establishments which are in fact open
to all the white public and not to Negroes. We intend only to protect the
genuine privacy of private clubs or other establishments whose membership
is genuinely selective on some reasonable basis."
386Bradshaw v. Whigam, 11 RACE REL. L. REP. 934 (U.S.D.C., S.D. Fla. 1966);
United States v. Northwest Louisiana Restaurant Club, 256 F. Supp. 151
(W.D. La. 1966); United States v. Clarksdale King & Anderson Co., 10
RACE REL. L. REP. 1762 (U.S.D.C., N.D. Miss. 1965).
387 Sutton v. Capitol Club, Inc., 10 RAcE REL. L. REP. 791 (U.S.D.C., E.D. Ark.
1965).
388 Williams v. Rescue Fire Co., 254 F. Supp. 556, 563 (D. Md. 1966):
"When a fire department, in its official name, using taxpayers' land and taxpayers' money in small or large part, constructs, controls, and operates a taxexempt recreation facility, in effect open to the public, it cannot exclude one
third of those taxpayers for 'social' reasons."
389See Van Alstyne, Civil Rights: A New Public Acconmodations Law for
Ohio, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 683, 688 (1961) : "The problem is, however, to acknowledge the legitimacy of certain interests in exclusive association which renders a place distinctly private, without at the same time swallowing up the
rule that there shall be no discrimination in places of public accommodation."
39047 N.J. 25, 219 A.2d 161 (1966).
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next to the entrance saying "a private family club with complete recreational facilities." The nature of the facilities and an address and telephone number were given.
The club contended that even though a swimming pool and recreation park were generally deemedto be places of public accommodation,
this club fell into the exemption for a "bona fide club, or place of accommodation, which is in its nature distinctly private." 391 In disagreeing
with this contention, the court laid heavy stress on the club's advertising,
saying:
An establishment which by advertising or otherwise extends an
invitation to the public generally is a place of public accommodation and cannot use race, creed or color as a basis for refusing
to deal with those members of the public who have accepted the
invitation. .

.

. Clover Hill argues that it engaged in no public

advertising, but its activities clearly indicate 392
that it sought to attract new members from the public at large.
The court rejected the limitation on the number of families as evidence
that the facility was private on the ground that even places of public
accommodation had limited facilities. Of course, it failed to note that
such businesses expand their facilities rather than limit their business.
The court likewise rejected the evidence that members are billed annually and required to purchase a bond. It held that the method of payment was not controlling. However, it is certainly unusual for a public
business to require customers to buy an interest-free bond in the business. Also, the court declared that the material referring to the
facility as a private club was self-serving. It is difficult for the club to
find any other way of expressing its nature than this.
Finally, the court declared that the club exemption did not apply
because the facility was a profit-making enterprise and not a non-profit
enterprise. The court said:
The statutory exemption for distinctly private organizations is
designed to protect the personal associational preferences of their
members. However, Clover Hill does not owe its existence to the
associational preferences of its members but to the coincidence
of their interest in the facilities offered by the owners. In other
words, Clover Hill originated not because certain residents of
Passaic Township wished to associate themselves in a swimming
club, but rather because an entrepreneur was seeking a profitable
investment. 393
The idea that people are uninterested in whom they will associate
with in the use of facilities is entirely unrealistic. Frequently, this is
the major factor in deciding to use a particular facility. The fact that
391 N.J.S.A. 18: 25-5 (1).
392 219 A.2d at 165.
3931d. at 166. Cf. Commonwealth v. Brown, 260 F. Supp. 323, 353-5 (E.D. Pa.
1966).
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the club is run for profit does not detract from this motive. The club
members may be quite satisfied to have the administrative burdens taken
off their hands in return for paying management a reasonable profit.
The fact that management runs the club does not detract from its exclusive nature, nor from the mutual interests of the club members. If
ninety percent of the club members prefer not to be bothered running the
club, it might be wiser to let the management run it than to let the
interested ten percent dominate its affairs. Many clubs are dominated by
a small group of activists who are less sensitive to the needs of the
members than professional management would be. The fact that management is professional, and is compensated by a profit rather than
salaries, does not detract from the fact that club members who invest
in the club are in fact bona fide members.
The fact that the club advertises for new members does not make it
any less of a club. Any club which owns facilities undoubtedly desires
capacity use of these facilities, since if they are idle the existing members
have to pay more for upkeep. It is of much more significance that the
facilities are limited and are not expanded to conform to "customer"
demand, although even the most exclusive membership clubs will frequently expand their facilities when membership rises. If the club's
advertising indicates that it is a private facility this should be enough.
To say that such a statement is self-serving is circular reasoning. The
object of "public accommodation" laws, as enunciated by the courts,
is to spare the public from taking the trouble of applying to a facility
advertised as public when it is not public in fact. 39 4 But if it is advertised as private, the public is alerted that service may be refused, and
the misleading element is absent. To say that a club invites the public
when its invitation indicates that access may be restricted, and then to
say that the restriction is invalid because it invites the public, is to engage in circular reasoning by which a club is lifted from private to public
by its own bootstraps. Apparently, the only private clubs in New Jersey
are those which do not advertise their existence, except possibly by
word-of-mouth, or in other words, secret societies such as the Ku Klux
Klan. But Negroes would not want to join these anyway.
8. CONCLUSION

The present statutes and cases thereunder which forbid discrimination in so-called "places of public accommodation" are in an unsatisfactory state. The cases are in a state of confusion because there is no
underlying rationale which distinguishes private businesses from public
businesses. Legislatures and courts have chosen to lump together whatever businesses they think ought to serve Negroes, without developing
any clear-cut theory to justify such inclusions or exclusions. Only ethnic
394 Note 271, supra.
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discrimination is forbidden, leaving all other discrimination uncovered.
Personal services are compelled to be furnished without contract even
where they could not be coerced to fulfill a contract. In short, the "civil
rights" laws, which started as a way of giving Negroes the same rights
as everybody else,3"5 have culminated in a system giving them more
rights than anybody else. One judge has aptly protested:
In allowing respondent to maintain her action, the majority
opinion has stricken down the constitutional right of all private
individuals of every race to choose with whom they will deal and
associate in their private affairs.
No sanction for this result can be found in the recent segregation
cases in the United States Supreme Court involving Negro rights
in public schools and public busses.
The rights and privileges of the fourteenth amendment, supra, as
treated in the segregation decisions and as understood by everybody, related to public institutions and public utilities for the obvious reason that no person, whether white, black, red, or yellow,
has any right whatever to compel another to do business with him
in his private affairs.
No public institution or public utility is involved in the instant
case. The Slenderella enterprise was not established by law to
serve a public purpose. It is not a public utility with monopoly
prerogatives granted to it by franchise in exchange for an unqualified obligation to serve everyone alike. Its employees are not
public servants or officers. It deals in private personal services.
Its business, like most service trades, is conducted pursuant to
informal contracts. The fee is the consideration for the service.
It is true the contracts are neither signed, sealed, nor reduced to
writing. They are contracts, nevertheless, and, as such, must be
voluntarily made and are then, and only then, mutually enforceable. Since either party can refuse to contract, the respondent had
no more right to compel service than Slenderella had to compel
her to patronize its business.
There is a clear distinction between the nondiscrimination enjoined upon a public employee in the discharge of his official
duties, which are prescribed by laws applicable to all, and his
unlimited freedom of action in his private affairs. There is no,
analogy between a public housing project operated in the government's proprietary capacity, wherein Negroes have equal rights,
and a private home where there are no public
rights whatever
3 96
and into which even the King cannot enter.

3 See Deuwell v. Foerster, 12 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 329, 330 (C.P. 1912):
"The law impressed those engaged in the business of maintaining inns, hotels:
and public carriers with a duty to the general public ,quasi public in its nature, that they should serve the public without discrimination. When colored
people were clothed with citizenship, it necessarily followed that they were
entitled to the same rights as other citizens. Legislation being necessary to.
secure these rights, it was first directed toward those engaged in the business.
of furnishing public accommodation in hotels and public carriers."
396 Browning v. Slenderella Systems of Seattle, 54 Wash.d 440, 341 P.2ct
859, 867-8 (1959) (Mallery, J., dissenting).
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The first category of "places of public accommodation" are taxsupported government facilities. These facilities may only exclude people
on reasonable grounds, 397 and hence Negroes cannot be excluded from
the equal right to use such facilities. 98 The next category of "places of
public accommodation" are public utilities, which includes those businesses which have a government-granted economic monopoly. If these
businesses may discriminate, people may never get the services they need,
for the government granted monopoly has by its terms excluded the
establishment of competing businesses.
A sharp distinction should be drawn between licenses for the purposes of insuring public health, safety, or access to competent workmen,
or for revenue purposes, and publicly-granted economic monopolies. 99
In the case of the former, the number of licensees is indefinitely expandable to meet the needs of any segment of the public which cannot obtain
service elsewhere. In the case of the latter, the government prevents
such expansion. Where unlimited opportunities exist for qualified individuals to enter the business, there is no legitimate reason to require
any particular person to serve somebody he desires not to serve. However, where government limits competition, it may legitimately ask those
who have been granted a monopoly to insure that nobody suffers because
of this monopoly.
The third category may include economic or natural monopolies.
Certain businesses are, for special reasons, necessarily monopoly businesses. Economic monopolies include businesses which are so expensive
to operate that the existence of one such business necessarily precludes
competition. Daily newspapers are rapidly falling into such a category.
It is uneconomic to have competition among them, as demonstrated by
the high rate of failures and mergers. Natural monopolies exist because
they require special geographic locations, which are unique or exist in
very small numbers. The grain elevators dealt with in Munn v. I1linois'0 0
fall into this category. In the case of economic or natural monopolies,
the state may justifiably treat them like franchised monopolies or public
utilities, and require them to serve the public without arbitrary discrimination. However, ethnic discrimination alone should not be banned,
for other classes will be left bereft of the service. All unreasonable discrimination should be forbidden if the business is to be treated as a
"place of public accommodation."
397 D.D.B. Realty Corp. v. Merrill, 232 F. Supp. 629 (D. Vt. 1964).
398 Easterly v. Dempster, 112 F. Supp. 214 (E.D. Tenn. 1953).
399 See Note, Equal Protection and Discrimination in Public Accommodations,
32 FORD L. REv. 327, 336 (1963): "In short, a system of 'granting' licenses
can hardly be called a favor to the businessman. Its object is to place limitations on him. The same cannot be said of the granting of a franchise or
lease, which involves giving one corporation or group the use of public
property denied to all or most of the rest of the populace."
40094

U.S. 113 (1877).
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In particular instances, it may be difficult to determine whether a
business has an economic or natural monopoly. What should be considered is not merely the number of businesses in any given locality, but
the customary amount of traveling done to get to a business or facility
of that kind. For example, to get to a resort hotel or beach of any size,
it is customary to travel not merely outside of one's community or state,
but also, even outside of the country. Therefore, the scope of competition
is really international. It is by no means unusual for people in the United
States to fly to Central or South America or to Europe for a vacation
of a few weeks. The area of competition is therefore international, and
even if only one resort hotel exists in the locality, it cannot be said to
have an economic or natural monopoly. On the other hand, nobody would
think of going to Europe for a tank of gasoline for his car or for a
drink of whiskey. If there was only one gasoline station or bar within a
reasonable driving distance it might constitute a local monopoly upon
which a state could justifiably impose the duties of a public utility.
Businesses wherein there is sufficient competition to assure the use
of some facility for all members of the public within a customary area
of use of these facilities is not a "place of public accommodation," statecreated labels to the contrary notwithstanding. Such businesses are
purely private. Proprietors ought to be entitled to select their own customers. They are entitled to do this, not merely because they have a right
to determine what sort of business they want to attract in order to insure
the prosperity of the firm, but also to protect the interest of their customers in association with other persons of the group or class which
pleases their customers.

40 1

It has been argued that freedom of choice in association does not
extend beyond the home; specifically, that it does not extend to "public
accommodations." 40 2 Such an argument begs the question at issue, which
401See Johnson v. Auburn & Syracuse Elec. R. Co., 169 App. Div. 864, 156
N.Y.S.2d 93, 96-97 (1915), rev'd on other grounds 222 N.Y. 443, 119 N.E.
72 (1918):
"Was it the intent of the Legislature by this statute to require the proprietor
of every place where a public dance is being given to admit all persons who
apply and are willing to pay the admission fee? A so-called public dance is
usually a private enterprise conducted for the profit of its proprietor. It is
a social meeting of the sexes for the pleasure derived from the society of
those they know or whose acquaintance they there form, as well as from
the dancing. Its success depends largely upon bringing together people who,
are mutually congenial and who are willing to associate together for the
time being for the pleasure they derive from each other's society and acquaintance, as well as from dancing together or upon the same floor.
"If a proprietor of such a place may not eercise his judgment as to who to.
admit and who to exclude, in order to secure the patronage necessary to
success in such an enterprise, then it is manifest he cannot control the character of his place or its patronage ....

It would seem, therefore, that such

a business could not be carried on successfully unless the proprietor is able
to discriminate according to his judgment as to persons, male and female,
he is to admit to such an intimate association with each other."
402 In Johnson v. Humphrey Pop Corn Co., 24 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 135, 138 (1902)
aff'd 70 Ohio St. 478, 72 N.E. 1160 (1904), the court said:
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is what the law ought to deem a "place of public accommodation." Even
a private dinner party in one's home could theoretically be labeled a
"place of public accommodation." The question is, should it be so
labeled ?
Even those who favor a broad meaning for the term "place of public
accommodation" concede that freedom of choice in association is a value
worth protecting. 40 3 But they would subordinate this value to the right
of the public to use any and every business facility-or at least the right
of Negroes to use such facilities, which is even less justifiable than enforcing a broader rule applicable to public utilities. From this view, this
author dissents. Freedom of choice in association is a value of importance. It has even been held that such freedom exists in respect to
government-owned facilities, where no right of anybody else is infringed
upon.40 4 As one federal court held:
It has not yet been held to be unconstitutional for individuals to
prefer to associate with others of their own race, class, background, or, if you like, prejudices. And there is no reason for
the City to interfere with such freedom
of choice-or freedom of
40 5
association as it is sometimes called.
An Ohio court has likewise aptly put it:
[B ] ut until the passage of this [civil rights ] act whether there
should be discrimination or nondiscrimination fell outside the
domain of positive law. It remained in that field of "free choice,"
in which the operator was free to deny access to his facilities,
"A man is at liberty to select for his associates whom he will, provided only
that the party whom he selects is willing to be his associate. He is at liberty
to invite to his home whom he will, and to exclude from his home whom he
will, but this does not give to one citizen above another, under the same circumstances, the right to say who shall be admitted to the privileges of the
public places enumerated in this section of the statute first referred to."
403 See Horowitz, The 1959 CaliforniaEqual Rights in "Business Establishments"
Statute-A Problem in Statutory Application, 33 S. CALIF. L. REV. 260, 280
(1960) :
"There would seem to have been reasonable grounds, in detremining what
the scope of protection should be for the interests of discriminatees protected by the statutory principle, to limit that principle to non-gratuitous and
relatively noncontinuous, nonpersonal, and nonsocial relationships. For to be
balanced against the discriminatee's interest in not being subjected to racial
discrimination is the ever present interest of the discriminator in having
freedom of choice in the utilization of his property or facilities and in the
selection of those persons which (sic) whom he wishes to deal. The balancing of these competing interests is a delicate one in any fact situation. The
policy reasons favoring permitting a private person to discriminate on grounds
of race in his relationships with other persons would be strongest where
the person offered benefits or facilities to other persons gratuitously, and
where the relationships with those other persons were of a continuous and
closely personal and social sort."
404 Freeman v. City of Little Rock, 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 173 (U.S.D.C., E.D.
Ark. 1963) ; Jones v. Marva Theatres, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 49, 51-52 (D. Md.
1960); Mitchell v. Boys Club of Metropolitan Police, 157 F. Supp. 101
(D.D.C. 1957). Cf. Statom v. Board of Commissioners, 8 RACE REL. L. REP.
175 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1963), rev'd 233 Md. 57, 195 A.2d 41 (1963).
405 Wood v. Vaughn, 209 F. Supp. 106, 114 (W.D. Va. 1962).
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and the prospective patron was free to withhold his patronage.
This right of free choice determines the domain of liberty for
every American citizen of every race and color. 406
Freedom of choice is an irresistible urge. No matter how dammed
up it is by laws, it will find a way to flow out. It will flow through the
creaks and crevices and the loopholes of the law 4 0 7 until it has all seeped
through. Laws limiting such freedom to aid Negroes are doomed to
failure in the end. They serve only to frustrate the asperations of Negroes and irritate the whites.
It has been correctly observed that "discrimination is but another
word for free choice," and that "in dealings between men, both cannot
be free unless each acts voluntarily; otherwise one is subjected to the
other's will." 408s Where competition exists, the business proprietor must
conform his practices to his customers' tastes; otherwise he goes out
of business. He must select the class of patronage that they want. His
selections therefore represent a vicarious exercise of the free choice
of his customers. Such choice ought only to be overruled by government
based on imperative necessity. Only a monopoly can create the necessity
of extending the facility to all persons. These are "places of public
accommodation." All other business is private, and should be governed,
not by the laws of the state but by the competitive pressures of a free
enterprise market place.
APPENDIX
S. 15, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. Dec. 4, 1883, to amend sections 1756 and 1757 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States-Edmunds-Committee on the Judiciary
A Bill
To provide for the further protection of citizens of the United States and others
against the violation of certain rights secured to them by the Constitution of the

United States.

Whereas, in the judgment of Congress, by the true intent and meaning of the
Constitution of the United States no distinction can be made in respect of the
civil rikhts of person or rights of property by any law, custom, usage, practice,
rule or decision of any department of the government of any State or of the
United States, based upon race, color, or previous condition of servitude of citizens of the United States; and
Whereas such rights of all such citizens are protected by the Constitution of
the United States against such cruel and unjust distinctions; and
Whereas doubts have arisen whether the laws of the United States now in
force are in all respects adequate to such protection; and
406 Fletcher v. Coney Island, Inc., 100 Ohio App. 259, 136 N.E.2d 344, 350-1.
(1955), aff'd 165 Ohio St. 150, 134 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
40tIn Castle Hill Beach Club v. Arbury, 208 Misc. 35, 142 N.Y.S.2d 432, 440
(1955), the court noted:
"The overt and even blatant discriminatory practices of the past have succumbed, in recent years, to the condemnation of an aroused and enlightened
public and to the enactment of remedial legislation. However, those determined to continue such intolerant and intolerable purposes have attempted
to evade the charge of discrimination by changing their methods of operation. The variety of stratagems employed seems infinite, and the ruses and
dodges are limited only by the extent of the practitioners' ingenuity."
408 Browning v. Slenderella Systems, supra, n; 396 at 868.
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Whereas it is the duty of Congress fully to provide for the protection of
citizens of the United States against all such unjust distinctions; Therefore,
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled:
That whenever in any case now pending or which may hereafter be pending
in any court of any State an issue shall exist or be made or any material question
shall arise concerning any civil right of person or right of property which shall
be assailed or maintained or assailed or denied in any such issue or question on
the ground that such issue or question depends upon or is affected by the race
or color or previous condition of servitude of any person or persons concerned
in and a party to such issue on question, the person or persons against whom
such issue or question shall be made, asserted or maintained, or against whom
any such denial shall be made in the ground aforesaid, shall be thereupon entitled
to remove such cause to the circuit court of the United States for the district
within the territorial limits of which such case shall be pending, for proceedings,
trial and judgment in the manner and with like proceedings, as near as may
be, as are provided by section 639 of the Revised Statutes of the United States,
but without regard to the sum in controversy.
Section 2. That whenever in any case now pending or which may hereafter
be pending in any court in any State a ruling or decision, interlocutory or
other, shall be made adversely to the civil right or claim of any person on the
ground of his race or color or previous condition of servitude, or the race or
color or previous condition of servitude of any witness or juror in such case,
the person being a party to said cause against whom such ruling or decision
shall be made shall be thereupon entitled to remove such cause to the circuit
court of the United States for the district within the territorial limits of which
said court shall be held, for proceedings, trial, and final judgment in the same
manner and with like proceedings, as near as may be, as are provided by section
639 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, but without regard to the sum
in controversy.
Section 3. That whenever in any cause or matter mentioned in the preceding
sections the decision or judgment of the State court in which such case shall be
pending shall proceed upon or be affected by any matter or ground of the race
or color or previous condition of servitude of any person being a party to or
witness or juror in such case, and the decision of such court shall be adverse
to such person upon any of the grounds or matters aforesaid by reason of his
race or color or previous condition of servitude, the person being a party to
such cause against whom any such decision shall be made shall be entitled to a
review of such decision by the Supreme Court of the United States, upon his
writ of error to be sued out and prosecuted in the same manner as is now provided by law for writs of error to the highest court of any State; and in every
such case such writ of error may be sued out and prosecuted as of right, and
without giving any new bail or other security, unless a justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States allowing such writ of error, or said court itself,
shall be of opinion that the public interest or safety requires it.
Section 4. That no law, usage, or custom, and no practice, decision, or rule
of any department of the government of any State which may now or hereafter
exist which shall in any manner discriminate between the rights of person or
of property upon the grounds of race, color, or previous condition of servitude
shall be deemed valid; and it shall be the duty of every court, whether of a
State or of the United States, in which any such matter or ground shall be
drawn in question, to proceed to determine the matter in controversy in the
same manner and with the same effect as if such law, usage, custom, rule, practice, or decision did not exist.

